BCBSF Public Policy Issue Papers by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc.
INDEX 
BCBSF PUBLIC POLICY ISSUE PAPERS 
Issue Date Last Date 
Paper Title of Issue Paper Created Revised 
Number 
#1 Abortion Coverage Statistics 08/02/94 
#2 Actions Florida Could Take to 11/92 
Improve the Health System 
#3 Administrative Simplification 08/93 
#4 Anti-Managed Care Legislation 04/11/94 
#4.1 Anti-Network Legislation 05/03/95 
#5 Antitrust 02/01/94 
#5.1 Antitrust 05/03/95 
#6 Any Willing Provider 02/22/94 
#6.1 Any Willing Provider 03/06/95 05/03/95 
(MLR) 
#7 Assuring Good Information for 11/92 
Purchasers 
#8 Background on Purchasing Unknown 
Groups 
#9 Basic Benefit Standard 02/94 
#9.1 Basic Benefit Standard (Laura Unknown 10/20/95 
verified some information on this 
- see folder) 
950306 . lIP - Revised July 13 , 20 17 
1 
Issue Date Last Date 
Paper Title of Issue Paper Created Revised 
Number 
#10 BCBSF's Position on the Clinton 09/93 
Health Care Reform Proposal 
#11 BCBSF's Vision Statement 09/21/92 
#12 Centers of Excellence 02/01/94 
#13 Certificate of Need 02/01/94 
#14 Combining State Employee 11/92 
Group and Medicaid 
#14.1 Community Rating 11/94 
#15 Controlling Administrative 11/92 
Expenses 
#16 Cost Containment ??? 
#16.1 Direct Access 03/13/95 
#16.2 Cost of "Direct Access" 05/25/94 
Legislation 
#17 Employer Mandate to Provide 11/92 
Health Insurance 
#18 Encouraging Prudent Purchasing 11/92 
#19 Expenditure Caps/Rate Setting 11/92 
#20 Financing ??? 
#21 Florida Health Security Program 04/94 
#21.1 Florida Patient Protection and 05/03/95 
Quality Assurance Act 
#22 Government Contractor Mandate 02/10/94 
950306 . l I P - Revised July 13 , 2017 
2 
Issue Date Last Date 
Paper Title of Issue Paper Created Revised 
Number 
#23 Guarantee Issue ??? 
#23.1 Government As a Customer ??? 
#24 Health Care Data 02/01/94 
#24.1 Health Care Fraud 02/95 
#25 Health Care Purchasing Groups 01/19/94 
#26 Health Care Reform - General 08/25/94 
#27 Health Care Data and Information 08/11/93 
Released to the Public 
#28 Individual Health Insurance ??? 
#29 Individual Market Health 02/01/94 
Insurance Reform 
#30 Individual-Based System 08/93 
Experiment 
#31 Insurance Reform ??? 
#31.1 Insurance Reform ??? 
#32 no paper 
#33 Long-Term Care 02/01/94 
#34 Managed Competition ( CHP As) 02/01/94 
#35 Managed Competition - (check for 
Component of SB 1914 date) 
#36 Mandatory Medicaid Enrollment 03/04/94 
inHMOs 
#36.1 Mandatory Point-of-Service 05/03/95 
950306 . lIP - Revised July 13 , 2017 
3 
Issue Date Last Date 
Paper Title of Issue Paper Created Revised 
Number 
#37 Medaccess 08/11/93 
#38 Medicaid 08/93 
#39 Medicaid Reforms 11/92 
#40 Medical Practice Parameters 11/92 
#41 Medical Professional Liability 11/92 
Reform 
#41.1 Medical Savings Accounts 05/03/95 
#42 Medical Liability 02/01/94 
#43 Medical Malpractice 09/93 
#43.1 Medicare Reform - BCBSF's 09/11/95 10/20/95 
proposal 
#43.2 Medicare Reform - Vision 09/11/95 10/20/95 
Statement 
#44 Medicare 08/93 
#44.1 National Health Board ??? 
#45 Patient Choice and Managed Care 
#46 POS Compromise 05/25/94 
#47 Practice Parameters 02/01/94 
#47.1 Practice Parameters ??? 
#47.2 Price Controls 01/93 
#48 Pricing Practices ( written by Judy 02/02/93 
Discenza) 
#49 Primary Care 02/01/94 
950306 . lIP - Revised July 13 , 2017 
4 
Issue Date Last Date 
Paper Title of Issue Paper Created Revised 
Number 
#49.1 Proposal for Improving Access to 06/95 10/20/95 
Care (short version) 
#49.2 Proposal for Improving Access to 06/95 10/20/95 
Care (long version) 
#50 Purchasing Alliances 05/13/94 
#50.1 Purchasing Alliances ??? 
#50.2 Quality 05/05/95 
#51 Quality of Care Regulation 02/01/94 
#52 no paper 
#53 Rural Health Care 02/01/94 
#54 Self-Regulation 08/93 
#55 Standard Benefit Plan ??? 
#55.1 Standard Benefit Plan - ??? 
Alternative Proposal 
#56 Standard Setting Organizations 07/93 
#57 Standardized Claim Forms 02/01/94 
#58 State Employee Plan 02/01/94 
#59 Targets 11/92 
#60 Uninsured, The 08/93 
#61 Universal Access ??? 
950306 . lIP - Revised July 13 , 2017 
5 
ABORTION COVERAGE STATISTICS 
The only national statistics available on i nsurance coverage of abortion were 
recently released by the Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI) . It has been noted that 
the AGI is a non- profit reproductive health research organization connected to the 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America . 
According to a recent survey by AG I 1 : 
• Two - thirds o f " typical fee - fo r - service " insur ance plans " routinely " cover abo r t i on 
services . One - third either restrict coverage , basing it on specific medical 
indications (20 - 25 percent) , or do not cover it (10 - 15 percent) 
Percent of Typical Plans in Which Induced Abortion is Routinely Covered , by Type 
of Plan : 
I I Indemnity Plans I PPO I HMO I 
I 
<100 >100 Self 
Emplys . Emplys . Ins . 
D&C2 64 % 66 % 68 % 67 % 70 % 
D&E 3 66 % 69 % 68 % 67 % 70 % 
Percent of Typical Plans in Which Induced Abortion Coverage is Subject to Additional 
Restrictions , by Type of Plan : 
I Indemnity Plans I PPO I HMO I 
<100 >100 Self 
Emplys . Emplys . Ins . 
D&C 21 % 23 % 18 % 20 % 20 % 
D&E 18 % 20 % 18 % 1 9% 20 % 
1 The AGI study was funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Founda tion and is based on a 1993 survey of the 100 
largest commercial insurance carriers , all 106 HMOs with 100 , 000 or more enrollees , 107 smaller HMOs , and all 73 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans. Fifty- eight percent of commercia l i nsurers surveyed res ponded, 53 percent of BC/BS 
plans , and 50 percent of HMOs . The margin of error is+/- 10 pe rcent . 
2 oilation & Cutterage Suction 
3 oilation & Evacuation 
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1 
Percent of Typical Plans in Which Induced Abortion is not Covered , by Type of Plan : 
I I Indemnity Plans I PPO I HMO I 
<100 >100 Self 
Ernplys . Ernplys . Ins . 
D&C 15 % 11 % 14 % 13% 10 % 
D&E 16 % 11 % 14 % 14 % 10 % 
• 70 % of HMOs and 66 % of large health plans cover abortion 
IPl - August 2 , 1994 
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ACTIONS FLORIDA COULD TAKE TO IMPROVE THE HEALTH SYSTEM 
1 . Assure good information f o r purchasers . 
2 . Encourage prudent purchasing . 
3 . Reform Medicaid . 
4 . Encourage the development and use of pract ice parameters . 
5 . Control administrative expenses . 
6 . Reform medica l professiona l liability . 
IP2 - Novembe r 1992 
ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATION 
The Problem 
As health care costs have continued to rise , all segments of the health care system 
have come under closer scrutiny to justify their expenses . A study by Lewin/ICF 
estimates that as much as 24 % (or about $175 billion) of total health care costs 
are attributable to administrative services . Other estimates range from 5 % to 22 %, 
depending on what is included as administrative expenses (e . g ., planning , marketing , 
billing , sales , all expenses not directly attributable to patient care) . Lack of 
agreement on how to define administrative costs makes comparison of studies on this 
topic difficult . 
Although administrative costs are necessary in the operation of any service , there 
is widespread agreement that administrative costs in health care can be reduced . 
Two views prevail on how administrative costs can best be reduced . One view 
maintains that the large number of payers ( over 1 , 500 insurance companies and several 
public programs) in the current system inherently increase administrative costs , 
and the solution is to move toward a single payor system . Another view recognizes 
the benefit of system- wide cost reduct i ons associated with the administrative costs 
of certain services (e . g ., managed care) , and favors evaluating the benefits of 
existing administrative costs , introducing greater efficiencies wherever possible . 
On the surface , arguments for a single payor system appear attractive . Canada , 
most often cited as a system to imitate , boasts of administrative costs at about 
6% of their total health care expenses . As mentioned earlier , however , what is 
included in the definition (or what is excluded) can make a large difference in 
the outcome . Some studies of the U. S . system demonstrate a similar 5- 6% of total 
health care costs attributable to admi nist r ative functions . These studi es have 
included the administ r ation of government programs (e . g ., Medicare) and the 
admin i strative costs and profits of private insurance companies . Such findings 
indicate that the U. S . may be more efficient than Canada in administer i ng health 
care s ervices . 
Studies comparing U. S . administrative costs to Canadi an admin i strative costs also 
mention the different expectations that the two countri es have of their 
administrative systems . In Canada , certain administrative functions do not occur 
at the same level that they do in the U. S . (billing , marke t ing , utilization review) . 
These functions have a smalle r r ole i n their health care system . Consequently , 
Canada ' s administrative system does not need to collect and maintain the same leve l 
of financial and c linica l info r mation t hat the U. S . does . Access to detailed 
f i nancial and clinical information is necessary for a private market system to remain 
viable by continuously gaugi ng the efficiency of its operations . 
A large part of administrat i ve functions are devoted to the co l lect i on and processing 
of clinical and financial information . These costs occur at all levels of health 
care financing and deli very . Some of them are "hidden costs ", passed from the 
government to insurers , patients , and providers . It is estimated that 18 % of 
hospital spending is spent on administration and billing , 45 % of gross physician 
costs are spent on professiona l expenses (much of it for billing) . One visit to 
1 
the doctor generates 7 to 10 pieces of paper . Annually , over 450 different forms 
related to the billing process are used . There is widespread agreement that efforts 
aimed at simplifying and reducing data transacti ons among payers , regulators , 
providers , and patients will reduce overall administrative costs . 
IP3 - August 1993 
Current Efforts to Reduce Administrative Costs 
A concerted effort to simplify and reduce data transactions is being supported by 
the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) and the National Association of 
Insurance Companies (NAIC) through the Workgroup on Electronic Data Interchange 
(WEDI) , a coalition of major private and public payers created in 1991 . WEDI has 
been working on the electronic transmission of claims data , the development of 
confidentiality legislation , and the standardization of data formats , and data 
elements . Standardization of data formats and data elements has been developed 
in cooperation with the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) . 
The standardizat i on and automation of data collection and transmission will reduce 
the costs associated with collecting similar financial and clinical data for 
different entities . Insurers and providers will decrease the amount of time they 
spend fi l ling out paper - work , mailing forms , and waiting for reimbursement . Unlike 
many other countries , in the United States transaction- related functions are applied 
to a wide variety of purposes . Data generated for billing purposes are used for 
quality assurance , research , planning , supporting managed care functions , 
education , and compliance with government regulations . 
Standardiz i ng data will serve other purposes as well. Consumers will be able to 
use standardized information , as summary data are available , to compare various 
providers and insurance plans . As consumers become informed decision makers , the 
private market will become stronger and more cost - effective . Clinical and 
scientific communities will also benefit from the standardization of data . Research 
efforts to develop scientif i cally- based practice parameters will be faci l itated 
as will clinical comparisons of patient outcomes. Administrative costs in research 
heretofore spent on seeking comparable data or i n translating data into usable forms , 
can be spent on other research needs . 
In Florida , state sta t utes have charged the Department of Insurance (DOI) with 
prescribing separate standardized claim forms for use by all hospitals , dentists , 
physicians , and pharmacists . In all cases , the DOI has adopted nationally 
recognized forms (HCFA forms , the American Dental Association form , and the Nat i onal 
Drug Code form) . HCFA has mandated that the NAIC develop a standardized claim form 
and electronic data system . The NAI C is in the process of adopting and standardizing 
the nationally recognized forms ment ioned above. Florida ' s DOI is working closely 
with the NAIC in the deve l opment of the automated system . 
A recent Florida statute charges the Agency for Health Care Administration with 
developing a standardized claim form for use by insurers and health care providers . 
The agency must have a draft of the standardized form by October 1 , 1993 . The 
finalized form must be included in the final Florida Health Plan which is to be 
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submitted to the legislature by December 31 , 1993 . 
While the standardization and automation of data will increase the efficiency of 
many administrative functions , other efforts are underway in the heal th care industry 
to address managerial inefficiencies . These include the use of Total Quality 
Management (TQM) or Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) to streamline and improve 
operational activities . It is estimated that between 20 % and 30 % of operational 
(administrative) costs result from inefficient work systems . CQI is an 
administrative tool intended to correct systems - related inefficiencies and prevent 
future inefficiencies from developing . 
BCBSF Position 
BCBSF supports current efforts in the heal th care industry to reduce administrative 
costs and is encouraged by the government ' s support for the private sector ' s efforts . 
IP3 - August 1993 
In a private market , health care delivery systems are developed to achieve 
cost - effective care (e . g ., managed care systems , HMOs , integrated health care 
systems) . To remain competitive , unnecessary costs must be eliminated . Managed 
care systems focus on lowering overall health care delivery costs . The value of 
maintaining higher administrative costs is continually compared to the value of 
achieving lower delivery costs . 
In a well - functioning competitive environment , administrative costs naturally will 
be kept to a minimum by consumers who will demand value for what they purchase . 
Cooperative efforts within the industry to reduce administrative costs (such as 
efforts through WEDI) should be encouraged as long as these efforts do not disturb 
the competitive forces of the marketplace . 
Administrative costs must be viewed within the larger context of the role they play 
in the health care system . Some level of administrative costs are necessary and 
add value to the health care system . Comparisons of U. S . administrative costs to 
those of other countries may provide an incomplete picture . U. S . administrative 
costs should be analyzed for the value that they add to the entire health care system. 
IP3 - August 199 3 
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ANTI-MANAGED CARE LEGISLATION 
The Issue 
During this legislative session in Tal l ahassee , several bills have been introduced 
that have anti - managed care language . These bills have " any willing provider " and 
"direct access " components that would destroy the effectiveness of provider networks 
and eliminate the role of the primary care physician . This would result in less 
efficient, more costly health care for employers and employees. 
•"Any willing provider " bills require managed care organizations (MCOs) to include 
in their network any providers who accept the MCO ' s payment schedule . 
•" Direct access " legislation would forbid MCO ' s from agreeing with their policy 
holders to use a care manager. 
MCOs have contributed significantly to lower insurance premiums and lower health 
care costs in Florida by increasing competition among providers . "Any willing 
provider " and "direct access " bills would destroy competition in health care by 
eliminating two very important cost containment tools used by managed care 
organizations . These bills would destroy managed care systems and the value they 
bring to the health care market. 
Effects 
•"Any willing provider " and "direct access " bills are special interest legislation 
that hurt the consumers and payers of health care services - employers and 
their employees. 
• The abi l ity to contract selectively with providers is the central concept of managed 
care . "Any willing provider " and "direct access " restrict i ons would de s troy 
managed care and reverse the progress that employers have made in recent 
years in controlling their health care costs . 
•Selective contracting has led to lower costs because MCOs negot i ate the best payment 
contracts with the most efficient providers of health care services . In 
return for better rates , provi ders get a high volume of patients . 
•Costs have also been lowered by having primary care physicians act as care managers 
for all of the patient ' s care . 
• The Wyatt Company recently produced a report on the cost impact of any willing 
provider legislation . The report concludes that : 
-PPO costs would increase in the range of 30% to 50% under this legislative mandate 
- such legis l ation would ultimately result in the elimination of PPOs from the market , 
since " if a large percentage of providers are willing to join a PPO , 
this legislative mandate would eliminate the value of that PPO to the 
community " (p . 5) . 
•The cost impact will be even greater on HMOs and their subscribers, since HMOs 
tend to contain costs through even tighter management of provider networks 
than PPOs . 
I P4 - Apr il 11 , 1994 
• In south Florida , the effect will be far worse. A decade ago south Florida had 
some of the highest health care costs in the nation . The introduction of 
HMOs and PPOs , and subsequent competition among providers , has brought heal th 
care costs under cont rol . HMO costs in Miami, today, are less than in most 
areas of Florida . Passage of any willing provider/direct access legislation 
will reverse this trend; within a few years costs would more than double. 
•Taxpayers would be displeased as their taxes rise to pay for the increased cost 
of city , county , and state government employee health benefits , since these 
entities would no longe r enjoy the efficiencies associated with an MCO ' s 
selective contracting arrangements . 
•Supporters of market-based heal th care reform and citizens concerned about 
intrusive government practices would be disturbed by the state ' s interference 
in the business decisions of MCOs to develop products (health plans) that 
meet consumer needs (for cost , access , and convenience) . They would further 
be disturbed that these actions stifle competition and destroy the value 
of MCO products (health plans) . 
Conclusion 
The state should not pass legislation which hinders the operation of MCOs. 
Requiring MCOs to accept "any willing providers " will compromise the ability of 
the network to choose its inputs and will discourage competition among providers , 
in turn raising prices to consumers without providing public benefit . 
The private sector has responded to consumer needs for cost - effective health care . 
One reason that businesses and consumers are choosing managed care plans is because 
it provides high quality health care services along with cost savings. 
In the past , managed care organizations were hindered in many states by special 
interest groups that wanted to protect their economic base . The HMO Act of 1972 
opened the way for managed care organizations to compete with traditional 
fee - for - service plans . MCOs have been so effective in controlling costs , that 
special interest groups are trying once again to eradicate MCOs through laws like 
"any willing provider " and "direct access ." 
Special interest groups must not be allowed to erode the gains we have made in 
providing high quality , cost - effective health care . Weakening MCOs so that they 
cannot use competitive incentives will result in a market far less responsive to 
the needs of patients for cost - effective , quality health care services . 
I P4 - April 11, 1 994 
ANTI-NETWORK LEGISLATION IS AN UNFUNDED MANDATE ON: 
l)FLORIDA EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 
Health Care Plans 
If you have a network-based health care plan, these and similar proposals will 
raise the cost of your coverage and lower the quality of your medical care: 
ANY WILLING PROVIDER: 9% to 29% in the short term according to an independent 
actuarial study by Atkinson & Company (1994 ) 
DIRECT ACCESS: 4 % to 14 % according to an independent actuarial study by the 
Wyatt Company (1991) 
MANDATED POINT-OF-SERVICE HMO: 4% to 29% in the short term; same effect as Any 
Willing Provider, according to an independent actuarial study by the Congressional 
Budget Office (1995) 
Workers' Compensation 
Such legislation will also eliminate the cost savings available for Workers' 
Compensation through managed care -- estimated by the State at savings of 28% to 
54% on your Workers' Compensation medical costs ("Final Report to the Florida 
Legislature: Workers' Compensation Managed Care Pilot Project," 07/15 / 94: Florida 
Department of Insurance) 
2)STATE TAXPAYERS 
The cost of the Medicaid Program, and the State Employee Health Plan would skyrocket 
if these proposals pass -- and taxpayers will have to bear the burden: 
ANY WILLING PROVIDER: 9% to 2 9% increase adds $12 - 38 million to State Employee 
Health Plan costs and $60 - 192 million to Medicaid Program costs 
DIRECT ACCESS: 4 % to 14 % increase adds $5 - 18 million to State Employee Heal th 
Plan costs and $27 - 97 million to Medicaid Program costs 
MANDATED POINT-OF-SERVICE HMO: same cost impact as Any Willing Provider 
COUNTIES, MUNICIPALITIES, COMMUNITY COLLEGES, AND SCHOOL BOARDS WILL ALSO SUFFER! 
ORGANIZED MEDICINE IS PUSHING THIS LEGISLATION TO STOP NETWORK-BASED 
PLANS AND MOVE PEOPLE BACK TO THE "OLD STYLE" INDEMNITY COVERAGE 
WITH RAPIDLY RISING COSTS, HUGE OUT OF POCKET EXPENSES -- TELL YOUR 
LEGISLATOR TO VOTE NO! 
IP4 . l - July 13 , 20 17 
ANTITRUST 
Issue 
The AHCA has proposed changes to facilitate greater cooperation among providers , 
purchasers , and third- party payers seeking to form new working arrangements in 
response to state health care reform legislation . 
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes 
•Authorize the Department of Legal Affairs , Antitrust Division , in conjunction with 
AHCA , to issue business reviews , advisory opinions , and "no action letters " 
for proposed activities that comply with state antitrust laws . 
•Allow the AHCA to collect data from providers and others to assess the market . 
Effects 
•Competition among all health care market players will be destroyed if proprietary 
data is obtained by a governmental agency and becomes public information 
for anyone to see . Patients and taxpayers would lose the cost - effectiveness 
and innovation that is the hallmark of a competitive marketplace . 
• The state will become the de facto controller of the market if they are given the 
power to determine which organizations can preempt anti trust laws . If 
monopolies develop , taxpayers and consumers will be cheated out of the 
efficiencies and innovations that are gained through a competitive market 
system . 
• The use of " no action letters " are potentially dangerous . They could be granted 
without full knowledge of all the facts and could lead to bureaucratic and 
legal complications that further interfere with competition between players 
in the health care market. 
Alternative Proposal 
• Heal th care networks have been developing within the private marketplace for years . 
The state should support the continued efforts of the market to meet consumer 
demands , rather than create ways for competitors to circumvent the market . 
• The state and federal governments are capable of adequately enforcing present 
antitrust laws and regulations in a manner that promotes competition and 
protects consumers . 
IP5 - Fe b ruary 1 , 1994 
ANTI-TRUST 
Proposal 
"Anti - trust " legislation would provide exemption from state anti-trust laws and 
immunity from federal anti - trust l aws to allow physicians and other health care 
providers to establish networks for the purpose of negotia t ing with health plans. 
Myths 
Organized medicine contends that 
oalthough federal anti - trust laws and policy do not prohibit the formation of 
provider networks , they restrict the ways such networks can organize and 
do not provide adequate guidance on the l awful operation of these networks 
othis anti-trust legislation would promote competition 
The Facts 
Do physicians need anti - trust law exemptions to be ab l e to form effective provider 
networks? 
-No. Look around: physicians can and are forming provider networks! In addition , 
new ventures can receive timely guidance on whether proposed networks meet 
the requirements of a competitive market : 
·The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission issued statements and 
revisions in 1993 and 1994 that set forth " safety zones " - - acceptable 
collaborative activities which the federal government will not 
challenge -- and additional guidelines for other activities . 
·These agencies will address any matter in these policy statements within 90 days , 
and respond to any other non - merger matter within 120 days . 
Will exemption from anti - trust laws improve competition i n Florida ' s health care 
system? 
-No, this would effectively exempt physicians from any competition. Existing 
federal guidelines allow for provider- organized networks to represent either 
20 % of physicians ( for exclusive networks) or 30 % o f physicians ( for 
non- exclusive networks) in an area ; the proposed legislation would allow 
100% of physicians in non-exclusive networks. 
Action Recommended 
None. 
Anti - trust laws exist to support competition by prohibiting price - £ ixing , boycotts , 
and similar agreements among competitors which would have an anti - competitive 
effect, as well as mergers or acquisitions which would decrease competition or create 
monopolies . The proposed legislation would effectively allow all the physicians 
in an area to join together to fix prices , boycott heal th plans , or engage in other 
anti-competitive activities --- and Floridians would again see health care costs 
rising rapidly. 
As of 03/16/95 , anti - trust legislation appears in HB 841 (Goode) , HB 771 (Warner) , 
and SB 926 (Grant) . 
IPS . l - J u ly 13 , 20 1 7 
ANY WILLING PROVIDER 
Issue 
Recently , a bill was introduced in Florida that would require Accountable Health 
Partnerships (AHPs) to accept any health care provider who agrees to the payment 
rates the AHP has negotiated with other providers offering the same services. 
These kinds of bills are commonly called " any willing provider " bills . They require 
managed care o rganizations (MCOs) to include in their network any provider willing 
to accept the terms and conditions of the MCO ' s contract . 
These bills would destroy managed care systems and the value they bring to the heal th 
care market. 
Effects 
•This is a special interes t legislation that hurts the consumers and the payers 
of health care services . Major payors are employers , the government (both 
as an employer and Medi caid payor) , and of course , individuals . 
• The ability to contract selectively with providers is the central concept of managed 
care . "Any willing provider " restrictions would destroy managed care and 
reverse the progress that employers have made in recent years in controlling 
their health care costs . 
•Supporters of market-based health care reform and enrollees of managed care plans 
would be disturbed by the state ' s contradiction o f its own managed competition 
reforms . "Any willing provider " statutes are fundamentally inconsi stent with 
managed competition . 
• The state would be acting contrary to the Federal Trade Commissions ' s (FTC) 
recommendations , based on economic studies , that selective contracting 
arrangements should be supported. The FTC ' s findings show that compet ition 
from selective contracting arrangements controls costs , produces broader 
product coverage , and lowers out - of- pocket payments . 
•Businesses and enrollees of managed care plans ( the payers and consumers of heal th 
care) would be upset to find that providers would be substantially less willing 
to offer lower prices , more services , or allow greater review of the quality 
of care they provide because the portion of subscriber business each provider 
would receive from an MCO is diluted by the uncontrolled number of providers 
that can join the MCO ' s network. 
• Reduced competition among providers would lead to higher prices for provider 
services and increased administrative costs to credential and monitor the 
performance of more providers , and administer more contracts . Businesses 
and enrollees of managed care plans would be concerned by the increased costs 
they would face. 
•"Any willing provider " restrictions would raise prices for everybody, not just 
employers and individuals enrolled in managed care plans . Traditional plans 
that don ' t use selective contracting woul d no longer face the competition 
from lower priced MCOs and , therefore , could raise their prices . 
IP6 - Feb r ua r y 22 , 1994 
•Taxpayers would be displeased as their taxes rise to pay for the increased cost 
of city , county , and state government employee health benefits , since these 
entities would no longer enjoy the efficiencies associated with an MCO ' s 
selective contracting arrangements . 
•Supporters of market-based heal th care reform and citizens concerned about 
intrusive government practices wou l d be dis t urbed by the state ' s interference 
in the business decisions of MCOs to develop products (health plans) that 
meet consumer needs (for cost , access , and convenience) . They would further 
be disturbed that these actions stifle competition and destroy the value 
of MCO products (health plans) . 
•Many providers would lose the benefits they now enjoy from exclusive or limited 
contracts with restricted networks . These benefits include higher , 
predictabl e patient volumes which facilitate planning and budgeting 
decisions , and a clear understanding of the network ' s terms and conditions 
which reduces confusion for providers and patients. 
• The "any willing provider " concept is appealing to individuals because it gives 
them access to all the providers in their area . But , " any willing provider " 
increases costs to employers which lead to higher premiums , deductibles , 
and copayrnents for individual s . Under an "any wi lling p r ovi der " sys t em, 
individuals would spend $500 to $1 , 500 in deductibl es before they would get 
payment for any provider . 
Alternative Pr oposal 
The state should not pass legislation which hinders the operation of MCOs. 
A we l l - designed and developed managed care network requires a balance in the 
participation or "mix " of providers , because the strength of a managed care network 
lies i n i ts ability to mee t its cus t omer ' s needs (for cost , access , convenience , 
qua l ity , etc . ) . It i s through network "design " that consumer needs are met by 
blending various provider characteristics . Unlimited or forced part i cipat i on skews 
the blend . 
Requiring MCOs to accept "any willing providers " will compromise t he ability of 
the network to choose its inputs and will discourage competition among providers , 
in turn raising prices to consumers without providing public benefit . 
The state should require CHPAs to offer traditional plans if they are available 
in the area. This would provide , for consumers who want it , access to every health 
care provider in the area. 
IP 6 - Februar y 22 , 1994 
ANY WILLING PROVIDER 
Proposal 
"Any willing provider " (AWP) legislation forces network- based health plans to allow any physician 
to become a network member if the physician accepts the plan ' s payment level and agrees to abide 
by the plan ' s rules . 
Myths 
Organized medicine believes that AWP 
oensures that patients have a broader choice of physicians than they do now 
owill not affect the cost or quality of network- based plans 
ois strongly supported by all Florida physicians 
The Facts 
Do patients need a broader choice of physicians than they have now? 
-Nearly all --- 99% --- of the 11.2 million Floridians with health care coverage have a choice 
of providers or types of health care plans. The number who choose HMOs --- the type of 
health plan in which members agree to use only network providers --- is growing . Less 
than 1 % of insured Floridians are enrolled in HMOs by their employers without a choice 
of another type of plan . Those enrolled in HMOs choose their primary care physician from 
the HMO ' s panel. 
Will AWP really have little or no effect on the cost and quality of network- based plans? 
-Independent actuarial analyses indicate that AWP legislation will significantly increase the 
costs of network-based plans, both by eroding the incentives for network physicians to 
agree to lower rates and by increasing the administrative costs related to managing a 
network. Conservative estimates of the resulting premium increases are at least 4% to 
22 % for HMOs , PPOs , and other network- based plans (The Wyatt Company , Atkinson & Company , 
The Congressional Budget Office) . 
- Quality management becomes more difficul t and costly as a network gets larger . If heal th plans 
have no control over the providers who join their networks they lose a major quality tool 
--- ability to select (or de - select) the right provider . Members of network-based plans 
are satisfied with the quality of care their physicians provide --- according to a recent 
study, more satisfied than people with traditional health care coverage (Sachs Group , 
Inc . /Scarborough Research Corp . ). Members are rightly concerned that if any physician 
is allowed to join a network , quality wi l l decrease . 
Are Florida physicians unanimously demanding AWP legislation? 
-The answer is no. Many physicians believe that the changes brought by network- based plans 
have been good for patients and good for the practice of medicine. They stress that AWP 
woul d erode these positive changes . For example , HMOs have long been recogni zed for 
emphasizing preventive and primary care . These physicians , like their patients , point 
out that patients receive good value in network- based plans , with a choice among physicians 
in various specialties , lower premium prices , and quality care . 
Action Recommended 
None. 
Network- based plans , including standard HMOs , are valuable options for the citizens of Florida . 
Floridians choose these plans from the many health insurance products available in Florida 
today . For many , network- based plans have made , and kept , quality health care coverage 
affordable . AWP takes Florida back in time to high cost , traditional fee - for - service insurance 
coverage . Follow the advice of network-based plan members: 
for something to fix." 
"nothing's broken, so don't look 
As of 03/16/95 , AWP language appears in HB 541 (Kelly) and SB 828 (Myers) . HB 841 (Goode) contains 
language which would cripple network- based plans ' ability to select providers and thus has results 
very similar to AWP . 
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ANY WILLING PROVIDER 
Proposal 
"Any willing provider " (AWP) legislation forces network- based heal th plans to allow any physician 
to become a network member if the physician accepts the plan ' s payment level and agrees to abide 
by the plan ' s rules. 
Myths 
Organized medicine believes that AWP 
oensures that patients have a broader choice of physicians than they do now 
owill not affect the cost or quality of network- based plans 
ois strongly supported by all Florida physicians 
The Facts 
Do patients need a broader choice of physicians than they have now? 
-Nearly all --- 99% --- of the 11.2 million Floridians with health care coverage have a choice 
of providers or types of health care plans. The number who choose HMOs --- the type of 
health plan in which members agree to use only network providers - -- is growing . Less 
than 1 % of insured Floridians are enrolled in HMOs by their employers without a choice 
of another type of plan . Those enrolled in HMOs choose their primary care physician from 
the HMO ' s panel . 
Will AWP really have little or no effect on the cost and quality of network- based plans? 
-Independent actuarial analyses indicate that AWP legislation will significantly increase the 
costs of network-based plans, both by eroding the incentives for network physicians to 
agree to lower rates and by increasing the administrative costs related to managing a 
network. Conservative estimates of the resulting premium increases are at least 4% to 
22 % for HMOs , PPOs , and other network- based plans (The Wyatt Company , Atkinson & Company , 
The Congressional Budget Office) . 
- Quality management becomes more difficult and costly as a network gets larger . If heal th plans 
have no control over the providers who join their networks they lose a major quality tool 
--- ability to select (or de - select) the right provider . Members of network-based plans 
are satisfied with the quality of care their physicians provide --- according to a recent 
study, more satisfied than people with traditional health care coverage (Sachs Group , 
Inc./Scarborough Research Corp . ) . Members are rightly concerned that if any physician 
is allowed to join a network , quality will decrease. 
Are Florida physicians unanimously demanding AWP legislation? 
-The answer is no. Many physicians believe that the changes brought by network- based plans 
have been good for patients and good for the practice of medicine . They stress that AWP 
would erode these positive changes . For example , HMOs have long been recognized for 
emphasizing preventive and primary care . These physicians , like their patients , point 
out that patients receive good value in network- based plans , with a choice among physicians 
in various specialties , lower premium prices , and quality care . 
Action Recommended 
None. 
Network- based plans , including standard HMOs , are valuable options for the citizens of Florida . 
Floridians choose these plans from the many health insurance products available in Florida 
today . For many , network- based plans have made , and kept , quality heal th care coverage 
affordable . AWP takes Florida back in time to high cost , traditional fee - for - service insurance 
coverage . Follow the advice of network-based plan members: 
for something to fix." 
"nothing's broken, so don't look 
As of 03/16/95 , AWP language appears in HB 541 (Kelly) and SB 828 (Myers) . HB 841 (Goode) contains 
language which would cripple network- based plans ' ability to select providers and thus has results 
very similar to AWP . 
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ASSURING GOOD INFORMATION FOR PURCHASERS 
Background 
Competition among managed care companies holds the greatest potential to control 
costs in the health care marketplace . Managed care companies need data to secure 
the best quality of care at the most reasonable cost for their customers . 
Information is a l so needed to ensure that health care services lead to outcomes 
that improve the quality of life for consumers. 
Recommendations 
The state needs to take an active role in encouraging the appropriate use of 
information to foster competition among managed care companies . Such a role would 
include : 
• expanding the state ' s capability to collect and communicate provider licensure 
and other basic credentialling information 
•monitoring the research sponsored by the Agency for Heal th Care Policy and Research 
on quality measures , efficacy and safety , in order to disseminate and promote 
this information to purchasers in Florida 
•establishing and enforcing the rules of disclosure on cost and quality information 
to ensure that customers have appropriate information for valid comparisons 
of competing managed care companies 
• updating regular l y the information from the AHCPR and other sources on quality , 
efficacy and safety to make sure that Florida purchasers have the most 
up - to - date tools for assessing the value they receive for their health care 
dollar 
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BACKGROUND ON PURCHASING GROUPS 
Purchasing Groups and Managed Competition 
Under the theoretical model of managed competition , created by the Jackson Hole 
Group , purchasing groups called Health Plan Purchasing Cooperatives (HPPCs) were 
created to help small employers and individuals influence the health care market 
more effectively . HPPCs would pool the purchasing power of the small groups , 
improve the availability of i nformation , and act as buying agents and administrators . 
In the initial HPPC concept , HPPCs were government - sponsored , non- profit 
organizations serving exclusive geographic regions . HPPCs would have the power 
to negotiate with health plans . Small groups were mandated to enroll in HPPCs . 
Over time , the Jackson Hole Group modified its original HPPC concept somewhat , 
acknowledging that geographic regions need not be exclusive (competing HPPCs would 
be an option) , and giving states more leeway to define the structure/role of HPPCs . 
In sum , HPPCs under managed competition are basically a mandatory monopsony , and 
are dependent on a whole new set of bureaucratic structures , (national health boards , 
for example) in order to function . As originally designed , managed competition 
HPPCs do not fit well with private market concepts . 
General Conclusions on Purchasing Groups 
BCBSF believes in the ability of the private sector to meet the needs of consumers . 
We support health care reform that takes advantage of managed care and private 
markets to address health care cost , access , and quality issues . 
There is nothing wrong with , or even unusual about , group purchasing through buying 
cooperatives . If there are no regulations preventing them , purchasing groups will 
form spontaneously in the market . Purchasing groups that compete in the private 
market must meet the needs of their members to be successful . If they do not , they 
will not survive and other efforts , that better mee t the needs of their members , 
will take their place . 
Therefore , it does not seem necessary for the government to establish purchasing 
groups for the health care market. However , if a state or federal government does 
decide to set up government - sponsored purchasing groups , BCBSF identified several 
key components essential for their success : 
oThe purpose of government - sponsored purchasing groups should be to promote 
competition among insurers and managed care companies based on quality and 
price . The purchasing group should not be a purchaser ; it should improve 
the ability of its members to purchase for themselves . 
oA purchasing group ' s membership and governing board should be confined to persons 
who actually purchase health benefits through the organization -- those with 
a direct interest in its success . 
oMost important , individuals , not employers , should choose among the health plans 
competing for business among purchasing group members . Individual choice 
is the central concept of managed competition ; it promotes personal 
responsibility while allowing individuals to select a health care plan of 
their choice . 
Florida ' s Community Health Purchasing Alliances (CHPAs) 
With the passage o f the Heal th Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993 , Florida embraced 
the managed competition approach . The law authorized establishment of 
government - sponsored , non- profit purchasing groups called CHPAs to serve small 
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employers ( 1 - 50 employees ) Eleven geographically- exclusive CHPAs were specified , 
with start - up funding from the state. Some of the positive characteristics of CHPAs 
are that they are 
- voluntary 
- confined to small groups 
- have no regulatory authority or negotiating power 
- cannot contract directly with providers 
- required to financially support their o wn operations after the start - up period 
Several negative characteristics are that 
- CHPAs are not run by their members , but rather by boards of 17 political appointees 
- each CHPA board can re - structure the types of products health plans must of fer 
to members 
The main danger in CHPAs lies in their potential to change from a voluntary system 
to a mandatory , bureaucratic monopsony covering all o r most Floridians . Moving 
Medicaid beneficiaries and state employees int o CHPAs is a shift in this direction ; 
with state monies supporting CHPA operations , CHPAs have less need to provide value 
to the private market customers -- small employers -- for which they were originally 
designed . In a monopsony role CHPAs will fundamentally harm the private market 
system . 
IPB - December 1994 
BASIC BENEFIT STANDARD 
Issue 
The 1993 Florida Health Plan directed the AHCA to recommend to the legislature a 
basic hea l th care benefit package that provides basic health services . 
Flori da Health Security Pl an Proposes 
•Establishing the AHCA ' s benefit standard as the floor for all non- self- insured 
plans contingent on passage of Florida Health Security Program . 
•Requiring that insurers offer the benefit standard if the Florida Health Security 
Program is not enacted and implemented . 
Effects 
•Some small employers and lower-income individuals will be priced out of the market 
(causing an increase in the uninsured) if the basic benefit standard 
recommended by AHCA is adopted as the benefit floor for all non- self- insured 
plans . 
•Insurers in the competitive marketplace will be denied the flexibility to provide 
lower cost plans (i . e., catastrophic policies) . 
• Establishing the basic benefit standard as the floor for a l l non- self- insured plans 
wil l provide another incentive for even smaller businesses to become 
self- insured . As a result , 
- fewer companies and their employers will be subject to Florida insurance regulatory 
protection , and 
- the burden of the state ' s insurance premium tax will be placed on fewer small 
businesses who couldn ' t self- insure. 
Alternative Proposal 
The basic benefit standard should serve as a benchmark , to be used to promote 
comparability between health plans . It should not be the " floor " benefit , limiting 
flexibility of plans and products offered in the market . 
I P 9 - Fe brua r y 1, 1994 
BCBSF'S POSITION ON THE CLINTON HEALTH CARE REFORM PROPOSAL 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida supports the need for reform to make the heal th 
care system more efficient and less costly and to assure access to high quality 
services for all Americans . We particularly applaud the Clinton Administration ' s 
intent to achieve reform primarily through reliance on the private marketplace . 
The Clinton proposal would promote a competitive health care system by making 
comparison between plans easier , by making consumers more cost - conscious through 
limiting the tax deductibility of insurance coverage , by publicizing information 
on the value of competing heal th plans , and by reforming the heal th insurance market 
to reduce paperwork . 
However , some parts of the proposal cause serious concern about their effects on 
the U. S. economy and on Clinton ' s basic approach to reform . Three such elements 
are the mandate that all employers pay for health benefit plans for their employee , 
the price controls on hea l th insurance , and the command and control role of health 
alliances . 
While an employer mandate to purchase insurance is intended to help the employees 
of small businesses , it would actually hurt many of them. Employers with thin profit 
margins would be forced to reduce other forms of compensation , cut their work forces , 
or in the worst cases , go out of business . The impact on employees would be 
especially devastating in Florida because we have so many small businesses and low 
wage jobs . 
The Clinton proposal also would impose price controls through premium caps and global 
budgets . Price controls do not work . In health care , they lead to rationing , 
reduced services , the erosion of quality and , often , to higher prices than would 
be achieved through competitive markets . Also , administrative costs would increase 
from the expenses necessary to run a large bureaucratic monitoring and enforcement 
system. Perhaps worst of all , reliance on price controls would undermine the rest 
of the President ' s proposal which attempts to use private markets to improve the 
efficiency of the system. 
Another threat to the proposal ' s success is the role of the purchasing groups (Health 
Alliances) . In the Clinton plan , Health Alliances are micro - managers and 
monopsonistic purchasers , not market facilitators . Alliances negotiate fees with 
providers , organize them into heal th plans , and enforce global budgets . Enrollment 
in a Health Alliance is compulsory for most people . Enrollment is mandatory for 
businesses wi th fewer than 5 , 000 employees , government employees , Medicaid 
beneficiaries , the self- employed , and the currently uninsured . These individuals 
will have nowhere else to turn for health care if the Alliances do not meet their 
needs . Heal th Alliances would dominate the heal th care market , especially in states 
like Florida where there are very few businesses with more than 5 , 000 employees , 
and would virtually control the financing , organization , and delivery of health 
care. 
In designing its Cornrnuni ty Heal th Purchasing Al liances (CHPAs) , Florida has avoided 
many of the flaws in Clinton ' s Heal th Alliances . Florida ' s CHPAs promote 
competition by facilitating price comparisons of plans and by keeping enrollment 
voluntary. To be successful , CHPAs must convince their members that their products 
offer more value per dollar than the alternatives available outside the CHPA . Unlike 
Health Alliances , CHPAs allow the consumer to decide whether group purchasing is 
a good idea . 
A final concern about Clinton ' s proposal is how it will be financed . The proposal 
relies on employers ' " contributions ," cuts in Medicare and Medicaid , and 
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unspecified federal funds to pay for new coverage , implementation and maintenance 
of the Health Alliances and other admini strative bodies that will be created to 
support the new system . In light of the federal government ' s financial woes , it 
appears that most of the cost will eventually fall to the private sector which could 
negatively affect employment and the price of goods and services . A careful and 
thorough analysis should be conducted to confirm that adequate financing will be 
available for Clinton ' s reform proposal . 
The heal th care system needs reform that improves competitive markets . Competition 
among managed care plans has already produced innovative methods to control costs . 
Through managed care , BCBSF has successfully held health care cost increases to 
less than overall inflation for many of its customers . These successes in cost 
containment have been achieved while ensuring the delivery of high quality care . 
What is needed from heal th care reform is a more competitive system that will b r ing 
the benefits of managed care to many more Americans . Elements of the Clinton 
proposal that promote value - based competition shoul d be implemented , and those 
elements of the plan that stifle the private market should be discouraged . 
BCBSF ' S VISION OF THE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY AND FINANCING SYSTEM 
Health Care expenditures represent an increasing portion of government , employer , 
and personal budgets. At the same time , many Floridians lack even basic coverage 
for health care expenses . These problems have produced many proposals to reform 
the system, especially through government action . 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida agrees that some reform is needed . We also 
believe that a sound reform proposal should be shaped by a vision of the ideal heal th 
system . Our vision extends and amplifies what we see as the positive features of 
the current system while eliminating the dysfunctional elements . 
l . Access to most of health care is provided through managed care companies (MCCs) 
which are accountable for both the financing and delivery of care . Managed 
care companies compete based on their products' total value - - the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the health care delivered through benefit programs and 
the products ' prices . MCCs control total price by achieving efficiency in 
administration and health care delivery . 
2 . Buyers in any geographic area face a market consisting of two to ten MCCs . 
Competitive conditions drive out those companies that compete solely by 
serving low- risk customers . A few large companies are able to spread the 
costs of sophisticated information systems , administrative technologies , 
research and development , and management talent necessary to manage care 
effectively . They also have sufficient enrollment to exert pressure on 
providers to compete for their business . And as the industry evolves toward 
closer partnerships between MCCs and providers , a market characterized by 
a few large companies offers clearer choices . In buying a managed care benefit 
package , the consumer is buying access to a distinct network of providers . 
3 . Competing MCCs achieve greater efficiency in the allocation of resources : (a) 
among primary , secondary , and tertiary care ; (b) among types of providers 
specialists , generalists , physician extenders , nurses, and other 
professionals; (c) across locations of service physician ' s offices , 
emergency rooms, outpatient clinics , hospital beds ; and ( d) across particular 
diagnostic and therapeutic modalities . These efficiencies are achieved 
because (1) MCCs and the providers in their networks have the incentives 
to search for and take advantage of efficiencies ; (2) good information is 
available on the costs and benefits of alternative ways of providing care ; 
and (3) regulatory and benefit restrictions (e.g ., mandates to use certain 
providers) on efficient allocations have been removed . 
4 . Competition among MCCs translates to competition among heal th care providers based 
on the value they can bring to a managed care program. Heal th care 
professionals and institutions that provide care efficiently and effectively 
compete successfully for the managed care dollar . Competition based on 
treating the more profitable cases and avoiding less profitable cases is 
eliminated as providers ' economic incentives are more closely a l igned with 
the MCC ' s . Competition based on needless amenities is also eliminated as 
providers are judged on their results . These judgments are possible because 
there is valid , reliable information on the quality and cost of care that 
each provider achieves . 
5 . The system encourages flexibility and experimentation in benefit packages , 
delivery arrangements , payment methods and amounts from MCCs to providers , 
payment methods among providers, and provider network structures . Since no 
one knows a best way for a heal th care system to work and since it will always 
be changing , it is better to reward results than to prescribe structures 
and processes . 
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6 . The system benefits from administrative effici encies such as standardization of 
payment forms ; automation of financial and clinical data transmission; 
innovation in payment arrangements ; and development of sophisticated 
management information systems. These efficiencies reduce the unit operating 
costs of both MCCs and providers . 
7.All citizens are enrolled in either a health benefit program sold by an MCC or 
in a public program . Universal coverage assures access to primary care and 
thereby eliminates the inefficiency and ineffectiveness that resul ts from 
the uninsured receiving care only when seriously ill . It also eliminates 
the implicit subsidization of the uninsured by the insured . 
8 . Public programs use managed care systems to serve the poor and medically indigent. 
Some public program beneficiaries are enrolled directly in products offered 
by MCCs . This reduces government bureaucracy needed to operate a public 
program and it assures the poor the same access to care as the rest of the 
population . To the extent there is still a need for government operated 
programs , those programs exploit the technologies of selective contracting , 
and quality and utilization management developed by MCCs . 
9 . The system promotes individual responsibility for health and health care cost . 
MCCs recognize and reward patient education as an essential component of 
health care delivery . The avoidance of unhealthy behavior is rewarded in 
lower premium costs . Hea l th benefit programs include copayments at the point 
of service and individuals pay at least a portion of the premium . 
10 . Government finances : (a) research on the efficacy , safety , and costs/benefits 
of medical procedures ; (b) development of measures of patient conditions 
to allow adequate assessment and comparison of outcomes ; and (c) development 
of medical practice guidelines based on scientific research. The system 
provides the incentives and flexibility for competing MCCs to use this 
information and these tools to select and reward providers and to design 
optimal benefit programs . 
11 . Government establishes and enforces the rules by which both MCCs and providers 
compete . Government assures that competition is fair , that successful MCCs 
and providers are the ones that most effectively deliver value to the 
individual and society . 
12 . Government detects and punishes fraudulent behavior on the part of patients , 
insured groups and individuals , individual and institutional providers , 
insurance companies , and managed care companies . 
13 . The malpractice system assures that patients who are harmed by negligent or 
wrongful medical care are compensated by the providers of that care . The 
malpractice system does not have a punishment function ; providers who 
consistently deliver low- quality care find i t difficult to survive when 
quality is an important basis of competit i on . The malpractice system also 
does not serve a purpose of enriching patients or their attorneys . 
14 . The health care delivery and financing system is not expected to be the sole 
source of improved health nor the sole object of attempts to control health 
care expenditures . Improving the health of our population requires 
addressing major causes of illness such as drug and alcohol abuse , violence , 
nutrition , and accidents . Public and private action that affects these and 
othe r factors external to the health system are essential to a comprehensive 
strategy for reducing health care costs . 
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CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE 
Issue 
Current law calls for the AHCA to redesign and modernize its regulatory programs and to limit 
programs that are barriers to market entry. 
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes 
• Use CON regulation to control the development of Centers of Excellence and force AHPs to accept 
them . 
•Authorize the AHCA to establish uniform standards for the certification of Centers of Excellence . 
• Use the CON program to establish quality standards that the AHCA ' s Division of Health Quality 
Assurance will monitor and enforce. 
Effects 
•Creating a set of " state authorized " providers limits competitive forces and choice in the 
health care market . Consumers would not make choices about health care providers , the 
government would . 
• It could potentially result in monopolies and higher costs to consumers. 
•Floridians would see overall heal th care costs rise if providers have incentives for unnecessary 
services because they want to obtain Center of Excellence designation from the state . 
•AHP customers would see their premiums rise because requiring AHPs to include Centers of 
Excellence as in- network referrals would reduce the ability of AHPs to negotiate with 
facilities for tertiary care . 
Alternative Proposal 
• The Agency already has authority to monitor and delicense facilities for quality of care issues . 
There is no need for additional regulatory controls for quality assurance. The 
competitive marketplace will drive improvements in quality of care with the release of 
certain quality- related information by AHPs to consumers . 
• The AHCA is attempting to use CON requirements to limit market entry , in direct contradiction 
of existing law . Centers of Excellence are an innovative market response to the need 
for high- quality but cost - effective care for high- cost services . Consumers , armed with 
applicable utilization and quality information should determine the success of these 
Centers , not the government . 
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CERTIFICATE OF NEED 
Issue 
Florida , through S . B. 1914 , chose the managed competition approach to health care 
reform . The state needs to determine whether and how CON , which is part of a 
regulatory approach to cost containment , fits with the reliance on competition . 
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes 
•Maintain CON r eview for all tertiary health care services , including open heart 
surgery , neonatal intensive care services , comprehensive rehabilitation 
services , burn units , and organ transplantation programs . 
•Maintain CON review for services that are exempt from DRG reimbursement , including 
psychiatric services and long-te r m ca r e hospital services . 
• Expand CON review to outpatient capita l expenditures in excess of $ 1 million . 
• Require CON review for the acquisition and replacement of all major medical 
equipment that costs in excess of $1 million regardless of setting . 
•Modify the health faci l ity l i censure process to allow the delicensure of facility 
servi ces that do not meet CON qua l ity and volume standards . 
• Expand AHCA ' s assessment of new technologies to a i d it in its management of health 
care markets and to assist purchasers and consumers . 
• Use CON regulation to promote the development of centers of excellence . 
•Eliminate the statutory requirement that CON applicants submit a facility 
long- range plan with the i r CON appl ication . 
• Elimi nate the statutory requirement that CON applicants assess the impact of their 
proposed project on the cost of other services provided by the applicant . 
• Ensure that any provider in a tertiary planning services area has standing in CON 
legal proceedi ngs . 
• Extend the CON validity period for construction projects from one year to 18 months . 
Effects 
• Expanding CON review to all out - patient capital expenditures over $1 million places 
another segment of the health care system under regulatory control . This 
is contrary to the state ' s adoption of managed competition 
as the mechanism that would drive the marketp l ace . The result would limit the 
ability of all players in the heal th care market to respond to consumer needs 
in a competitive fashion . 
• Requiring CON review for the acquisition and replacement of all major medical 
equipment regardless of setting stifles the market ' s ability to respond cost 
effectively and creatively to consumer needs for convenience and efficiency . 
Patients and providers would be ill - served by the state dictating where 
services requiring major medical equipment may be offered . They would be 
better served by removing CON regulations rather than expanding them to 
additional providers . 
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•Consumers would not appreciate the AHCA assessing new technologies wi th the aim 
of further controlling the hea l th care market . This would undermine the 
ability of the medical community and patients to determine the technologies 
that can best serve their needs. 
Alternative Proposals 
• CON is compatible with a managed competition approach to health care reform . The 
Legislature should direct the AHCA to develop a plan for a careful and selective 
phasing out of CON as competit i ve markets mature . The Plan must consider 
the competitiveness and needed changes in payment mechanisms (e.g . , Medicaid 
payment for nursing home services) for each type of service to assure that 
CON ' s removal is scheduled appropriately . 
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COMBINING STATE EMPLOYER GROUP AND MEDICAID 
There has been some discussion of combining the State Employee Group and the Medicaid 
program . Although the objectives of this proposal are not clear , there may be a 
hope that it would provide the State greater bargaining power in purchasing services 
or that there would be some administrative savings . We believe it is not a viable 
proposal for the f ol l owing reasons : 
oThe two programs have very different objectives , benefits , processes , procedures , 
and service requirements . The State Employee health benefit is part of a 
compensation package intended to attract and retain qualified public servants . 
Medicaid is part of a safety net that assures the availability of some care 
for the poor and medically indigent . 
oThe State Employee program demands broad access to the State ' s hospitals and 
physicians ; Medicaid beneficiaries , in reality , have access to only a small 
minority of the State's providers . 
oThe Medicaid program does not call for cost sharing from the beneficiary and requires 
financial transactions only between the provider and the payer . The State 
Employee program includes some payment responsibility from the enrollee and , 
therefore , entails considerably more complex administration and service 
requirements . 
oConfining State employees to what is effectively a Medicaid network (e . g ., 
approximately 2000 physicians, most of whom practice at a few teaching 
hospitals) would not be acceptable . In contrast to the current program which 
satisfies over 95 percent of employees and thus partially compensates for 
low salaries , the State would find itself with a demoralized , demotivated 
work force. 
oTo try to broaden the Medicaid "network " to satisfy State employees would 
significantly increase Medicaid expenditures . It would require increasing 
the fees Medicaid pays and development of a provider service function that 
is not part of the current Medicaid program at all . 
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COMMUNITY RATING 
Background 
As the debate on health care reform has escalated, community rating 
increasingly has appeared as a component of state and national reform 
packages. A number of states have already started to experiment with 
community rating. By 1994, forty-five states required some form of 
community rating to be used in setting heal th care insurance premiums 
for individuals and small groups. Many supporters of community rating 
are seeking to expand this pricing system to all purchasers of heal th 
insurance. 
There are two types of community rating, "pure" community rating and 
"modified" community rating, which is also known as community rating 
by class (CRC) . According to the American Academy of Actuaries (AAA), 
under "pure" community rating everyone is charged the same premium. 
The only variation in premium occurs because of family status, 
geographical area, or plan design. The AAA recognizes two additional 
premium modifiers under CRC; age and gender. Some states have 
introduced additional premium modifiers such as occupation and 
wellness habits (e.g., smoking status). 
In Florida, 1993 health care legislation required insurers to begin 
using modified community rating to set premiums for small groups. 
Legislative attempts to move toward "pure" community rating and to 
expand the use of community rating to individuals and groups not 
currently included under the law are expected. 
Clearly, community rating is being seen by some as an approach to 
solve certain perceived problems with the health care market. As 
interest and experience grows in the use of community rating, so must 
our understanding of its appeal to supporters and its effect on the 
heal th care market. This paper presents information that is currently 
available on community rating. 
Historical Perspective 
•During the 1930's, prepaid arrangements for hospital coverage were 
introduced. These plans eventually evolved into the Blue Cross 
system. Blue Cross plans were attractive to subscribers in part 
because they were community rated - everyone was charged the 
same premium for the same set of benefits regardless of the 
subscriber's potential risk. Risk for economic loss due to 
hospitalization was spread across the community. 
•During the late 1930's/early 1940's, medical benefits became a way 
for employers to provide workers with additional compensation 
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during wage freezes. Heal th insurance flourished and commercial 
insurers began offering health insurance plans. As commercial 
insurers entered the market, they used the underwriting methods 
of property/ casualty coverage to determine heal th care prerni urns. 
Underwriting through experience rating enabled commercial 
insurers rate premiums based on the estimated risk of a potential 
subscriber. Lower-risk indi victuals and groups could be charged 
lower premiums than through community rating. 
Individuals and groups that remained in community-rated pools tended 
to be higher-risk indi victuals. This caused community rated 
premiums to rise. Eventually, Blue Cross plans stopped 
community rating large groups and began experience rating them 
in order to offer more competitive rates. 
•In the 1950's, as insurers added major medical coverage to insure 
individuals against catastrophic risk, it became customary for 
policy holders to pay deductibles and coinsurance. Heal th 
insurance coverage continued to expand throughout the 
population. 
•As health insurance coverage continued to be associated primarily 
with full-time employment, the elderly and the poor 
disproportionately represented the uninsured. Individual 
policies for these groups were often too expensive for them to 
purchase. The elderly tended to have high premiums because of 
their increased risk for using medical services. During the 
1960's, Medicare and Medicaid were created to provide health 
insurance coverage to the elderly and certain segments of the 
poor. 
•Additional changes in health insurance occurred during the 1970's. 
Large employers noticed little variation in their premiums from 
year to year and many began to self-insure. As self-insurance 
grew, contractual arrangements known as "administrative services 
only" (ASO) also grew. ASO contracts provided the 
administrative processes needed to administer the self-insured 
plans. With the continued proliferation of experience rating 
and self-insured plans, community rating became an even less 
competitive underwriting practice than before. 
•Prior to the passage of the HMO law in 1973, most HMOs operated as 
prepaid group practices (like Kaiser Permanente) and based their 
premiums on a variation of community rating. 
-Although generally mandating community rating, the HMO law exempted 
certain groups from the community rating requirements. 
HMO products for state and local government employees as 
well as Medicare/Medicaid eligibles were permitted to be 
based on experience rating or negotiated rates instead. 
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-In response to petitioning from several medical groups, including 
the AMA, fee-for-service medicine was incorporated into 
the HMO law through the independent practice association 
(IPA) model. IPAs adopted payment mechanisms similar to 
indemnity plans. 
With the emergence of new types of HMOs, came the need for different 
types of rating systems (eg., composite rating, rating bands). 
Increased tension has been experienced around how premiums are 
set. 
Federally qualified health maintenance organizations generally 
continued to practice community rating after passage of the HMO 
law. 
Recent Legislative Action 
•In July 1992, New York became the first state to implement "pure" 
community rating for individual and small group policies. In 
addition, insurers for these markets must offer policies on a 
guaranteed issue, continuous open enrollment basis. 
•By 1994, forty-five states had enacted laws requiring some form of 
community rating of the individual or small group markets. 
•In 1993, Florida passed a law requiring insurers to use modified 
community rating to price products for small groups (1-50). 
Allowable modifiers include gender, age, family composition, 
tobacco use, and geographic area. Standard and basic health 
plans must be offered on a guarantee issue basis. 
Why Community Rating has become an Issue 
During the past few years, the health insurance industry has become 
a focus for increased national attention. In part, this is out 
of public concern for the number of people believed to be 
under-served by the current insurance system. These people 
include the uninsured and the "job-locked." The "job-locked" 
are individuals who feel restrained from changing jobs for fear 
of losing their employer-based heal th insurance coverage or from 
fear of being denied coverage temporarily or permanently due 
to preexisting health conditions. 
Community rating ( "pure" or modified) has been proposed by some people 
as a solution. It is believed that community rating will reduce 
the number of uninsured and make insurance more affordable for 
a greater number of people. The belief is that including 
everyone in one large pool will spread the risk and cost across 
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many people so that the impact to individuals is minimized. 
Additionally, some people believe that community rating will eliminate 
certain health insurance practices they view as undesirable. 
One such practice is "predatory rating", where individuals and 
groups are offered low introductory rates which are sharply 
raised as the group begins to submit medical claims. Another 
is "red-lining" where policies are sold only in certain 
geographic areas. Such practices would be eliminated by 
spreading the risk (through community rating) among a large group 
of people. 
Proponents of Community Rating and their Arguments 
Proponents of community rating include professional and trade 
associations such as the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, Health 
Insurance Association of America, Group Heal th Association of America, 
the Alliance for Managed Competition and the American College of 
Physician Executives. A special committee of the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) endorsed community 
rating. A number of small business associations and some heal th 
policy analysts also endorse the use of community rating. 
•The Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) supports modified 
community rating. They do not support "pure" community rating 
which they believe would lead to an enormous cost shift from 
older to younger Americans. This would occur since the elderly 
tend to have higher costs which would be spread over the entire 
population. "Pure" community rating without an adjustment for 
age would cause premiums to increase dramatically resulting in 
"sticker shock" for younger consumers. In addition, individuals 
who are now uninsurable would enter the market. These expensive 
high-risk individuals are currently excluded from many 
private-sector pools in which young consumers now participate. 
•Some insurance commissioners favor community rating because they 
believe it will bring price stability to a volatile market. 
Over time, experience rating results in continued price 
increases. This is reflective of the greater risk for illness 
that occurs as one ages. These price increases are steeper for 
certain age groups. When medical inflation is added to the 
initial price increases, the rate of increase is magnified. 
For some, premiums become too expensive and they drop coverage. 
A special committee on health care reform of the NAIC recommends that 
businesses with up to 500 employees be community rated. 
Businesses with 500 or fewer employees should not be allowed 
to self-insure or otherwise exit the community-rated pool. 
•Many proponents of community rating believe that society should 
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spread the risk and costs of health care services throughout 
the population so that individuals are shielded from the full 
economic impact of illness. Charging everyone the same rate 
for health insurance premiums would be one way to do this. 
•Others believe that private health insurance is unique. Charging 
higher prices to riskier customers is less acceptable when it 
comes to health. They argue against experience rating, claiming 
that it is "morally questionable" to experience rate if the risk 
is not controllable, as is often the case with health. 
Those who adopt this philosophy maintain that in health care, risk 
is not assumed the way it can be in other areas of life. For 
example, the risk of a house being hit by a hurricane is 
proportional to where it is located. A greater risk is 
voluntarily assumed by living along the east coast. The risk 
of getting cancer is usually more elusive and is not a risk 
voluntarily assumed by many of the people who get it. People 
cannot can respond to health matters the way they do to other 
risks. A cancer patient will still require treatment and cannot 
choose to move away from the disease. 
Susceptibility to some risk factors is hereditary as well as 
environmental. Much is unknown about these types of risks and 
often little can be done to mitigate them. 
In addition, some "victims" of risk are helpless to effect a change 
in their status even when it is humanely possible to do so. 
For example, people in the inner city are more likely to be shot, 
whether or not they themselves are violent. However, most people 
living under these conditions do not have the economic means 
to move to a safer environment. 
Finally, many people cannot be counted on to tell insurers about 
behaviors that would raise their rates. For example, smokers 
may not report their consumption and the insurance system cannot 
be expected to measure it. 
•Another view is that community rating can improve an insurance system 
that allows some insurers to reap large profits by selecting 
the best insurance risks while insurers of last resort accept 
everyone and struggle to stay financially afloat. 
•Many supporters believe that community rating is central to any 
serious market reform effort and that it must be included as 
part of incremental insurance reform. 
•Some people view experience rating as a gamble, particularly for 
small group employers. One supporter of community rating notes, 
"it does not take much for a heal thy, low-cost employer to become 
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a high-risk, high-cost group." Community rating acts as a 
"guarantee" to individuals and small groups that their health 
insurance will not be cancelled or suddenly priced beyond reach 
solely because of the individual or group's catastrophic medical 
claims. Large employers are expected to accept community rating 
as their contribution to the community to help maintain 
affordable health care coverage for everyone. 
•Another view is that since people generally save or borrow for most 
large expenses, insurance is a way to save together as a community 
by pooling funds so that whomever needs them, uses them. This 
view maintains that there are many ways to save as a community. 
One is through traditional insurance. Another is through 
government funding, a third is through employer self-insurance. 
Of these, the preferred form is community rating. 
•While some opponents to community rating claim that the heal thy will 
subsidize the sick, spreading expenses over a large group of 
people is one of the fundamental principles of insurance. 
Community rating has been successfully employed in Rochester, 
New York. Since the implementation of community rating, the 
community has sponsored a number of studies showing that there 
would be significant increases in the cost of health care for 
the community if community rating were repealed. 
• Some supporters of community rating believe that the price of 
insurance should depend on average costs in the community. 
Premiums should be based on the "community rate" rather than 
on insurance companies' attempts to assess risk. The premium 
should reflect the amount necessary to pay average medical costs 
in the community. This would provide subsidies from some people 
to others. Subsidies to the elderly for health insurance are 
viewed as a form of saving for society's own future expense. 
A current example of this according to these proponents is social 
security and Medicare. 
•Many supporters as well as critics of community rating believe that 
community rating should not be required without other measures 
to make it work. Some suggested measures are: 
-Universal coverage. Younger, healthier, lower risk individuals must 
participate in a community pool to balance the higher costs 
associated with high risk subscribers. 
-Guarantee issue. 
achieved, 
For risk to be spread and universal 
insurers must accept any applicant. 
coverage 
-Standard benefits. If insurers guarantee everyone the same price, 
but can offer different packages, there is an opportunity 
to segregate risk by benefit package. The guarantee of 
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equal prices becomes meaningless. Insurers will assess 
risk and sell much less adequate coverage to those who are 
more likely to need care. A standard benefits package would 
require insurers to sell the same basic package so that 
none can design a package to discourage expensive 
beneficiaries. 
-Tying premium contributions to income. Community rating, mandatory 
acceptance of applicants, and compulsory participation may 
not be enough to make health insurance affordable to all 
because U.S. health care costs are higher than most other 
countries. Since Americans' incomes vary widely, health 
insurance financing must include subsidies by income and 
must not discriminate by risk. The United States is the 
only advanced country other than Switzerland where most 
people are insured at rates that are not in proportion to 
their income. 
Opponents of Community Rating and their Arguments 
Opponents of community rating include the Council for Affordable 
Health Insurance, many insurance companies and various policy analyst 
groups (e.g., The Heritage Foundation). 
•Community rating is a hidden tax on the young. It forces younger, 
generally healthy people to pay higher premiums to subsidize 
older, generally sicker individuals. Most of these older people 
earn more than the younger people or have savings from which 
they can draw. 
-Because everyone is charged the same premium under "pure" community 
rating, sick people are charged less than under other rating 
systems. As more sick people enter the market, the cost 
of premiums rises. The young and heal thy flee the insurance 
market creating a spiral of higher costs and lower 
enrollment. 
Although community rating at first glance might appear to be a good 
idea because risk is spread among the general population, in 
the end those who were initially helped by community rating will 
tend to be worse off than before community rating was implemented. 
•A few opponents of community rating believe that in some states 
community rating laws were passed to prop-up mismanaged 
companies. For example, in New York, Empire Blue Cross Blue 
Shield lied to the state legislature and the New York Insurance 
Department about its financial condition presumably to get the 
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community rating law passed. 
•An analogy used by one opponent of community rating is that an 
insurance contract is like a credit card or bond issue used to 
finance certain goods and services. The price of the insurance 
contract includes the risk that is assumed for potential losses. 
Interest rates for credit cards reflect the amount of risk that a 
bank assumes in providing credit to an individual 
card-holder. Banks charge interest rates that can vary 
greatly as they determine what kind of risks they are willing 
to take on. A bank can offer different types of credit 
cards with different restrictions, again reflecting the 
type of risk a bank is willing to assume. 
Americans would never agree that the government should make banks 
charge one interest rate for all credit card holders. If 
the rate were set too low then bad risks would take advantage 
of it and the bank would go broke as a result of improper 
underwriting. Similarly, community rating is not a good 
idea. 
• Losses are being experienced in II assigned risk pools II for auto 
insurance, workers' compensation, and health insurance. These 
losses are due to government imposed community rated underwriting 
for these products. Establishing a government imposed 
community-rated risk pool for everyone would have similar 
disastrous effects on the health insurance market as a whole. 
•Competition should determine the fair price for assuming various 
types of risk. Only the consumer, the agent, and the insurance 
company can decide what is best for each party. An external 
observer cannot determine for each participant the best mix of 
benefits that should appear in an individual's insurance 
contract. 
-The role of government should be to allow insurance companies to 
pursue profits within guidelines that would ensure 
sufficient reserves. Government should also address 
unfair claims practices. 
•Medicare, a program which engages in community rating for physician 
services, has not been successful in it's financial operations. 
Some believe that this is because the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) underwrites using a community rating 
method that cannot address the problem of over-utilization. 
The nation does not see HCFA's failures because there are no annual 
statements, agents are not employed, reserves are not 
posted, and regulatory authorities do not have sufficient 
oversight controls. The results are higher taxes coupled 
with a reduction in benefits. If HCFA's community rating 
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policy works why would they be shifting primary c are for 
employees age 65 or older to private carriers (through 
HMOs)? 
•A favorable point about pricing health insurance contracts along 
underwriting principles, is that there is an incentive for 
policyholders to seek to get into a better underwriting category. 
Evidence 
Studies of community rating are scant. Few states have implemented 
community rating long enough t o allow for an appropriate evaluation 
of its effects and the findings of some studies contradict that of 
other studies. This is not surprising since states experience with 
community rating is limited, implementation differs from 
state-to-state, and research methodologies vary. 
Community Rating: States' Experience (The Commonwealth Fund) 
•A study based on an analysis of data from 5 states that have had 
a year of experience with full or partial community rating was 
recently released by the Commonwealth Fund. The study suggests 
that while community rating may offer marginal market 
improvements, it must be part of a broader effort if health 
insurance reform is to have a significant impact in covering 
the uninsured and improving access to care. The report is based 
on interviews with state officials in Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, New York, and Vermont. 
-The impact on coverage appears to depend on how the program is designed 
and implemented. Vermont and New Jersey experienced net 
gains in coverage while New York experienced a loss in 
coverage during the first year of implementation. 
-Community rating appears to do little for those who cannot afford 
average premiums before implementation of community 
rating. 
-According to the report, the true impact on overall coverage is 
unknown because all the state estimates are 
based on the number of policies sold, not the number of people covered. 
-The New York experience indicates that in a voluntary system, 
community rating may not work well. Healthier small groups 
and i ndi vi duals may go without insurance, or may form 
voluntary pools that self-insure leaving only sicker groups 
in the community pools. The report notes that the long-term 
impact o f community rating without mandatory participation 
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is unclear. 
-Researchers found similarities and differences in state experience 
depending on factors such as legal requirements and phase-in 
schedules. The following general observations were made: 
oOverall, health insurance premium rate increases were smaller than 
anticipated except in New York where community rating 
was implemented without a phase-in period. Several 
state insurance officials reported that initial rate 
filings by insurers were higher than necessary. 
Carriers later reduced premiums to remain 
competitive. 
oPremium rates were compressed, higher premiums fell and lower 
premiums rose. 
oPreviously insured healthier 
increases. 
small groups incurred premium 
oThe number of insurers leaving the market was minimal. Most 
companies with a significant presence stayed in the 
market. 
oSome of the exit by consumers from individual and small group 
insurance markets may have been to larger groups 
through family coverage or to HMOs. HMO access was 
expanded as a result of requirements to sell to small 
group and individual markets. Enrollment in HMOs 
rose. 
The report concludes that longer term analysis will be needed to 
determine whether community rating has succeeded in lowering 
barriers to insurance for those who can afford to pay. 
Other Findings 
•A study conducted by Lewin-VHI, Inc., analyzed the distribution of 
cross-subsidies among various income levels, health statuses, 
and age groups that would occur under the Health Security Act. 
The study then compared how the cross-subsidies would change 
if age were introduced as a rate modifier. Government subsidies 
and employer contributions are not reflected in this study. 
-The Health Security Act requires that premiums be community-rated. 
Modifiers would be permitted only for family composition 
and geographical differences. 
-Their conclusions were that without age modifiers,: 
IP14 . l - November 1994 
10 
•the average family headed by persons under 25 years of age would 
subsidize families with older head of households by 
approximately $870 per year. Similarly, families 
headed by individuals aged 25 to 44 would subsidize 
families headed by older individuals by approximately 
$720 per year. 
As recipients of these subsidies, families with head of households 
aged 45 to 54 would benefit by more than $1,100 a year. 
Families with head of households over age 55 could 
benefit by as much as $1,900 per year. 
Community rating cross-subsidies would tend to flow from younger 
families to older families. 
•but within age cohorts, community rating cross-subsidies under the 
Health Security Act would flow from higher income 
families to lower income families (earning less than 
$20,000 per year or less than 200 % of FPL). On 
average, families with annual incomes under $10,000 
would benefit from a net cross-subsidy of $1,870. 
Families with annual incomes between $50,000 and 
$75,000 would cross-subsidize lower-income families 
by approximately $1,000 per year. 
•The greatest cross-subsidy would occur between families reporting 
"excellent" or "good" health status and those 
reporting "fair" or "poor" heal th status. Families 
in good heal th would cross-subsidize families in poor 
health by about $1,900 annually. Families in poor 
heal th would effectively benefit from cross-subsidies 
of more than $12,000 annually. 
-Their conclusions were that with age modifiers,: 
•cross-subsidies between age groups would be eliminated. Within age 
groups, cross-subsidies would continue to benefit 
lower-income families at the expense of higher-income 
families. 
•the difference in cross-subsidies between income groups for community 
rating and community rating by age is minimal. 
While age-rated premiums are closer to actual 
household costs, that difference at most is less than 
49-0 • 
•families with "excellent" health would have premium costs move closer 
to actual costs by almost 14 %. Families in other 
health status categories would realize a smaller 
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change in premium. 
•retired families would see the largest impact to their premiums. 
Premiums for this group would increase by about $1,600 
a year. Even so, they would continue to benefit from 
cross-subsidies of approximately $1,200 a year under 
an age rated system. 
•Statistics from the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) 
support assertions that "pure" community rating coupled with 
universal coverage results in a regressive distribution of 
income. Younger people who make less money would be forced to 
pay more than the "real cost" of their policy in order to subsidize 
sicker, generally older people. This essentially becomes a 
transfer of income from people in their 20's and 30's to those 
in their 50's and 60's. 
HIAA figures show that the median household income in 1991 for someone 
under 25 years of age was 42 % of that for someone aged 45 to 
54. For individuals between the age of 25 and 34, the median 
income was 70 % of those aged 45 to 54. Young, healthy people 
will pay more under community rating although they generally 
use less medical care. HIAA estimates that 19 to 24 year-olds 
spend 66 % as much on medical care as 55 to 64 year-olds. Those 
aged 25 to 54 spend half as much. 
•Implementation of "pure" community rating in New Jersey resulted 
in 1) huge premium increases for young people; 2) premium 
increases for the large majority of people; and 3) a dramatic 
increase in uninsured young people. 
• HMOs have generally not experienced a drop in coverage by the younger 
and healthier due to community rating laws. This is probably 
because HMO risk pools are stable and broad-based. In New York, 
the state's largest HMO, Health Insurance Plan of Greater New 
York (HIP) experienced a slightly lower than average age in it's 
pool since the community rating law took effect there. 
•According to a report released by the Blue Cross Blue Shield 
Association, a "significant percentage of employers" would 
realize premium increases under a "pure" community rating system. 
Their findings show that little, if any, rate reductions would 
be experienced by small employers. Although the Association 
is a proponent of modified community rating, it cautions the 
government to be careful in how modified community rating is 
implemented. 
•Other findings by the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association indicate 
that some Blues plans would be able to offset the risk of community 
rating with other advantages. Regardless, since most plans 
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currently have worse risk pools than their competitors, modified 
community rating would benefit a majority of plans. Competitors 
would lose their ability to attract heal thy risks through pricing 
flexibility. The use of risk adjustors would further strengthen 
plan positions. 
The Pennsylvania Blue Cross Blue Shield Experience 
In Pennsylvania, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield system community rates 
programs for individuals and small businesses. These programs 
include an "open enrollment" policy which allow applicants to 
purchase coverage regardless of personal medical history. A 
one-year preexisting condition waiting period is imposed. 
Provider discounts of up to 35 % help the community-rated Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield programs in Pennsylvania remain solvent. In 
1990, a quarter-million Pennsylvanians with individual Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield policies paid $260 million in premiums, 
but received nearly $300 million in benefits. 
Pennsylvania Blue Cross Blue Shield community rated products have 
been nationally recognized for giving value for premium dollars 
spent. In August 1990, Consumer Report ranked the hospital 
surgical policies sold by Capital Blue Cross and Pennsylvania 
Blue Shield first among more than fifty policies reviewed. 
Pennsylvania's Blue Cross and Blue Shield system includes Blue Cross 
of Northeastern Pennsylvania, Blue Cross of Western 
Pennsylvania, Capital Blue Cross, Independence Blue Cross, and 
Pennsylvania Blue Shield. 
Pennsylvania's uninsured rate is the fourth lowest in the nation. 
Community rating is not currently mandated in Pennsylvania. 
The Rochester, New York Experience 
In Rochester, New York, community rating has been successful. Over 
90 % of insurance policies in Rochester are community rated. 
In 1991, Rochester premium costs averaged less than $2,400.00 
per employee. The national average at that time was almost 
$3,600.00 and the New York state average was more than $4,300.00. 
Insurance rate increases in Rochester were less than half the 
national average from 1980 through 1991. 
A study conducted by Louis Harris and Associates found that the 
uninsured rate in Rochester was approximately 6% compared to 
a national rate of 14 %. Customer satisfaction with health 
insurance coverage high. 
Insurance is available year-round through open enrollment. Community 
rating in Rochester was adopted voluntarily in response to cost 
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concerns expressed by business groups. 
According to studies sponsored by the community, if community rating 
were repealed and replaced with experience rating; 1) health 
insurance would become unaffordable for high risk groups and 
individuals; 2) the number of uninsured would increase; and, 
3) providers and hospitals would experience increased bad debt 
which would be passed back to the community through higher rates. 
The Rochester experience is unique. It is unclear whether its success 
can be replicated throughout the country. Universal insurance 
coverage is nearly achieved through a few large employers. One 
insurer controls the market. Blue Cross Blue Shield of the 
Rochester Area has more than 70 % of the marketshare. 
NEW YORK'S COMMUNITY RATING EXPERIENCE 
•On April 1, 1993, New York became the first state to implement 
community rating with guaranteed issue for small groups and 
individuals. 
•The New York Insurance Superintendent Salvatore Curiale claims the 
reason for passage of the law was because the state's individual 
and small group markets were "falling apart". Mr. Curiale 
believes this was occurring because commercial insurers could 
select the best risks, experience rate them and offer lower 
premiums compared to Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield and other 
non-profit plans which accepted and community-rated everyone. 
This was causing the community rated premiums to rise 
dramatically as the pool became older and sicker. 
•Because 1993 was an election year for state legislators, some 
legislators believed it was politically unpopular to allow Empire 
to raise its rates. Some law makers also believed that the 
state's Medicaid costs would rise if individual policies from 
the Blues became unaffordable. 
•New York's community rating system is considered "pure" because 
there are no variations in price for age, gender, or other 
factors. The law includes open enrollment provisions which 
require insurers and HMOs in the individual and small group market 
( 50 members or less) to accept all applicants regardless of heal th 
status. 
In an attempt to discourage people from waiting until they get sick 
to purchase insurance, insurers and HMOs can impose a one-year 
waiting period for preexisting conditions. The law requires 
portability of policies so that people can switch jobs without 
jeopardizing their coverage. A final and controversial 
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component of the law establishes risk adjustment pools to help 
insurers who have a disproportionate share of sick and elderly 
customers. This component has been struck down by a U. S. 
District Court and is on appeal. 
Unlike other states that have instituted community rating, New York 
did not establish a transition period during which the new rates 
would be phased-in. 
•According to the New York Department of Insurance, during the first 
year of community rating approximately 30 % of the insured 
received increases in their premiums ranging from 20 % to 59 %. 
Rates for 30 year old single males increased 170 %. 
Approximately 30 % of New York's young men cancelled their heal th 
care coverage. 
•The New York Insurance Company reported 43,666 cancelled individual 
policies after one year of community rating. The average age 
of their New York policyholders increased by 3. 5 % as the majority 
of people opting out of the system were younger, healthier 
individuals. 
•In the months following enactment of the community rating law, many 
New Yorkers switched to managed care plans. The number of people 
in HMOs rose by 22 % to 296,000 subscribers in the small group 
market. In the individual market, the number increased by 26 % 
to 34,000 subscribers. 
According to the New York State Heal th Maintenance Organization 
Conference, the community rating law had little impact on the 
HMOs because they were already community rating. The open 
enrollment requirements for HMOs in the individual and small 
group market had the greatest impact. They facilitated 
enrollment by people in these groups. Individual contracts at 
HMOs almost doubled, particularly for HMOs in New York City. 
•According to the New York Department of Insurance, the range of rate 
increases and decreases after passage of the community rating 
law has varied dramatically by age. In the small group market, 
a group with an average age of 50 to 60 experienced rate declines 
of 50 % while a group with an average age in the 20's experienced 
rate increases of 120 %. 
•Before community rating was instituted, Mutual of Omaha in New York 
charged a 25 year old male in Albany $64.45 a month for health 
insurance. A 55 year old male paid $141.79. After community 
rating, that same 25 year old male received a 67 % increase in 
his premium, now paying $107.33 while the 55 year old received 
a 24 % decrease, also paying $107.33. In 1994, both will pay 
$145.10 because of higher costs. 
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•Recent statistics from the New York State Insurance Department 
indicate that the number of New Yorkers with health insurance 
declined by approx imately 1.2 % (25,477 people ) in the first nine 
months after community rating too k effect. After more than a 
year, the number of people insured in the individual market 
declined by 12 % (43,666 people). It is estimated that the number 
of insured with Medicare supplemental coverage increased by 1. 7 % 
(13,903 individuals). 
•Eighteen percent of individual and small group commercial insurance 
policyholders experienced changes in their premiums after 
enactment of the community rating law. Of those who experienced 
a change in premium in the individual market, about 62 % faced 
increases. In the small group market, about 66 % of policyholders 
experiencing a change in premium faced increases. 
•Health insurance coverage was impacted more in the individual market 
than in the small group market as a result of the community rating 
law. The small group market experienced a O. 4 6% loss in policies 
between 3/31/93 and 1/1/94. Although the loss of policies was 
slight in t h e small group market, there was a noticeable shift 
in coverage from the nonprofit insurers to the HMOs. Some 
policyholders migrated to the commercial insurers. 
•According to a spokesperson of the National Federation of Independent 
Businesses, it is too early to tell what the overall impact of 
the New York community rating law will be on small businesses. 
Small businesses favored passage of a modified community rating 
bill. An annual survey of NFIB members found that about 64 % 
have experienced an increase in health insurance costs of 10 % 
to 20 % from 1993 to 1994. Another 24 % experienced an increase 
of 20 % to 30 %. According to the routine survey, 68 % of 
respondents were providing health insurance coverage to their 
employees in 1994. So far, members have expressed neither 
outrage nor praise for the community rating law. 
•Supporters of New York's community rating law note that the most 
significant loss of coverage occurred among non-profit insurers, 
including Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield. The non-profits 
lost about 30,000 subscribers or 70 % of the individual market. 
Non-profits also lost about 60,000 subscribers in the small 
group market. The sharp declines cannot be attributed to the 
community rating law, however, because the non-profits have been 
community rating for years. 
Instead, these losses are believed to be due to a 25 % rate increase 
at Empire which had 8 million customers. Excluding the 
non-profit losses, the first year of community rating showed 
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an increase in new subscribers of 70,000 policies in the 
individual market or an 8.8 % increase. In addition, 13,000 new 
subscribers purchased Medicare supplemental coverage. 
•According to the Coalition of Voluntary Health Organizations which 
supported the community rating bill, the law helped moderate 
rate increases for thousands of Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield 
customers who would otherwise have faced a 50 % rate increase. 
Under the previous system for small groups, a single 
catastrophic illness in a small group would cause rates to jump 
for everyone in that group. Over the long term, it is believed 
that the law will provide greater equity and stability in the 
market. 
•New York Insurance Superintendent Curiale, emphasizes that 60 % of 
the insured experienced either a rate decrease or increase of 
less than 20 %. These rate adjustments are expected to be 
one-time modifications. Future increases are expected to be 
based on the experience of the community pool and projected 
medical costs. 
• Superintendent Curiale acknowledges that the community rated 
policies young people are buying are more expensive than they 
were under experience rating. He maintains, however, that they 
are of a higher quality. Policies offered before community 
rating was passed were inexpensive because there was little 
likelihood of anyone collecting on them and there was no assurance 
that the policies would be there if the policyholder or a 
co-worker got sick. Under open enrollment/community rating 
young people can be assured coverage will be in place when they 
need it most, and with portability provisions they can change 
jobs even after a serious illness. 
•In 1994, the New York insurance department created Regulation 146 
which establishes two pooling mechanisms intended to offset any 
potential effects from adverse selection. Commercial insurers, 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield indemnity companies, and HMOs are 
required to participate in the pools. The first pool creates 
an age/gender morbidity table that compares the demographic 
characteristics of individuals covered by an HMO or insurer to 
a regional average. HMOs and insurers with a relative 
demographic factor greater than average would receive money from 
the pool. HMOs and insurers with a relative demographic factor 
below average would pay into the pool. Payments out of the pool 
would be equally divided among the commercial insurers and HMOs. 
The second pool is based on a list of high cost medical conditions. 
All HMOs and insurers are supposed to contribute a fixed amount 
to the pool. The amount would be determined by the insurance 
commissioner. 
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The creation and implementation of these risk pools has been challenged 
in court. Neither pool is being used presently although money 
is being held in escrow by the New York Department of Insurance. 
-The state's HMOs and health insurance companies have challenged 
implementation of the law's risk adjustment pools in federal 
and state courts. The purpose of the pools were to 
stabilize the risk that would be shared within the small 
group and individual markets. The rules are being 
challenged on the grounds that they are preempted by ERISA. 
In February, 1994, they were struck down by a U.S. District 
Court. The case is now on appeal to a U.S. Court of Appeals. 
-The superintendent of the Department of Insurance claims that he 
will seek an ERISA exemption if the court appeals prove 
unsuccessful. 
•Health Insurance Association of America has brought suit against 
New York concerning Regulation 14 6 on ERISA grounds. HIAA 
contends that implementation of Regulation 146 will increase 
the cost of employee benefit plans that obtain coverage under 
commercial insurers, force employee benefit plans to reduce 
coverage provided to their members, or force these plans to choose 
other means of funding. These actions would have to be taken 
due to the interference of the regulation in the administration 
of ERISA plans in the small group market. 
•Currently, the New York Department of Insurance considers the small 
group market to be stable and to offer consumers a variety of 
commercial insurers. Additional legislative efforts by 
supporters of the community rating law are therefore centering 
around the individual market. In this market, prices remain 
high and only one insurer is participating. 
•A great deal of controversy surrounds a study released by the 
actuarial firm Milliman and Robertson (M & R) about the effects 
of community rating in New York. The report concludes that the 
number of people with individual coverage in the state fell from 
more than 1.2 million on March 1, 1993 (one month before the 
community rating law took effect), to 493,000 on January 1, 1994. 
Combined with losses in the small group market, this produced 
a net decrease of approximately 500,000 insured according to 
the report. 
In response to complaints raised by the New York Department of 
Insurance, M & R acknowledged an over-count of 265,000 people 
in the study' s pre-reform estimate of insured individuals. 
Estimates of the population prior to passage of the reform law 
were based on the Employee Benefits Research Institute' s analysis 
IP14 . l - November 1994 
18 
of the March 1993 census bureau report. After passage of the 
law, the number of insured was estimated from sample data 
collected from carriers in the New York individual and small 
group markets. Samples were adjusted to account for all 
carriers. 
•The Milliman and Robertson report found that the average premium 
for small group and individual policies combined fell $100.00 
from $3,400 to $3,300. 
-The report concludes that insurance companies in general are not 
meeting their target loss ratios. Rate increases above 
trend levels will probably be needed in the future. 
Adjunct Issues to Community Rating 
Supporters and critics of community rating often agree that 
implementation of community rating without other reforms will further 
distort the market rather than stabilize or improve it. There are 
several reforms that are being introduced or considered in conj unction 
with community rating. 
•Employer Contributions/Mandates 
For community rating to remain affordable, there must be sufficient 
numbers of healthy people in the risk pool to offset the costs 
of those who will be submitting claims. In a "voluntary" system, 
employer contributions to health plans would make coverage more 
affordable for many employees. This might encourage healthy 
people to purchase coverage rather than go uninsured. 
•Risk Adjustment 
Risk adjustments are a way of equalizing payments and restraining 
attempts by some insurers to come out ahead by attracting 
favorable risks. The calculation of risk adjustments is complex 
and still largely experimental. It has to distinguish the part 
of the plan's losses or profits that are due to the risk profile 
of its subscribers rather than the plan's efficiency. 
•Mandatory versus voluntary participation 
Similar issue to that of employer contributions/mandates. The 
purpose is to get healthy people to participate in the system. 
•Guarantee Issue 
This is viewed by some as a necessary component of reform that should 
be implemented with community rating. The purpose of requiring 
guarantee issue of policies would be to prevent insurers from 
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rejecting poor risks. 
•Guarantee Renewability 
Guaranteed renewabili ty would prohibit insurers from cancelling 
coverage or raising rates after a policyholder gets sick. It 
would require insurers to renew coverage and charge everyone 
with the same policy the same rate. 
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The Future for Florida 
•CHPAs/small group 
It is expected that efforts to repeal the gender modifier for CHPA 
policies may be pursued during the next legislative session. 
Federal regulations do not permit gender discrimination for 
pricing of products. It is possible that the gender modifier 
could be construed to be a form of gender discrimination. 
•It is possible that community rating of individual policies will 
arise during the next legislative session. 
Alternative Approaches 
•State risk pools for the uninsurable are being considered by some 
as an alternative to community rating. However, risk pools have 
the potential to increase the problem of adverse selection 
because there is less incentive for individuals to enroll in 
a plan on the open market. 
•The Council for Affordable Health Insurance supports an 8-point 
program to lower the cost of health insurance, ensure access 
to coverage for all Americans, preserve the freedom of choice 
and market competition in heal th care. Their eight points 
include reforms in taxes, tort law and small group regulations; 
establishment of medical savings accounts, universal access to 
heal th insurance through separate risk pools for the uninsurable, 
advance disclosure of treatment costs and various forms of 
patient education. 
• Risk purchasing groups could be formed by small employers to negotiate 
large group rates with providers. This would provide more heal th 
insurance coverage for small group policyholders. Carriers 
could off er standard group policies but allow employees to select 
customized features that would better serve their individual 
needs. The standard group policy could be experience rated with 
small premium variations depending on the customized features 
added or subtracted from the policy. 
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CONTROLLING ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES 
Background 
Increased administrative costs affect both insurers and providers . In o rder to 
lower administrative costs , efforts should focus on streamlining operating 
procedures and improving efficiency , but not at the expense of medical cost savings 
from managed care interventions . 
Recommendations 
oThe state , cooperating with providers and purchasers , should encourage industry 
standards for design of forms , definition of terms , coding of entries , 
inquiries regarding benefit entitlement , submission and payment of claims , 
and paid benefits summary statements . 
oThe state should cooperate with other entit i es (providers , insurers , employers) 
in automating the exchange of data among all parties . 
IP15 - November 1 992 
COST CONTAINMENT 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida recognizes the tremendous positive changes 
made in the financing and deli very of care over the past several decades and supports 
building on that current system to improve the functioning of the heal th care market 
to reduce costs . We advocate reform that 1) provides enough and the right type 
of information so that purchasers can make informed value - based decisions ; 2) revises 
the tax system to improve purchaser ' s incentives to shop for value in health plans ; 
3) removes legal and regulatory barriers obstructing a competitive market ; and 4) 
continues the development of managed care programs . 
We believe that a health care system built on the private market will provide the 
competition needed to reduce costs , by increasing efficiency , while improving 
quality and expanding access . People will choose plans that offer the best value 
for their heal th care dollar ; inefficient plans will be more costly , and will either 
improve or leave the market . Through private market competition , the health care 
industry can control costs while maintaining quality standards and developing 
innovative new programs to meet the people ' s needs . 
We believe that efforts in the health care industry to reduce administrative costs 
are also important . The best way to address administrative costs is to support 
specific measures that will increase efficiencies and add value to the system 
overall , but do not disturb the competitive forces of the marketplace . Some 
suggested reforms would be standardizing and automating data and streamlining 
paperwork. 
We are strongly opposed to government - imposed price controls as an approach to 
reducing overall health care costs -- they simply do not work . In the health care 
system, price controls lead to rationing , reduced services , the erosion of quality 
and , often , to higher prices than would be achieved through maintaining competitive 
markets . Administrative costs would also increase from the expenses necessary to 
run the large bureaucratic monitoring and enforcement system that would be needed . 
Perhaps worst of all , government - imposed pricing distorts market incentives , and 
therefore the decisions people make , resulting in less efficient resource 
allocations . Price controls cannot substitute for a competitive market , nor are 




In network - based plans whose design calls for patients ' care to be coordinated 
through their personal physicians , direct access (DA) legislation would prohibit 
this important quality of care and cost saving design feature . 
The Myths 
Special interests say that 
oDA does not affect the cost of network- based plans since the specialists are 
in the network 
oDA does not harm the quality of care for plan members 
oDA improves choice for Floridians 
The Facts 
Does DA have any effect on the cost of network - based plans which rely on personal 
physicians to coordinate patients ' care? 
-Yes --- it will raise the cost of network-based plans. According to an independent 
actuarial analysis (The Wyatt Company) , DA would increase the cost of 
network- based plans between 4 and 14 %. Personal physicians are trained 
to provide many basic services , and refer patients to more expensive 
specialists for specialized services . Personal physicians coordinate and 
manage the hea l th care of patients , ensuring that patients 1) obtain routine 
preventive care , 2) receive the care needed from specialists , and 3) do 
not receive duplicate , contradictory , or unnecessary care. 
personal physician from this role will increase costs . 
Does DA affect the quality of care members receive? 
Removing the 
-Yes --- DA harms quality of care. There is no medical reason for by- passing 
the personal physician . DA moves people back to the old system of care , 
where people self- diagnose and then guess at what type of spec i alist they 
need to see . The y will receive care for specific medical problems , but 
this care will not be coordinated in relation to their overall heal th status . 
Does DA improve choice for Floridians? 
-No. DA will reduce choice. DA would effectively remove from the market plans 
in which personal physicians coordinate care for members . This type of 
plan should be available to Floridians ; it is an important part of the overall 
product mix . 
Action Recommended 
None. 
DA is an example of special interest legislation which will harm Floridians . 
Health care reform should lower costs and increase quality . By eliminating a 
cost effective , quality product from the market , DA will raise costs and decrease 
qual i ty . It will also decrease access to care because rising prices mean fewer 
peop l e will be able to afford coverage . 
As of 03/13/95 , DA legislation appears in HB 723 (Kelly) and SB 914 (Myers) . 
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THE COST OF "DIRECT ACCESS" LEGISLATION 
The Florida legislature has emphasized health care system reforms to reduce health 
care costs while maintaining quality care for Floridians and improving access to 
care . It has emphasized the benefits of managed care in achieving these goals. 
Nevertheless , in 1994 the legislature has considered f or passage several pieces 
of legislation which would destroy the effectiveness of managed care plans. One 
type of " anti-managed care" legislation , called "direct access ," would keep 
Floridians from purchasing a health plan in which patients agree to consult with 
their primary care physician whenever they become sick . 
In an HMO , a member selects a family (primary care) physician to oversee and 
coordinate covered health care services . The primary care physician provides 
referrals to specialists as necessary . The primary care physician is key to the 
cost effectiveness and quality of HMOs because he/she : 
ocoordinates and manages the health care of patients -- bringing together and 
captaining a team of other specialty providers as necessary to ensure a patient 
receives the care needed ; 
oprovides many basic services directly , rather than having basic services provided , 
inappropriately, by a specialist; 
omonitors all the care a patient receives , so that duplicate , contradictory , and 
unnecessary care is not provided, and routine , preventative care is not 
overlooked . 
There is no medical rationale for by- passing the primary care physician in his/her 
care manager role . If the state passes a "direct access" law which initially allows 
patients to bypass their family physician for only a few specialties, all other 
specialists will cry " foul! " and demand direct access as well. Within a few years 
of passing direct access legislation, this legislation will be broadened to apply 
to all special ties. This will effectively do away with the primary care physician's 
role in HMOs as a care manager. 
Loss of the care manager role will have several consequences : 
o The cost of HMO coverage will increase. In a recent report , the Wyatt Company 
estimated that PPO costs (for PPOs which use a care manager) would increase 
from 4 to nearly 14 %; the higher figure is for plans where members mainly 
stay wi thin the network of PPO physicians for services . Therefore for HMOs, 
where staying in- network is customary , we estimate the cost of coverage will 
increase at least 14% . 
oQuality of care will decrease. HMO members will no longer automatically benefit 
from the coordination and management of care provided by the care manager . 
Many will instead be back in the old system of medical care : patients will 
self-diagnose and then guess at the appropriate type of specialist (and guess 
wrong at least some percentage of the time) . They will receive care from 
a medical specialist for specific medical problems, but in many cases there 
wi ll be no care manager aware of other treatments that the patient may receive. 
If direct access legislation passes : 
o it will harm the Floridians who currently have heal th care coverage. Many 
Floridians depend on HMOs for lower - cost , quality coverage , but they will 
no longer be able to buy the standard HMO product . Their HMO coverage choices 
wi ll be limited to the " new , " higher cost " HMOs " dictated by state government . 
As their cost of coverage rises , with no increase in value , some of these 
Floridians will undoubtedly join the ranks of the uninsured . 
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o it will harm state employees. Many state empl oyees have selected an HMO for their 
health care coverage . Under this legislation , their HMO coverage choices 
will be limited to higher cost plans with fewer benefits (that is , no care 
manager required) , and state employees will be forced to pay more for less 
health care coverage . 
o it will increase the state's costs for the Medicaid program. The state plans to 
achieve signifi cant savings in the Medicaid program by moving Medicaid 
beneficiaries into HMOs . As HMO costs i ncrease , the state ' s anticipated 
savings will not materialize . 
o it will harm uninsured Floridians. The state is designing a subsidy program for 
low- income uninsured Floridians to purchase private health care coverage . 
Coverage for the program comes from Medicaid program savings achieved by 
mov i ng Medicaid recipi ents into HMOs . Savings are estimated at 5- 10 %. When 
HMO costs increase 14 % or more as a resul t of this legi slation , there will 
be no savings to fund a program for the uninsured . 
Health care reform should lower costs, increase quality, and reduce the number of 
uninsured Floridians. Direct access legislation will increase costs, lower 
quality, and boost the number of uninsured. 
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EMPLOYER MANDATE TO PROVIDE HEALTH INSURANCE 
Recognizing that a majority of the uninsured are employees and their dependents 
has led some people to recommend a mandate that employers provide health insurance . 
We do not support an employer mandate for the following reasons : 
oThere is no sound policy reason for requiring employers to provide a heal th benefit . 
Most large employers find a heal th benefit to be an i mportant part of 
compensation packages in their efforts to compete for the most qualified 
workers . If an employer chooses not to use health benefits , despite existing 
tax advantages , he must not believe that it improves his ability to attract 
needed labor . Inter£ erence in employers' use of resources only reduces their 
competitiveness with businesses , such as out - of - state or foreign enterprises , 
that can escape the mandate. 
oA mandate to provide health insurance would set a bad policy precedent . If 
businesses can be mandated to include health insurance in the compensat ion, 
why not auto and property insurance? Why not housing or entertainment 
expenses? There is no reason to assign employers responsibility for health 
insurance . 
oFor small businesses , which represent nearly all of the employers not already 
providing health insurance , a mandate would , of necessity , be borne by the 
employees . To cope with the added expense , most small businesses would have 
little choice but to reduce other labor expenses . They would either have 
to reduce the price of labor (other compensation , such as wages and salaries) 
or reduce the amount of labor they purchase . Workers would be reduced to 
part - time , laid off , or not rep l aced . 
oSome businesses that are only marginally viable today would find the added cost 
impossible to absorb . Operating with less labo r would not permit production 
of their goods or services and they would be forced out of business . 
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ENCOURAGING PRUDENT PURCHASING 
Background 
The traditional health care system is really a cost - plus system which offers little 
in the way of incentives for providers , consumers , or traditional insurance plans 
to hold down costs . 
Recommendations 
The health care system in Florida should move toward providing strong incentives 
for controlling costs while maintaining the quality of care . 
oThe system must provide incentives for consumers to purchase managed care plans , 
based on both cost and quality 
- if the Federal government doesn ' t reform national tax policy , Florida should develop 
tax incentives to encourage 
l)purchase of managed care plans , and 
2)employers to contribute to the cost of health care benefits in an amount equal 
to the basic value plan in a multi - choice situation 
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EXPENDITURE CAPS/RATE SETTING 
One approach to containing health care costs would have government impose limits or caps 
on total expenditures . The global caps would somehow be translated into price ceilings 
for specific segments such as hospitals or physicians . Hospital and physician rate set ting 
has also been suggested as an approach separate from the global expenditure caps . Some 
proposals see these government price control schemes as an alternative to the competitive 
market while others would add them as a supplement to reforms intended to encourage greater 
competition. 
We are convinced this is the wrong approach . Government imposed pricing cannot substitute 
for a competitive market nor is it compatible with the market . 
oA competitive market allocates resources based on the independent decisions of many 
suppliers and purchasers. Government imposed pricing distorts the incentives and 
therefore the decisions people make resulting in less efficient allocations . The 
supply of and demand for the various services diverges from what would occur under 
a competitive market resulting in lower overall benefits per cost . 
oGovernment imposed pricing rewards all providers equally . A competitive system makes 
greater rewards to the more efficient and effective providers -- those who bring 
greater value to patients . 
oProviders respond to caps and price setting by providing more services per patient . 
For example , during the mid- eighties when admission rates declined nationally , rate 
setting states experienced substantial increases in admissions . 
higher total costs. 
The result is 
oProviders also respond by shifting patients to other settings where prices are not as 
stringent . Total heal th expenditures increase and quality suffers because of these 
unintended , indirect effects . 
oRate regulation performs poorly as a cost containment tool even if you consider only 
its d i rect effects . For the four year period , 1986 - 1989 , rate - setting states 
had an average increase in hospital costs of 33 . 4 percent compared to 30.6 percent 
for non rate - setting states . By contrast , the average increase in nine of the more 
competitive states was 27 . 6 percent . 
oConstraining prices does not effectively constrain the costs providers face . Stringent 
price controls can drive out of business those hospitals that have high fixed costs 
as they have in New York State . A competitive system can also drive providers out 
of business but it more effectively discr i minates on the basis of efficiency ; those 
providing the most value per cost are more likely to survive . 
oGovernment imposed pricing inhibits innovation in payment and contracting that managed 
care companies (MCCs) would otherwise use to give providers incentives to become 
more efficient and effective . Many MCCs , for example , are working to form 
partnerships with physicians and hospitals in which the providers are at least 
partially at risk for total costs . Such arrangements would be stifled by government 
price setting . 
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FINANCING 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Florida supports reform of the federal tax structure to 
limit the amount of insurance premium which is deductible from income taxes . 
Spending on health care coverage above a certain level (cap) would be taxable . 
This tax deduction would apply uniformly to all Americans , regardless of their 
employment status : employers and employees could deduct this amount from taxable 
income , and so could individuals and the self- employed . 
Most states , as well as the federal government, are struggling with budgets and 
their ability to finance the health care needs of their poorer citizens . In order 
to achieve this goal , states must maximize potential federal revenues , and must 
become very efficient at organizing programs for the needy . 
There is a tremendous need for innovation in health care delivery systems for the 
poor . Government should experiment with primary care programs, and other managed 
care approaches as a way to improve services and contain costs. However , government 
at both the state and federal level should strive to avoid the expense of developing 
government - run programs which duplicate programs already available in the private 
market , and to avoid setting up a two- tiered system. We believe that where possible, 
care should be provided through the private market , with low- income consumers making 
the same kinds of value - based choices as consumers who are self- sufficient 
purchasers . Thus , we support states enrolling Medicaid beneficiaries in private 
managed care systems . 
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FLORIDA HEALTH SECURITY PROGRAM 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida supports the concept of a subsidy program 
for low- income Floridians to purchase private health insurance . The program must 
be designed , however , so that it does not harm the 8 in 10 Floridians who already 
have health care coverage ; and so that it achieves the desired result of decreasing 
the number of uninsured Floridians . 
A subsidy program should : 
- Make government subsidies available for the poor and near - poor to purchase private 
coverage 
- Over time , put all Medicaid beneficiaries into HMOs or Medipass 
- Establish a reserve fund using savings from moving Medicaid beneficiaries into 
managed care , and use these monies to fund the program 
- Direct AHCA to complete a study , working with the heal th care industry and consumers , 
on ways to obtain additional funds 
- Not change the Medically Needy , Disproportionate Share , or County Public Health 
Unit programs for now 
- Ensure reevaluation of payment levels to HMOs for Medicaid enrollees prior to 
program implementation so that commercial HMO enrollees will not pay a "hidden 
tax " through their premiums to support the state ' s Medicaid program 
- Ensure no health plan is forced to participate in Florida Health Security or to 
enroll Medicaid beneficiaries . Statutory language should explicitly prevent 
the agency from establishing participation in Florida Health Security of 
Medicaid as a pre - condition for serving any other al liance member . 
- Make the program available in and out of CHPAs and ensure administration by TPAs 
selected through a competitive bidding process 
- Give the AHCA no power to change the program design without legislative approval 
-Ensure an affordable benefit package with 80/20 cost - sharing provisions . 
Therefore , the standard benefit plan developed by the Department of Insurance 
Advisory Council should be adopted and remain in force for at least the next 
24 months . A specific benefit package should not be included in statute . 
- Require that all family members be uncovered for 12 months to be eligible for family 
coverage ; make available spouse - dependent and dependent - only coverage 
- Require all participants over 100 % o f poverty to pay a portion of the premium in 
order to receive coverage 
- Freeze enrollment in the program whenever 85 % of the dollars actually available 
are cornmi tted for the balance of the fiscal year . This number may be modi£ ied 
with experience . 
- Establish enrollment caps for each subsidy (or income) level , to accurately estimate 
costs 
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THE FLORIDA PATIENT PROTECTION AND QUALITY ASSURANCE ACT 
Proposal 
The FMA ' s Florida Patient Protection and Quality Assurance Act would 1) 
significantly restrict health care plans ' capability to design and develop 
network- based products to meet consumers ' needs; and 2) give organized medicine 
unwarranted and potentially harmful control over the structure and workings of 
Florida ' s health care system . 
Myths 
Organized medicine contends that 
ohealth care providers should be "protected" by making it difficult (costly and 
time - consuming) for health care plans to exclude providers from their 
networks 
opatients need protection through more government control of the care management 
practices of network- based health care plans 
othis legislation would not affect the cost and quality of health care in Florida 
oorganized medicine should have greater control of the heal th care system in Florida 
The Facts 
Should providers be "protected" by making it difficult for health plans to exclude 
them from their networks? 
-No. For the good of all Floridians, physicians must compete for business just 
like other players in the health industry . 
. Health care plans must deve l op networks to meet the quality and access 
needs o f their customers , at affordable prices . Meeting this set 
of needs requires that health care plans be selective in signing up 
physicians , and be able to make changes on occasion , as customers ' 
needs change. This proposal is another form of "any willing 
provider." 
Do Floridians who choose managed care need more government "protection " ? 
-No. Recent studies indicate that consumers in network-based plans are more 
satisfied with their heal th care than people with traditional coverage (i.e. , 
unrestricted choice) (Sachs Group , Inc./Scarborough Research Corp) . Nearly 
all --- 99 % --- Floridians have a choice of providers or types of health 
plans , and an increasing number are choosing network- based plans . In 
choosing network- based plans , Floridians are making decisions based on their 
own percept i ons of the value (cost and quality) these plans offer . 
Do Floridians need more government control of the care management practices of 
network- based plans? 
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-No. National accrediting organizations have set standards for the certification 
of network-based plans. Florida law requires that all HMOs be certified 
by an approved national accrediting organization by 1996. The proposed 
legislation would result in duplicate and overlapping certification 
processes . Such duplication woul d raise the cost of HMO coverage and add 
no value for Floridians . 
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Would this legislation have any effect on the cost and/or quality of health care 
coverage in Florida? 
-This legislation would significantly raise the cost of network-based heal th plan 
coverage while decreasing quality. Just like "any willing provider ," it 
would dramatically increase network- based health plan costs . Costs would 
also rise as health plans meet redundant , fragmented , and inconsistent 
requirements regarding care management practices . At the same time , 
network - based plans would lose control of network design and therefore 
quality . 
Should organized medicine have greater control over Florida ' s health care system? 
-No . Through control of a new Department of Health, one set of players in the 
health care system would have far too great a role in setting system policy 
and regulation . A state organization should represent the interests of 
all Floridians. It would be very difficult for this new Department to 
make fair and unbiased decisions affecting all the players in the health 
care system in Florida . 
Action Recommended 
None . 
This legislation is "provider protection." Through its many provisions it would 
significantly raise the cost of network- based health care coverage , decrease 
quality , and give greater control of the system to one set of actors in the health 
care arena . This legislation would turn back the clock to the days when traditional 
insurance coverage was the norm , along with out - of - control cost increases . 
Floridians cannot afford this type of "protection . " 
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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR MANDATE 
Issue 
Although Florida has avoided an employer mandate to provide health insurance , a 
1992 law does require contractors who receive state business to provide insurance . 
That law , which would take effect in mid 1994 , is somewhat vague about the types 
of businesses covered , the definition of " full - time employees ," and the 
responsibility for oversight of the law . 
The Florida Health Security Act Proposes 
•Extending the health insurance requirement to out - of-state contractors , 
construction contractors , and subcontractors . 
• Defining a full - time employee as someone who works at least 17 . 5 hours . 
•Assigning rule making authority to the Department of Management Services 
Effects 
• The mandate to purchase insurance would raise costs to the contractors and , 
therefore , to the State and Taxpayers. 
• Some potential contractors would not bid for State business because of the mandate ; 
the mandate would reduce competition for state business and indirectly raise 
costs to taxpayers. 
• Some contractors would respond to the mandate by hiring fewer workers or using 
more part - time workers , reducing or eliminating wages of their employees. 
•This mandate threatens to become a mandate for all employers which would threaten 
the jobs and i ncomes of many employees of small businesses . 
Alternative Proposal 
• Repea l the government contractor mandate . 
•Encourage the purchase of health insurance through appropriate small group and 
individual insurance reform and through reforms that make the health system 
more effic i ent . 
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GUARANTEE ISSUE 
There was no paper found in the folder 
for this topic 
Melissa, what do we need to do about this? 
GOVERNMENT AS A CUSTOMER 
Introduction 
Historically , government business has been an important and notable part of Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield of Florida ' s total business . 
Data 
Government business will become an even more important part of BCBSF ' s business 
as the health care reform debate continues and changes are passed . 
At the state level , for example , Governor Chiles ' s Florida Health Security program 
that moves Medicaid recipients into private HMOs gained approval from the Health 
Care Financing Administration (HCFA) . This will move Medicaid recipients into 
private HMOs which could possibly increase private HMO enrollment by 2 million 
individuals across the state , resulting in a signif i cant part of the Florida HMO 
market . 
At the federal level , new government business is flourishing even without reform 
legislation. The HCFA ' s revision of the Medicare program has made privately 
administered HMOs available to many Medicare beneficiaries . This provided private 
HMOs an opportunity to seek government business in a market which has historically 
not been available . 
In addition to the increase of government business through legislative and regulatory 
reforms , there are other factors that attribute to the government business becoming 
a larger and more important part of private health care services . First , over the 
past decade , government employment at all levels has increased at %. That 
is a % growth rate compared to a % growth rate for the private sector . 
Second , one of the fastest growing segments of the population are people reaching 
the age 65 and entering the Medicare program . It is estimated that the Medicare 
population will reach % of the total population in 
To help BCBSF better understand and manage government business , an assessment of 
the risks and benefits is needed . The purpose of this paper is to set out what 
the risks and benefits are with having government as a customer and to explain the 
company ' s position on evaluating that business . 
Risks Associated With Government Business 
The following identifies the general risks for BCBSF when it takes on government 
as a customer . 
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•Government business is likely to be open to the public , and therefore , competitors 
will have access. Certain aspects of negotiations , transactions , or company 
information normally considered private , may fall under disclosure laws or 
reporting requirements and become public information . 
• The media naturally has a greater interest in how government money is spent and 
managed and , therefore , greater media attention and scrutiny is placed on 
the company receiving public funding . 
- For example , unfavorable reports about the management of and satisfaction with 
government accounts tend to receive greater media coverage than 
favorable reports . If anything were to go "wrong " in the 
administration or delivery of a product, even if it is due to government 
regulations or mismanagement , it would reflect poorly on the private 
business and could be played- out in the media. 
•Government customers tend to have more bureaucratic reporting and deli very 
requirements than private customers . 
•Conflict of interest 
Benefits Associated with Government Business 
The following identifies the general benefits a private company can achieve when 
it takes on government as a customer . 
•Government business represents about 
Florida . Pursuing government as 
significantly increase market share . 
percent of the insurance business in 
a customer offers opportunities to 
•Managing large amounts of government business can provi de a private company with 
valuable political capital in the market place and in the legislative 
environment . Such political capital can provide a private company 
credibility that will be beneficial when facing private competitors and 
influencing the legislative and regulatory process . 
•When private business takes on government as a customer they ' re seen as being part 
of the greater community and a good corporate citizen . 
Specific Risks for BCBSF From Each Level of Government 
Federal Government 
•Criminalization of procurement process 
The State Government 
•May be viewed as a obstructionist 








HEALTH CARE DATA 
Issue 
Consumers need adequate comparative information to decide which health plan to purchase . 
The Florida Heal t h Security Plan Proposes 
• Streamline and strengthen the AHCA ' s data collection authority . 
• Develop performance indicators for Accountable Health Partnerships and hospitals . 
• Refine clinical and other outcome measures . 
Effects 
• The federal government and several national organizations are devoting large resources to 
developing national clinical guidelines and outcome measures based on medical research 
f i ndings . Implementing the vague proposals in the Florida Health Plan could : 
- place the AHCA in a situation where they are contradicting physicians and other health care 
groups that have already developed nationally accepted measures , and 
-increase administrative costs for heal th plans and providers ( and therefore increase insurance 
premiums) if health plans and providers are required to collect and send the 
AHCA a lot of additional data . 
•Floridians concerned with "big government" will not be convinced that the government can 
design the best consumer - oriented reporting system, and wi ll certainly not like the 
added bureaucracy necessary to manage all these data . 
•Providers could be put financially at risk and their reputation in the community jeopardized 
if misleading or incomplete information on their practices are released . 
•All health care players could find their proprietary information collected and released by 
the AHCA which would destroy their competitive advantage in the market . 
•Patients and providers dislike the expansion of the AHCA ' s (a government agency) authority 
to collect increasing amounts of personal information , and will view i t as an intrusion 
into their confidential relationship . 
Alternative Proposal 
• Develop a private- sector , non- profit organization with representation from all the health 
care players (including consumers) to conduct research , gain consensus , and develop 
information policy and standards for consumers , health plans , and providers . 
• The AHCA should accept outcome measures developed by the health care community rather than 
develop or " refine " its own . Many medi cal specialties and health care players have 
already devoted a l ot of resources to developing nationally accepted measures . 
• The AHCA should rely on external groups to help determine how best to process the information 
it already collects . 
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HEALTH CARE FRAUD 
Background 
Fraud can be found in all segments of the health care industry . Though the effects are 
similar -- wasteful spending and inappropriate patient care -- the nature of the fraud 
is generally d i fferent for fee - for - service and prepaid health care providers . 
Fraud in the fee - for - service reimbursement system includes overcharging for services 
provided , charging for servi ces not rendered , accepting bribes or kickbacks for referring 
patients , and rendering inappropria t e or unnecessary services . 
In contrast , prepa i d health care provi der , typica lly HMOs , fraudulent pract i ces tend 
to involve avo i ding expensive trea t ments , underfinancing health plan operations , 
disregardi ng member complaints , providing poor- qua l ity care , or using deceptive marketing 
practices . 
Regardless of the type of reimbursement method , fraud results in s i gnificant loss of 
public and private health care dollars. The National Health Care Anti - Fraud Association 
and various federal agencies , such as the Government Accounting Office , estimate the 
cost of fraud to be between 3 - 10 % of the nation ' s annual health care expendi tures . Using 
this formula and the figures the Department of Commerce developed for 1994 , where it 
is estimated that the U. S . wi l l spend $1 . 006 trillion for health care , the min i mum loss 
to fraud is at least $30 billion . In all likelihood it i s substantially more , perhaps 
as much as $100 bil l ion . In Florida , this equates to $1 . 4 billion at the low- end , and 
to $4 . 7 bi l lion at the h i gh- end . 
Sixty- five percent of health care fraud cases involve health care providers -- with 
physicians committing 56 percent o f these cases . Consumers commit 35 % of the health 
care fraud cases ; however , provider has , by far , the biggest economic i mpact . 
Expec t ed Proposal s 
The Florida Health Security Pl an - Healthy Homes 1994 , contained thirteen (13) separate 
and specific r ecommendations to combat fraud . An inventory of these with a BCBSF pos i tion 
statement fo r each is attached (A) . Only one bill (SB/CS 1192 - Insurance - proposed 
by Jennings) conta i ned language addressing fraud and no legislat i on addressing health 
care fraud passed during the 1994 state legislature . Any of the thirteen recommendations 
noted above could be introduced and promoted by the Governor or the Agency for Health 
Care Administration (AHCA) during '95 . 
Interpreting current health care reform information/materials , the following categorizes 
components that may be contained in legis l ative proposals during the ' 95 state legis l ative 
sess i on : 
•Prevention: Requiring hospitals and other health care providers to establish fraud 
prevention programs to mi n i mize the risk of a violation of l aws ; educating health 
professionals regarding legal and ethical responsibilities ; educating the general 
public on the affects of fraud ; requiring on- going education for professionals 
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as part of licensure ; maintaining the health care fraud task force to oversee 
Florida ' s needs ; establishing financial solvency requirements for prepaid health 
plans . 
•Detection and Investigation: Affording specialized (investigative) training for staff 
in hea l th care businesses ; using computer - assisted detection of fraud ; 
implementing a statewide/nationwide coding and claims system with electronic fraud 
detection devices , used by all insurers and providers , both public and private ; 
implementing a state "watch dog " law modeled after the federal False Claims Act. 
•Prosecution: Targeting "more teeth " legal mechanisms to prosecute after thorough 
investigation ; applying administrative and civil remedies as more effective and 
more timely deterrents as well as providing for greater financial recovery . 
Rational for Proposals 
The majority of debate on health care fraud and resultant proposals is driven primarily 
by the following rationale : 
1 . the excessive waste as the result of fraud allows for a great potential for cost savings 
within the system by aggressively pursuing and combating fraud , 
2 . the lack of tolerance for " crime " within a system that is built on trust , honesty and 
caring ; especially if quality of care is at stake , 
3 . al though insurers and the government may be the immediate targets of heal th care fraud , 
we are all victims -- as consumers and patients who pay heal th insurance premiums , 
co - payments and deductibles ; as employers who purchase heal th coverage and 
employees ; and as taxpayers , where we are doubly victimized when publ ic payment 
programs are defrauded , and 
4 . experience clearly shows that the health care provider who is defrauding Medicare , 
Medicaid , or other government programs is , in all likelihood , also defrauding 
private payers and therefore a joint public/private solution sponsorship is 
indicated . 
Concerns for BCBSF 
The main concern of BCBSF with most anti - fraud legislative proposals pertains to 
heavy-handed government regulation and bureaucracy . BCBSF is aware of the tremendous 
financial implications of this issue and its impact on Florida ' s health care consumers 
( increase of insurance premiums for all) . We believe the private sector and the 
government should work together to develop programs and practices to curb the escalating 
fraudulent practices . 
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Another concern is our image. The perception by the general public is that as the Medicare 
carrier it is our role to combat fraud regardless of HCFA guidelines . (HCFA will not 
sanction the carrier to do more than state level law and Florida lacks strong controls 
or programs to combat fraud . ) It is a widely stated belief by the general public that 
BCBSF should not " let the bad doctors in " and we are repeatedly asked "who are we still 
paying bad doctors " ? An easy approach would be to support heavy-handed government 
involvement and controls to organize "getting the bad guys ." However , BCBSF ' s preferred 
approach is consumer education and consumer activism . 
BCBSF understands the need for large- volume/multiple - source data to identify and 
effectively investigate aberrant billing patterns . However , mandating a state-wide or 
nation-wide, single "data" source, is not cons istent with private - sector , competitive 
system advances to the detriment of all . 
Recommended Position 
BCBSF believes the role of government is to work with the private sector to detect and 
punish fraudulent behavior on the part of patients , insured groups and individuals , 
individual and institutional providers , insurance companies and managed care companies . 
specific examples include tightening provider enrollment procedures in managed care 
organizations , focus more on suspension (if reliable evidence of fraud is available) 
rather than "pay and chase ," increase the use of technology to detect fraud , educate 
the consumer , and apply utilization standards to Medicare . 
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HEALTH CARE PURCHASING GROUPS 
Introducti on 
The United States health care system is recognized to be among the best in the world . 
During the past few years , however , there has been growing concern about the 
increasing number of uninsured individuals and the rising cost of health care and 
health insurance . 
In the ensuing debate about how the American health care system can be improved , 
the use of purchasing groups has received a lot of attention. Purchasing groups 
are being introduced as a way to: 
•pool purchasing power among small groups, 
• improve the conduit of information, and in some cases, 
•pool risk 
Purchasing groups can be used to pool risk among small groups; however , they have 
not been designed to do this in most private- sector groups or in most state and 
federal proposals. In most group purchasing arrangements , individuals are 
encouraged to choose a health plan from among those offered within the purchasing 
group. This allows for the possibility that high risk and low risk individuals 
may gravitate toward different plans, resulting in adverse selection for one or 
more of these plans . 
Additional benefits of purchasing groups are often cited as 
• creating a more responsive insurance market , 
• reducing administrative costs for small groups , 
• creating incentives for more prudent purchasing by emphasizing the link between 
health benefits and their costs . 
Although there is little scientific evidence that purchasing arrangements save money 
or achieve any of the benefits ascribed to them , those who participate in purchasing 
arrangements tend to believe that they receive some or all of the benefits ascribed 
to group purchasing . Increasingly , health care reform proposals and state and 
federal legislation aimed at increasing access and reducing health care costs , 
include government - run or government - sponsored purchasing groups. 
Types of Purchasing Groups 
Private- Sector Purchasing Groups 
Private - sector purchasing groups currently exist throughout the United States. 
They have been formed for different reasons . 
Some were formed with the sole intent of assisting members to purchase health care 
(e . g . , Florida Gulf Coast Heal th Coalition , Federal Employees Heal th Benefits 
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Program) . Others developed from a need that a coalition or association had to assist 
its members with the purchase of health care which then became one service among 
several offered to group members (e . g ., the Council of Smaller Enterprises/Group 
Services , Inc . in Cleveland) . 
Some employers formed coalitions to exert pressure on providers and third party 
payers to offer more information , better discounts , and more consistent quality 
as part of an overall effort to refor m the health care system from a grass roots 
level (e.g ., the Business Health Care Action Group in Minneapolis). 
Purchasing Groups Under the Heritage Foundation Proposal 
In its proposal for health care reform, the Heritage Foundation requires everyone 
to have health care coverage . Yet , they recognize that individua l s and small 
employer groups are in a relatively weak position to influence the health care market . 
Therefore , they recommend that individuals and small employer groups band together 
with other individuals or small groups that have similar needs , and purchase health 
care as a large group . These purchasing groups would be pr i vate - sector 
organizations and could be formed around existing associations (e . g , churches or 
professional associations) or around specific heal th care needs as they arise (e . g ., 
cancer , heart disease) . In addition to pooling their purchasing power , these groups 
could pool risk , and would provide their members with administrative assistance 
and greater access to health care information . 
Florida : Community Health Purchasing Alliances 
With the passage of the Health Care Reform Act of 1993 , Florida introduced 
government - sponsored, government - designed Community Health Purchasing Alliances 
(CHPAs) . CHPAs are purchasing groups that will provide small businesses (1 - 50 
employees) with comparative information on the cost , quality , usage , enrollee 
satisfaction , and the medical outcomes experience of health plans . They do not 
pool risk . CHPAs may act as administrators in the future , but may not bear risk 
or directly contract with providers . As with heal th plans offered outside of CHPAs , 
heal th plans must use modified community rating and must offer plans on a guaranteed 
issue basis . Businesses have the choice of enrolling in a regional CHPA, finding 
health care coverage independent of a CHPA, or not providing health care coverage 
to their employees . Medicaid beneficiaries and State Employees may be required 
to purchase their health care through CHPAs . 
Since membership is voluntary , CHPAs must prove their value to small businesses . 
If they provide a valuable service at a reasonable price , they wil l succeed . If 
not , small businesses will be no worse off . 
Purchasing Groups Under Managed Competition 
Under the theoret i cal model of managed competition , created by the Jackson Hole 
Group , purchasing groups called Health Plan Purchasing Cooperatives (HPPCs) were 
created to help small employers and individuals influence the health care market 
more effectively . HP PCs would pool the purchasing power of the small groups , improve 
the conduit of information , and act as buying agents and administrators . In these 
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ways , HPPCs would allow small groups and individuals to influence the market on 
an equal basis with large groups . Since first introducing the concept of managed 
competition , however , the Jackson Hole Group has made some significant changes in 
its proposal . 
Originally , HPPCs were well - defined entities. One HPPC per government - designated 
region (state , MSA , other) would serve individuals and the small group population . 
Individua l s and employees of small businesses would be required to enroll in 
regional HPPCs . HPPCs would be government - sponsored non- profit organizations whose 
board of d i rectors would be e l ected by its members . Indi viduals would choose a 
health plan from among those offered , and risk- adjustors would be used to equalize 
the risk between plans . 
In a December , 1993 communique , the Jackson Hole Group shows an important change 
in direction . HPPCs are described as being " relatively excl usive ." More than one 
could exist within each government - defined region , but each should represent 30 
to 50 percent of the purchasing population and should contain a sufficiently broad 
risk pool to attract AHPs . The state would determine how they would want HPPCs 
to be structured (as state agencies , non- profit organizations , corporations , etc.) 
although cooperatives are favored . Membership in the HPPCs is opened to Medicaid 
and Medicare beneficiaries , government employees , the uninsured , and "other " 
individuals . The government is responsible for ensuring universal coverage either 
through an individual mandate , employer mandate, or other means . Risk adjustors 
are retained . 
Throughout the evolution of managed competition , HPPCs are dependent upon government 
structures to run well . A new regulatory entity , the National Health Board (NHB) , 
would be created and charged with a wide range of responsibi l ities . Included in 
its duties would be the oversight for the development and update of standard benefits , 
the certification of health plans and HPPCs , and supporting the development and 
dissemination of outcomes - based information . 
President Clinton ' s Health Alliances 
Health alliances in the Clinton proposal are large , regulatory entities that have 
the power to l imit competition . Individuals and all employers with fewer than 5 , 000 
employees must enroll i n regional health alliances . Onl y one regional health 
alliance is permitted within a government - designated geographic area . Corporate 
hea l th alliances can be formed by employers with more than 5 , 000 employees . All 
health plans must use community rating . 
The President ' s plan does not pool the purchasing power of small groups and 
individuals , nor does it pool risk. Rather , it ensures that everyone is enrol l ed 
in a health plan which meets government - established criteria at 
government - prescribed rates. Clinton ' s heal th alliances are so inclusive and 
powerful, that they will contro l the market rather than support it . 
The President ' s hea l th alliances will also serve as a regulatory mechanism through 
which to implement price controls on providers and health plans . Health al l iances 
can refuse to contract with a heal th plan if the plan ' s bid is higher than a specified 
amount . A National Health Board would set the budget and would establish the 
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standard benefits to be offered . Health alliance members would be limited in their 
cho i ce of health plans and benefit structure . Some members might prefer to pay 
more for health plans that offer more value or different benefits . 
Under Clinton ' s plan , the federal government (through the National Health Board 
and the heal th alliances) would essentially determine the future structure of heal th 
care financing and delivery instead of the public who must use it. 
The Role of Individuals in Health Purchasing Groups 
The participation in purchasing groups of individuals (who do not receive health 
care coverage through an employer or a government program) varies by state and by 
health care reform proposal . Some states that have legi slated the use of purchasing 
groups , have not addressed individual participation (e . g ., Florida , California) . 
Other states require individuals to enro l l in a purchasing group if they do not 
obtain coverage through an employer or a government program (e . g ., Minnesota) . 
Health care reform proposals also vary in their requirements toward individual 
participation in purchasing groups . The Jackson Hole Group would require al l 
individuals to receive health care through purchasing groups , the Cooper- Grandy 
bill would not . 
Currently , there do not appear to be any private-sector purchasing groups that allow 
individuals , who are not immediate family of their members , to join for the purpose 
of purchasing health care coverage . 
BCBSF's Position 
BCBSF believes in the ability of the private sector to meet the needs of consumers . 
Purchasing groups that compete in the private market must meet the needs of their 
members to be successful . If they do not , they will not survive and other efforts , 
that better meet the needs of their members , will take their place . 
Large , mandatory purchasing groups , l ike President Clinton ' s heal th alliances , will 
not allow their success to be determined by market forces . Such purchasing groups 
force most people to enroll in them and then largely determine which health plans 
may be offered . If the purchasing groups fail to achieve the expected savings , 
become unresponsive bureaucracies , or unacceptably limit the public ' s choices , no 
a l ternatives exist . A large , cost l y regulatory system would have been created 
displacing existing ( and future) financing and deli very systems in favor of a system 
that may be unsatisfactory or inappropriate in the long run . 
Private- sector purchasing groups already exist and are i ncreasing in number . These 
organizations must meet the needs of their members in order to succeed. The ref ore , 
they are we l l - suited to respond to the changing needs of their members . The 
government ' s role in a private - sector system should be to support the private market 
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by ensuring that a competitive environment exists . 
In Florida , the state legislature has made participation in the CHPAs voluntary . 
New or existing private purchasing groups may compete with the CHPAs . Health care 
coverage can cont i nue to be purchased outside of the CHPAs . If the CHPAs work , 
the market wi ll be better served ; if they do not , many alternatives continue to 
exist . Either way , the road is open for new arrangements to evolve . 
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HEALTH CARE REFORM - GENERAL BCBSF POSITION 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida believes the United States ' health care system 
has many strengths , and is among the best in the world . We also believe tha t reform 
is needed to improve the current system . We support health care reform that is 
market - based and builds on the current employer- based system . We advocate reform 
that 1) provides enough and the right type of information so that purchasers can 
make informed value - based decisions ; 2) revises the tax system to improve purchasers ' 
incentives to shop for value in health plans ; 3) removes legal and regulatory barriers 
obstructing a competitive market ; 4) encourages the continued development of managed 
care programs ; and 5) promotes innovation through experimentation with new programs 
and approaches . 
A health care system built on the private market provides the competi t ion needed 
to reduce costs by increasing efficiency , while improving quality and expanding 
access . When market forces are at work , people choose health plans that offer the 
best value for their heal th care dollar ; inefficient heal th plans will be more costly , 
and will either improve or leave the market . In a competitive private market system , 
consumers direct reform through their purchasing behavior . This has been occurring 
in the health care industry over the past several decades with tremendous positive 
changes taking place in the financing and delivery of care . Further improvements 
are needed and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida is cornrni tted to being an innovator 
and leader in the improvement process. 
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HEALTH CARE DATA AND INFORMATION RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC 
Background 
The Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1992 established funding for the State 
Center for Heal th Statistics ( SCHS) and placed the Center under the Agency for Heal th 
Care Administration . The Center is authorized to create a state- wide Comprehensive 
Health Rela t ion Information System (CHRIS) that wil l require providers and insurers 
to report financial and clinical information to the State . 
Analysis 
There is widespread recognition that consumers of health services often lack clear 
information upon which to base their purchase decisions (e . g ., which provi der to 
see , which hea l th plan to choose) . For the private market system to work 
effectively, consumers must be able to make informed decisions about their purchases . 
The State has responded to this situation by legislating the development of a 
state - run data system. 
Information that is made public must maintain patient confidentiality and must 
safeguard proprietary information . It is critical to ensure that whatever 
information is developed for consumer or other uses (e . g ., creation of practice 
parameters) be reliable and accurate . 
To encourage a productive private market , the government must respect and support 
the confidentiality of proprietary information as well as support consumers with 
the information they need to make informed decisions . 
A government - run system cannot be as responsive as the private market to changing 
consumer needs and to a changing environment . A government - run data system will 
be expensive to develop and maintain , will be bureaucratically administered , and 
will duplica t e information currently in the private market . 
Position 
BCBSF believes it is essential for consumers to have information with which to make 
informed , value - based decisions to purchase health plans . This information should 
be at an appropriate summary level to facilitate comparative shopping for health 
plans (premium cost , benefit designs , pat i ent and customer satisfact i on , etc . ). 
Standard industry indicators (e . g ., per member per month , cost per employee , etc . ) 
can be collected and disseminated for the bene f it of Florida ' s insurance buyers . 
Insurers have the obligation to protect patient - specific information . Moreover , 
companies have the right to protect proprietary information -- information that 
is important for them to remain competitive in the marketplace . This would include : 
- Information that would disclose specific financial arrangements 
with providers 
- Provider - specific information necessary to maintain and manage 
network arrangements 
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It is crucial that the industry proceed cautiously with the release of information 
on quality of care . Careful evaluation of the accuracy and sensitivity of the data 
must occur before information is released . 
The government ' s role should be to support the private market system by encouraging 
data standardization , collection , and distribution to appropriate users 
(researchers , consumers , health p l ans , etc . ) . It should also finance specific 
research efforts (e . g ., to develop pract i ce parameters) . It is not the government ' s 
responsibility to develop a data base that would lead it to micromanage the market . 
The information needs of consumers , and of the scientific community , can be met 
cost - effectively through the establishment of a private organization whose 
membership includes all the stakeholders in the health care market (consumers , 
empl oyers , providers , insurers , etc . ) . This organization can determine what 
information should be distributed to consumers for the market to work , and can develop 
protocols for the standardization , automation , and storage of informat i on . 
Pertinent , standardized information can be shared directly wi th consumers , health 
plans , etc . 
A private market alternative to a state- run data base wi ll save taxpayers money 
and will be more responsive to consumer needs and a changing environment . A 
state - run data system will be expensive to develop and maintain , will duplicate 
information currently in the private market , and will add another layer of 
bureaucracy . 
IP27 - August 11 , 1993 
INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE 
Background 
The vast majority of Floridians (under 65) purchase heal th insurance coverage through an 
employer - sponsored plan . Those who don't , find and pay for health insurance coverage on their 
own through the individual health insurance market . In Florida , approximately 9 percent 
(970 , 000) of insured Floridians currently hold an individual health insurance policy . The 
individually insured market is generally comprised of the following categories of people : 
• self- employed individuals , 
• unemployed individuals , 
• employees of businesses that do not offer coverage , 
•early retirees who do not have employer coverage , and 
•dependents of those above or dependents not covered by employer plans . 
Individual Insurance Market 
The individual heal th insurance market today covers a significant number of Floridians . However , 
many more Floridians who are uninsured at a given time , and who do not have access to group 
coverage , could benefit from coverage through the individual insurance market . The purpose 
of this paper is to describe some improvements to the individual insurance market that would 
make individual coverage more attractive and affordable to uninsured Floridians without making 
it less affordable for those who have it now . 
Uninsured Floridians 
As concern about the number of uninsured Americans has increased , so have the number of studies 
and reports that provide information about the uninsured population . As a result, we are learning 
more and more about the characteristics of this population -- why they are uninsured and how 
l ong they are without coverage . This information is important for developing appropriate 
solutions for the uninsured . 
An important recent finding relates to the length of time people are without coverage . According 
to studies conducted by the Urban Institute and the U. S . Census Bureau , the 37 million uninsured 
frequently cited in the media represent all individuals who are uninsured at any particular 
time . However , relatively few of these individuals remain uninsured for long periods of time . 
•A 1992 Urban Institute paper notes that 48 percent of the uninsured obtain coverage within 
five months of becoming uninsured , and more than two - thirds obtain coverage within a year . 
•A 1990 Census Bureau study states that only four percent of the uninsured lack coverage for 
as long as 28 months . 
Another important point is that the uninsured are , in fact , a very heterogeneous group . Based 
on the work by the Urban Institute , we can define at least 5 categories of uninsured Floridians : 
• Temporarily uninsured workers , and their dependents . This includes people in new jobs who 
are subject to waiting periods and/or preexisting condition exclusions . 
•Temporarily unemployed individuals (up to six months) and their dependents . This includes 




•Chronically uninsured workers (over six months) , and their dependents . Most of these people 
are in low wage jobs . A majority work for small companies , but some work f or large firms . 
•Chronical l y unemployed individuals (over six months) , and their dependents. 
early retirees . Income levels for this group vary widely . 
This includes 
• Insured workers with non-insured dependents . This includes employees o f firms that choose 
not to offer dependent coverage , or which o ffer dependent coverage , but do not cont ribute 
to its cost . 
Throughout these categories are the approximately 5 percent of Floridians who are chronically 
ill . These people either never had coverage , had coverage cancelled , or had coverage that became 
too expensive . 
Proposed Improvements to the Individual Insurance System 
Below are some preliminary suggestions on changes to the insurance and regulatory systems to 
improve affordability , continuity/portability , and availability of coverage in the individual 
insurance market . 
Affordability 
To ensure the cost of individual coverage is more affordable: 
• Exempt Individual Coverage from Certain State Mandated Benefits* 
State laws which mandate that specific benefits be included in all health insurance policies 
drive up the cost o f heal th care . Be exempting individual policies from certain mandated 
benefits premiums could be reduced. Insurers would then have more flexibility in 
developing products to meet the needs of low- income Fl oridians. For example , some carriers 
may choose to offer catastrophic coverage with high co - payments and deductibles in 
traditional insurance products ; other carriers would choose to of fer managed care products 
to individua l s . In the aggregate , these additional choices will provide Floridians more 
lower- cost options in the individual market and will bring more uninsured into the insurance 
system . 
• Exempt Individual Coverage from State Premium Taxes* 
State premium taxes add to the cost of health care coverage . By exempting i ndividual policies 
from state premium taxes , the cost of coverage for individual policies could be reduced . 
This represents a relatively small off set to the "penalty" of federal tax treatment which 
is much less favorable for individuals than for employers . 
•Restrict Commission Structures* 
Establish agent commission restrictions similar to those currently in place for Medicare 
supplemental products : When an agent replaces an individual policy , compensation is based 
on the renewal commission rate , not the " new cust omer " rate. 
• Pricing 
BCBSF believes the best pricing strategy falls between the two extremes o f pure community rating 
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and pure durational/experience rating . Current regulation prohibits the use of pure 
durational/experience rating. However , adopting the other extreme -- community rating 
-- will deter purchase by those in good health and increase the cost of coverage for those 
who can least afford it . We support defining allowable premium rate deviations from the 
average , so that those with better- than- average health have somewhat lower premiums and 
those with poorer health still have affordable premiums . 
* While each of these changes taken separately would achieve only small reductions in premiums , 
taken together they can have a significant impact on the cost of individual coverage . 
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•Rate and Financial Stability 
In today ' s market individua l insurance exhibits a predictable pattern of low claims during the 
early policy years and higher c laims in the later years . Current regulation requires , 
in effect , that these claims be "averaged" in setting premium rates . This creates a 
situation in which there are excess gains in the early years and excess losses in later 
years. Regulations should be tightened in two ways : 
- The insurer should be required to set aside the excess ga ins as reserves . These reserves must 
be developed using uniform standards , which do not penalize the insurer's federal 
income tax status . 
- The excess gains in the early years must be recognized in establishing future year rates . 
This will help assure rate stability to policy holders . 
BCBSF does not favor guaranteed issue of policies. In this paper we are proposing a number 
of changes to improve the individual insurance market . These changes can achieve the goals 
of bringing many more uninsured into the system, keeping the system viable for those currently 
covered under individual policies, and providing for the chronically ill . Guaranteed issue 
will not achieve these goals. In fact , if people are assured of being able to purchase health 
care coverage when they become sick (that is , guaranteed issue) , many people will decide not 
to purchase until they need coverage . The ef feet would be to undermine the indi victual insurance 
system , as the "pool " of insureds shrinks and includes only those who are sick or who anticipate 
medical care . 
Continuity/Portability 
To assure that the insurance system better supports continuity/portability of coverage , certain 
changes must be made in the group market: 
• Require COBRA- Like Coverage for Smaller Firms 
Current COBRA regulations require firms with 20 or more employees to continue group coverage 
for a certain period of time after an employee leaves the firm . Employees leaving a firm 
that has fewer than 20 workers do not have the benefit of transitional coverage through 
COBRA . BCBSF proposes that Florida require COBRA- like coverage be provided by insurance 
carriers to employers with 2 - 19 employees. 
• Ensure Understanding of Conversion Rules 
Florida law requires all licensed insurance carriers selling group policies to offer conversion 
policies (with a premium cap) to individuals who terminate their group coverage . Thus , 
Florida already has guaranteed issue of individual policies for many Floridians . BCBSF 
proposes that insurers be required to inform individuals terminating employment o f their 
coverage options under federal and state conversion laws. For example , insurers could 
be required to send information packets with a toll free number to make the process as 
easy as possible . 
• Pre - existing Condition Provisions 
BCBSF proposes that insurers be required in many cases to waive pre - existing condition provisions 
upon the purchase of a new policy . Any Floridian who has maintained continuous coverage 
for at least the period of a new policy ' s pre - existing condition provision , would have 
this provision waived . Therefore , when an employee changes jobs , or an employer changes 
carriers , in many cases no pre - existing condition provisions could be imposed . 
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Availability of Coverage 
To improve access to coverage : 
•Guaranteed Renewability 
BCBSF advocates guaranteed renewability -- coverage cannot be terminated except for fraud or 
non- payment of premium . This will prohibit companies from cancelling coverage for Florida 
citizens , leaving them without access to insurance . 
•Allow sma l l employers to facilitate purchase of individual policies for employees when the 
employer does not (or cannot) provide group coverage . 
• Re - open FCHA with Certain Changes 
BCBSF suggests re - opening the FCHA program contingent on the following changes : 
- allow premiums to reflect actual costs , 
- require program participants to contribute to premiums based on a percentage of income , 
- provide state subsidies to cover the remaining costs , 
- fund the program through a broad- based revenue vehicle , and 
- allow insurers to competitively bid on the FCHA group . 
By allowing FCHA premiums to reflect costs , insurers will have an incentive to bid on FCHA business 
and to use managed care techniques to provide quality , cost - effective care . Placing a 
cap on out - of- pocket expenses for individuals participating in the FCHA will limit their 
financial liability and increase access among Florida ' s high - risk/medically uninsurable 
individuals. Changing the state funding source to a broad- based tax will avoid the counter 
productive increases in the price of insurance which result from insurer assessments . 
Keeping the "medically uninsurable " separate from other individuals and small groups for rating 
purposes is essential for maintaining the affordability of insurance coverage and small 
groups . Pooling the chronically ill with individuals and small groups will dramatically 
drive - up the cost of coverage for the whole pool of insureds and will increase the number 
of uninsured Floridians . 
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INDIVIDUAL MARKET HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM 
Issue 
The Governor and the AHCA have proposed reforms to the individual health insurance 
market to achieve greater access and move closer to the goal of universal access 
for all Floridians by December 31 , 1994 . 
Florida Health Security Plan Proposes 
For the most part , recommendations for the individual insurance market are similar 
to the reforms passed for the small group market: 
• require guaranteed issue of all individual policies , and 
• require modified community rating with limits on rate differentials between 
classes . 
Effects 
•The number of uninsured Floridians is certain to increase. 
- If people are guaranteed the purchase of health care coverage , most people will 
wait to purchase coverage until they are sick . 
- If modified community rating is mandated for the individual insurance market , the 
price of coverage will increase for most individual policyholders . 
If the price of coverage goes above what is viewed as a " good value , " 
fewer and fewer people will purchase coverage . 
•Florida employers who provide health care benefits will be subjected to greater 
cost shifting as the number of uninsured increases , driving up their costs 
and pushing some of them out of the small group market . 
•Individual insurance policyholders who already made the prudent and responsible 
decision to purchase insurance coverage will see their ra tes go up . 
- Guaranteed i ssue will ensure that most new purchasers are sick , driving rates up . 
- Community rating will raise the price of coverage for the majority of current 
individual insurance policyholders , pushing some of them out of the 
market . 
•The number of insurers in the competitive marketplace for individual coverage will 
decrease , similar to what happened in the small employer market when guaranteed 
issue was implemented . When insurers withdraw from a specific market , it 
undermines the competitiveness of that market and usually causes prices to 
rise . 
Alternative Proposal 
IP29 - February 1 , 1994 
Implementing individual insurance reform discussed in the Florida Health Security 
Plan will adversely effect the Governor ' s goal o f achieving universal access . To 
increase access in the individual insurance market , coverage needs to be more 
affordable and portable . To accomplish this , the following changes should be make : 
• exempt individual coverage from state mandated benefits , 
• exempt individual coverage from state premium taxes , 
• e l iminate abusive pract i ces (i . e. , cancellation for claims ) , 
• require guarantee renewal of policies , 
• require COBRA- like coverage for small emp l oyers , 
• ensure understanding of conversion rules and options available to individuals , 
and 
•waive pre- existing condition provisions when mov ing from one policy to another 
policy . 
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INDIVIDUAL-BASED SYSTEM EXPERIMENT 
A . Introduction 
In order to set up our discussion of the experiment , we first want to review some 
of the characteristics of individual and employment-based systems. 
Central to a market - based system is consumer choice . Market - based systems function 
as a result of many small decisions made by individual consumers . The effects of 
these many decisions accumulate over time and direct change in the system, ultimately 
satisfying the needs of the consumers . 
A core decision in any market - based proposal for health care reform is to determine 
the consumer ' s role in purchasing health care coverage . In our current 
employment - based system , the majority of Americans have coverage provided through 
employers who decide what types of plans and benefit packages will be offered . 
This system restricts indi vidual consumer choice , as well as consumers ' sense of 
personal responsibility for health care decisions , and conflicts with a fundamental 
element of a market - based system. 
Furthermore, an employment-based system may no longer meet the needs of a dynamic 
economy and mobile work force. The present employment - based system was organized 
when the concept of long- term employment was the prevail i ng practice and portability 
of heal th care benefits was not a major consideration . However , in today ' s economy , 
job change is commonplace, and often needed for career development and advancement. 
The structure of pension programs has changed to reflect the changing work place , 
with benefits more individual - based and more portable . We may now need to re - think 
the structure of health care benefits. 
Alternatives to the employment - based system could give individual consumers a 
greater role in deciding which plan to purchase , as well as the portability of 
coverage needed in today ' s economy . That is , an individual - based system would make 
the indi vidual consumer the pr i mary decision- maker for the purchase o f coverage 
and the primary holder of the policy , rather than the employer . 
The purpose of this paper is to briefly describe the current system; outline the 
advantages of an individual - based system and the possible ways to structure it; 
point out limitations associated with both systems ; and develop a framework for 
creating an alternative system experiment that incorporates the advantages of both . 
B.Employment-Based System 
In the current employment - based system, about 85 % of the 160 million Americans with 
private heal th care insurance receive coverage through their employers . Most people 
are both comfortable and satisfied with this system . Many of these Americans view 
health care benefits as an important part of an overall compensation package . 
However , the effectiveness of this employment - based system varies . 
Large employers and their employees tend to fare well in this system. Most large 
employers who offer health care benefits have full - time benefits managers whose 
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job is to understand and compare the range of heal th care plans available at various 
prices and select the plan(s) that best meet the needs of their employees . Large 
employers also receive the best prices for coverage , because from an insurer ' s 
perspective , marketing to large groups 1) decreases the administrative costs for 
distribution of policies and information , and 2) effectively spreads risk . Both 
characteristics contribute to lower premiums . 
In contrast , small employers and individuals who purchase health care benefits 
(including self- emp l oyed) tend to fare less well . Small companies and individuals 
do not usually have benefits managers and must work through insurance agents to 
select a health plan . This approach means they pay a commission for the agent ' s 
servi ce in addition to a premium for the coverage itself . Small employers often 
contribute little or nothing to the cost of coverage for their employees . 
Furthermore , indi vidua l purchasers , i n addition to having no help from employers , 
receive only a fraction of the tax subsidy for health care coverage that covered 
employees receive . 
C.Individual-Based System 
An alternative to the current employment - based system is an indi vidual-based system 
which gives the individual consumer the role of deciding which health plan to 
purchase . Many advocates of market - oriented reform regard the indivi dual - based 
system as the most attractive system available because it preserves the conditions 
of indi vidual consumer dec i sion- making which are so important to ma r ket systems . 
Proponents claim that the individual - based system places the consumer in a position 
of power , closer and more involved in the decision- making process . Thi s has the 
ef feet of increasing cost - conscious purchas i ng and personal responsibility without 
sacrificing quality and efficiency . Consumers would demand better information on 
the quality of care givers, prices charged , medi cal outcomes , and treatment 
alternatives . Under this system , consumer demand would d i rect insure r s to offer 
the types of plans and changes to plans which would best meet their needs . 
An individual - based system would be portable , accommodating the work- force movement 
in our economy . Employees could move from one job to another without experiencing 
uninsured spells due to temporary unemployment and/or waiting periods . 
Finally , individualizing health insurance would remove other constraints often 
associated with th i rd- party payers systems . This would allow providers to see 
patients rather than employers as the principal buyers of health se r vices. This 
change would strengthen their relationships by helping both patients and providers 
to feel more accountable for care . 
D.Structuring An Individual-based System 
Recently there have been a number of health care reform proposals , mostly from 
politically conservative organizations , that have advocated individual - based 
systems . These proposals design individual - based systems that vary in the degree 
individual consumers are invol ved in the purchase and financing of health coverage . 
Some proposals describe systems that completely separate the employer from the 
health care system, wh i le others maintain a role for the employer in the financing 
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of coverage . 
The purest form of an individual - based system places all information-gathering , 
purchase decision- making , and coverage - financing activities in the hands of 
individual consumers . In this type of system, the purchase of health insurance 
would be entirely separate from employment , as the purchase of automobile insurance 
is today. 
The Heritage Foundation designed a reform proposal that closely resembles a pure 
individual - based system . Under the Heritage ' s proposal , the financing system would 
be changed through tax reform to place the consumer in direct control of the money 
used to purchase health insurance and medical care . The employer ' s role would be 
limited to handling premium payments and tax adjustments for their employees , and 
if they wished , acting as sponsors for the purchase of group coverage. 
The Heritage Foundation proposal cites the Federal Employee Heal th Bene£ its Program 
(FEHBP) as a successful model of an individual - based system . The FEHBP provides 
about nine million federa l employees and their dependents a choice of coverage 
through a variety of competing health plan options . The federal government helps 
finance coverage by contributing a fixed amount for the purchase of heal th insurance. 
According to Heritage, based on data supplied by Lewin/ICF, the combination of 
consumer choice and market competition has allowed the FEHBP to experience a lower 
rate of premium increase in the past decade than the current private employment - based 
system . To Heritage , this clearly demonstrates the success of the individual - based 
system . 
Moving away from the strict form of an individual - based system, there are a number 
of organizations introducing reform proposals that expand individual consumer choice 
while maintaining a role for the employer in the financing of coverage . 
Organizations such as the American Conservat i ve Union , Citizens Against Rationing 
Health , Council for Affordable Health Insurance , and National Center for Policy 
Analysis , as well as a number of Republican sponsored House and Senate bills , have 
proposed individual - based systems built on the concept of Medical Savings Accounts 
(MSAs) . 
MSAs , similar to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) , would be portable tax- free 
accounts to which employers and empl oyees wou l d contribute funds for the purchase 
of coverage and/or health care services . That is , MSAs would allow individuals 
to make the purchase decision for coverage , take the coverage wi th them when they 
change jobs , and still permit employers to contribute to employees ' health coverage 
as part of their benefits package . 
A leading proponent of MSAs and a source of much of the data and literature is the 
National Center for Policy Analysis . Under their system, a medical savings account 
would be set up and the employer would deposit the same amount of money previously 
paid on premiums into an employee ' s individual account . The individual employee 
would then purchase a catastrophic health insurance with a high deductible. This 
insurance would then be used to pay for infrequent and expensive treatments , while 
routine services would be paid directly to providers using funds from the MSA . 
MSA funds not spent would be able to accumulate over time and would be availab l e 
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to cover individuals during spells of unempl o yment , used for the purchase of 
long- term insurance, or to supplement Medicare coverage . 
D.Limitations of Both Systems 
Employment - based 
As mentioned earlier , in the current employment - based system , employees of large 
companies receive advantages (i .e., benefit managers and lower premiums) not 
available to employees of smaller companies . Additionally , individuals are also 
discriminated against because they receive no help from employers and only a fraction 
of the tax subsidy that employees receive . However , there are two other fundamental 
problems with an employment-based system . 
First , the employment - based system confl icts with a market approach because it 
constrains individual decision- making for the purchase of coverage by turning over 
the decision process to the employer. This removes much o f the personal 
responsibility from the selection , purchase , and use of coverage . It also impedes 
awareness of the relationship between lifestyle decisions and personal health . 
Secondly , the employment - based system does not support portabi lity . It was built 
on an economy that experienced far l ess job change than today . Because of shifts 
in the economy , corporate restructuring , development o f a world economy and the 
mi gration of the population , the present labor force is changing jobs more 
frequently . This has created a demand for portable heal th care coverage t o 
accommodate employee mobility . 
Individual - Based 
The first and most obvious limitation o f a pure indiv idual-based system is that 
most Americans are not familar with an individual - based system for purchasing heal th 
care coverage and are satisfied with the current employer- based system . An 
individual - based system would present many difficulties for individual consumers 
choosing their own health coverage . The complexity of insurance plans and the 
current lack of accurate information makes comparison shopping very confusing . 
Secondl y , an individual - based system would lead t o increase administrative costs 
associated with the distribution of policies and information on an individual basis . 
Some of the economies of scale that are a feature of the current system would 
disappear . Insurers would need to market their plans directly to individual 
consumers , adding additional marketing costs to the price o f policies . 
The third limitation , adverse risk selection , is a major problem with an 
individual - based system , and one that is not adequately addressed in any of the 
individual - based reform proposals mentioned ear lier . In an employment - based system 
risk is spread among the purchase group and adverse selection is control led. 
However , if the purchase of coverage is individual - based , insurers are much more 
susceptible to the problem of adverse risk selection. 
Finally , there are many unknowns wi th an individual - based system . For example , 
there are aspects of an individual - based system (e . g ., medical savings accounts) 
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that may be incompatible with managed care and other proven cost saving techniques . 
Developing and implementing an individual - based system may add unnecessary 
complexity to the system without achieving the perceived benefits . 
E.Framework for an Alternative System 
The purpose of this section is to stimulate discussion about an experiment with 
an alternative approach to the health care system that could explore the 
effectiveness of such a system without putting the mainstream system at risk . 
The following is a framework of an alternative system that incorporates some of 
the advantages of both the employment - based and individual - based systems . This 
system would increase personal responsibility for the selection and purchase of 
heal th coverage while still maintaining health coverage as part of an employee ' s 
benefit package. 
The system would be developed around individual and portable Medical Savings 
Accounts, similar to IRAs. The tax subsidies available to employers that contribute 
to their employees' coverage would remain in place but be limited to a fixed amount 
(as described earlier in BCBSF's main health care reform proposal) . The cap on 
benefit tax deductibility would be set high to allow insurers incentives to design 
plans that meet consumer needs . Employers contributing to their employees' health 
coverage would continue to do so, but now would place the funds into employees ' 
MSAs . The employees would make the selection and purchase decision for coverage 
using those MSA funds . Under this system, employees will have a strong incentive 
to purchase value- based coverage , because the funds not spent on coverage would 
be available for transfer to their IRAs or could be withdrawn at a lower tax rate 
than their present rate . 
Employers who did not directly contribute to their employees ' heal th coverage would 
be required to act as group sponsors and handle premium payments and tax adjustments. 
Employees would contribute to their individual MSAs from tax adjusted income and 
would use those funds to select and purchase health coverage . Again , funds not 
expended on coverage , deductibles , or copayment would be available f or transfer 
to IRAs or could be taken out at a lower tax rate than their present rate . 
Individuals , including self- employed and unemployed persons , would receive the same 
tax subsidy as employed individuals. They would be allowed to set up MSAs and 
contribute to the accounts with pre-tax dollars for the purchase o f heal th coverage , 
or the payment of deductibles and copayments . Monies left over within the tax 
deductible cap amount would be transferable to IRAs or could be taken out at a l ower 
tax rate than their present rate . 
An experiment to test the above system would be designed and take place for some 
period of time in a large geographic region . The Florida market , for example , with 
its progressive positions on health care reform and diversity within the health 
care system would serve as a good laboratory . Any barriers for design and 
implementation of the system would be suspended , i . e ., perverse tax codes , state 
insurance regulation, etc. The experiment would establish measures to elevate the 
effectiveness of this system. Such measures would include : changes in the number 
of uninsured ; impact of adverse selection on insurers ; effects on employment levels 
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and small employers due to an increased burden ; average cost of coverage f or 
individuals , the amount spent on health care services , and the level of efficiency 
achieved in the hea l th care industry . Results would be carefully analyzed to 
determine which changes in the system proved to be the most effective . 
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INSURANCE REFORM 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida supports insurance reform that prohibits the 
use of abusive rating practices such as durational rating . Many of the health care 
reform proposals call for community rating as a " solution " to eliminate these harmful 
pricing practices . Some states (including Florida) have passed laws requiring 
insurers to use this type of pricing system for certain segments of business . 
However , the effects of community rating are also negative . Under community rating , 
those with poor health have their premiums subsidized by those with good health . 
Community rating increases the price of coverage for those who are healthy . If 
the price of coverage for the healthy rise and coverage is no longer viewed as a 
"good value ," fewer and fewer healthy people will purchase coverage . The average 
premium price will reflect a less healthy community , and will continue to rise . 
Eventually , the only people with coverage will be those who are certain of medical 
bills , fatally undermining the health insurance system . 
Some reform proposals mandate the purchase of coverage along with community rating 
in an effort to ease the adverse selection problem described above . However , a 
requirement to community rate under mandatory coverage is an inequitable method 
of health care financing . To require insurance along with community rating is , 
in essence , a regressive tax . That is , the low income population (who tend to be 
younger and healthier) would subsidize high income people . 
In addition , community rating under a mandate to purchase coverage does not preclude 
some carriers from " selecting " healthier purchasers through mechanisms other than 
underwriting . For example , some insurance carriers could use advertising 
techniques , marketing campaigns , agent commissions and sales practices to skim 
"better than average " risks from the market . To avoid this practice , risk adjustment 
systems have been proposed along with community rating . However , at this time , 
an equitable risk adjustment system has not yet been developed (and many experts 
are skeptical that one will be) , and we believe there is a better rating and pri cing 
strategy available . 
We advocate a pricing strategy which falls between the two extremes of pure community 
rating and pure durational/experience rating . We believe that prices based on 
rating bands are best . This could be accomplished , for example , by defining 
allowable premium rate deviations from average . Within certain bands , those whose 
health is better- than- average should receive treatment which will encourage them 
to purchase . This strategy produces the most rate stability over time , and ensures 
that affordable products are available , regardless of health status . 
We also advocate guaranteed renewal of policies . However , we do not favor guaranteed 
issue of policies because it encourages people to go without insurance until they 




Insurance reform is a category of proposals that includes a var i ed assortment of 
changes to the current health insurance system . These proposals vary widely in 
types of changes and effects they wil l have on the entire health insurance system . 
Insurance reform was a ma j or aspect of both state and national hea l th care reform 
proposals in 1994 (e . g ., the Fl orida Health Security Plan released by the Agency 
for Health Care Administration in December of 1993 set out several changes which 
appeared in proposed bills throughout the regular and special sessions) . On the 
national level , most of the major national proposals included reforms to the health 
insurance system . 
Expected Proposals 
The following proposals are expected to emerge in the 1995 Florida legislative 
session : 
•Mandate that all individual policies be offered on a guaranteed issue bas i s . 
• Limit pre - existing conditions provisions to a 12 month look back and a 12 month 
exclusion from coverage for the condition . 
•Apply modified community rating to individual health insurance plans allowing only 
age , geographic location , and fami l y composition as rate differential factors . 
• Remove gender and age as rate differential factors for small groups . 
• Requi r e COBRA- l i ke coverage for smaller firms. 
Rationale for the Proposals 
The proposed insurance reforms are seen as a continuat i on of the reforms made to 
the small group insurance market in the last few years in an effort to achieve greater 
access to coverage . 
Concerns and Recommended Posit i ons 
Most of the proposed changes will not achieve greater access , but are actually likely 
to decrease access and increase the number of uninsured . 
•Mandate that all individual pol i cies be offered on a guaranteed issue basis . 
A mandate that all individual policies be offered on a guaranteed issue 
basis wi ll increase the number of uninsured . If people 
are assured of being able to purchase heal th care coverage 
when they become sick (that is , guaranteed issue) , many 
people will decide not to purchase until they need 
coverage . The effect would be to undermine the individual 
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insurance system, as the "pool " of insureds shrinks and 
includes only those who are sick or who anticipate medical 
care , and premiums for such coverage would skyrocket . 
Recommended position : oppose guaranteed issue for individual policies . 
•Limit pre - existing conditions provisions to a 12 month look back and a 12 month 
exclusion from coverage for the condition . 
Limiting pre - existing conditions provisions for people who maintain 
continuous coverage would help prevent people from 
exper i encing " job lock " and going for periods without 
needed coverage . However , limits on pre - existing 
conditions provisions without requiring previous coverage 
would cause the same problems associated with guaranteed 
issue of i ndividual policies . If people are guaranteed 
coverage with limited pre- existing conditions without 
having to have previous coverage , they will wait to 
purchase coverage until they anticipate the need for 
medical care . 
Recommended position : support reducing/eliminating pre - existing 
provisions for those who have maintained coverage . 
condition 
•Apply modified community rating to individual heal th insurance plans allowing only 
age , geographic location , and family composition as rate differential factors . 
Mandating modified community rating for the indivi dual insurance market 
will cause the price of coverage to increase fo r most 
individual pol i cyholders . I f the price of coverage for 
the healthy rises and coverage is no longer viewed as a 
" good value ," fewer and fewer heal thy people will purchase 
coverage . The average premium price will reflect a l ess 
heal thy community , and will continue to rise . Eventual l y , 
the only people with coverage will be those who are certain 
of medical bills , fatally undermi ning the heal th insurance 
system . 
Recommended position : oppose modified community rat i ng for individual heal th 
insurance . 
• Remove gender and age as rate differential factors for small groups . 
Removing gender and age as rate differential factors will cause the 
pr i ce of coverage to increase for most small groups . If 
the cost of coverage goes up too much , fewer and fewer 
small groups will purchase insurance . 
Recommended position : oppose removing gender and age as rate differential factors 
for small group 
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• Require COBRA- like coverage for smaller firms. 
Requiring that small firms (less than 20 employees) offer COBRA- like 
coverage would reduce the number of uninsured by providing 
temporary coverage to people who are unemployed . 
Recommended position : support COBRA- like coverage for small firms (less than 20 
workers) . 
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INSURANCE REFORM 
Background 
Insurance reform is a category of proposals that includes a varied assortment of 
changes to the current health insurance system . These proposals vary widely in 
types of changes and effects they will have on the entire health insurance system . 
Insurance reform was a major aspect of both state and national health care reform 
proposals in 1994 (e . g ., the Florida Health Security Plan released by the Agency 
for Health Care Administration in December of 1993 set out several changes which 
appeared in proposed bills throughout the regular and special sessions) . On the 
national level , most of the major national proposals included reforms to the health 
insurance system . 
Expected Proposa l s 
The following proposals are expected to emerge in the 1995 Florida legislative 
session : 
•Mandate that all individual policies be offered on a guaranteed issue basis . 
• Limit pre - existing conditions provisions to a 12 month look back and a 12 month 
exclusion from coverage for the condition . 
•Apply modified community rating to indi victual heal th insurance plans allowing only 
age , geographi c location , and family composition as rate differential factors . 
•Remove gender and age as rate differential factors for small groups . 
• Require COBRA- like coverage for smaller firms . 
Rationale for the Proposa l s 
The proposed insurance reforms are seen as a continuation of the reforms made to 
the small group insurance market i n the last few years in an effort to achieve greater 
access to coverage . 
Concerns and Recommended Positions 
Most of the proposed changes will not achieve greater access , but are actually likely 
to decrease access and increase the number of uninsured . 
•Mandate that all individual policies be offered on a guaranteed issue basis . 
A mandate that all indi victual policies be offered on a guaranteed issue 
basis wil l increase the number of uninsured . If people 
are assured of being able to purchase heal th care coverage 
when they become sick (that is, guaranteed issue) , many 
people will decide not to purchase until they need 
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coverage . The effect would be to undermine the individual 
insurance system , as the "pool " of insureds shrinks and 
includes only those who are sick or who anticipate medical 
care , and premiums for such coverage would skyrocket . 
Recommended position : oppose guaranteed issue for individual policies. 
•Limit pre - existing conditions provisions to a 12 month look back and a 12 month 
exclusion from coverage for the condi tion . 
Limiting pre - existing conditions provisions for people who maintain 
continuous coverage would help prevent people from 
experiencing " job lock " and going for periods without 
needed coverage . However , limits on pre - existing 
conditions provisions without requiring previous coverage 
would cause the same problems associated with guaranteed 
issue of individual policies . If people are guaranteed 
coverage with limited pre - existing conditions 
having to have previous coverage , they will 
purchase coverage until they anticipate the 




Recommended position : support reducing/eliminating pre- existing 
provisions for those who have maintained coverage . 
condition 
•Apply modified community rating to individual heal th insurance plans allowing only 
age , geographic location , and family composition as rate differential factors . 
Mandating modified community rating for the individual insurance market 
will cause the price of coverage to increase for most 
individual policyholders . If the price of coverage for 
the healthy rises and coverage is no longer viewed as a 
" good value ," fewer and fewer heal thy people will purchase 
coverage . The average premium price will reflect a less 
heal thy community , and will continue to rise . Eventually , 
the only people with coverage will be those who are certain 
of medical bills , fatally undermining the heal th insurance 
system . 
Recommended position : oppose modified communi ty rat i ng for individual health 
insurance . 
• Remove gender and age as rate differential factors for small groups . 
Removing gender and age as rate differential factors will cause the 
price of coverage to increase for most small groups . If 
the cost of coverage goes up too much , fewer and fewer 
small groups will purchase insurance . 
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Recommended position : oppose removing gender and age as rate differential factors 
for small group 
• Require COBRA- like coverage for smaller firms . 
Requiring that small firms (less than 20 employees) offer COBRA- like 
coverage would reduce the number of uninsured by providing 
temporary coverage to people who are unemployed . 






In an effort to address Florida ' s long- term care needs , the Agency for Health Care 
Administration , in conjunction with the Department of Elder Affairs proposed a plan 
to fundamentally reform how Florida decides resource allocations in the long- term 
care system . 
The Florida Health Security Act Proposes 
•Establishing a Long- Term Care Authority in state law to assure that the separate 
agencies which make up the components of the long- term care system are 
regulated by a common authority . 
• Expanding home and community- based care options . 
•Revising licensure , monitoring , and evaluating requirements to focus on 
outcome-related measures by 1996. 
Effects 
•Florida taxpayers concerned about big government would disapprove of another 
government bureaucracy which will surely follow the establ ishment of a 
Long - Term Care Authority , when what is needed is encouragement of 
public/private partnerships to successfully manage Florida ' s long- term care 
needs . 
•Taxpayers and businesses would be concerned that the state will be financing a 
program that competes with the private sector to provide a long-term care 
infrastructure . 
Alternative Proposal 
• The Florida Health Security Program proposals are primarily concerned with the 
disbursement of Florida ' s tax dollars among long- term care providers . This 
approach ignores the benefits of financing long- term care through a 
public- private partnership (as exemplified by the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation ' s program in Connecticut) . The state should work with private 
insurers to develop high quality , ethical long- term care and home health 
care insurance plans that could be offered to Floridians at reasonable costs . 
Long- term care and home heal th care insurance furnished by the p r ivate market 
would be more cost effective than yet another taxpayer- funded government 
program . 
IP33 - February 1 , 1994 
MANAGED COMPETITION (CHPAs) 
Issue 
To make affordable health care coverage available to small employers (50 or fewer 
employees) , the Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993 created vo luntary , 
compet i tive CHPAs to create a competitive market for small employers ' insurance , 
l ower administrative costs , and provide comparative information on competing heal th 
plans. 
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes 
•Allowing CHPAs to "negotiate " prices with health plans. 
•Expanding CHPAs to include public entities , groups up to 150 employees , and 
individuals. 
•Allowing different contribution and participation requirements inside and outside 
CHPAs . 
Effects 
These changes will threaten the viability of the Governor's attempt to improve the 
market through health alliances. 
• CHPAs will become brokers of health care coverage rather than "market makers "; 
they will be viewed by Floridians as entities that add costs (administrative 
fees) while limiting consumers ' choice of plans. 
•As brokers, CHPAs may "negotiate " rates too low for the health plan ' s rates to 
meet DOI standards . Thus , ob jective DOI standards designed to protect 
consumers would have to be waived . 
•Giving CHPAs the power to negotiate will not produce the best deal for CHPA 
enrollees . If CHPAs " succeed " in negotiating rates below the market price, 
AHPs will have to scrimp on service and quality . Just as likely , CHPAs will 
get prices above the market level; AHPs will add a "negotiation factor " to 
their bids and the CHPA will negotiate away only part of that cushion . 
•Many more private and public sector employees will find their coverage at risk 
if these unproven CHPAs are expanded and fail . The CHPAs themselves will 
be held accountable by the public for the l oss of insurance coverage . 
•Larger employers and public entities do not need to be included in CHPAs ; they 
already have access to a competitive market with good information , favorable 
risk pools , and low administrative costs . Including large employers and 
public entities may divert the CHPAs from focusing on the needs of small 
employers - which was the original legislative intent of CHPAs . 
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•Many employers with under 150 employees and public entities have available the 
option of self- insurance . CHPAs should expect that groups with 
low- to - average claim costs will self- insure (because of the benefits , i . e ., 
exemption from state premium tax) and wil l not use CHPAs . Only employers 
and public entities with higher than average claims costs will find the 
community- rate - based coverage through CHPAs attractive . This will increase 
the price of coverage within the CHPAs for all CHPA members and harm the 
small employers . 
• The more variation the contribution and participation requirements are among 
members (i . e ., allowing the employer to contribute less to the employee ' s 
coverage) , the greater the degree of adverse selection wi thin the CHPAs will 
become , causing higher cla i m costs among members , and the less competitive 
CHPAs become. 
•Consumers , insurers , and CHPA boards are already experiencing widespread confusion 
from the number and complexity of changes being made to the new CHPAs and 
the Florida ' s heal th care system . Continued changes will further delay 
implementation , as well as increase administrative costs . 
Alternative Proposal 
•Allow CHPAs to meet the needs of small employers as originally intended by 
legislators - let CHPAs be "market makers ." 
• Do not expand CHPAs beyond what is prescribed in the current laws ; confine CHPAs 
to the segment of the market - small groups - for which they were designed . 
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MANAGED COMPETITION COMPONENT OF SB1914 
Background 
Managed competition is a model for health care reform that has received a lot of 
attention at the state and national level . Developed by the Jctckson Hole Group , 
the original managed competition model proposes a market - oriented approach to heal th 
care reform . Rather than relying on direct government control of the health care 
system, managed competition proposes new ru l es for competition to improve the private 
market system . In this new market , health plans compete for business based on the 
value of their products , not primarily on their ability to enroll healthy customers . 
To bring about these changes , managed competition restructures the heal th care market 
around large purchasing alliances and competing heal th plans . It emphasizes managed 
care and gives tax incentives for contracting with managed care plans . 
The federal government will probably seek to restructure the national health care 
system around some form of managed competition that permits state flexibility in 
its implementation . Many states are considering introducing versions of managed 
competition to reform the health care market within their borders . Washington and 
Florida have already legislated different versions of managed competition. 
Analysis 
The managed competition model attempts to improve the efficiency of health care 
delivery and financing in the private market . Under managed competition , " sponsors " 
arrange coverage and "manage " competition among health plans on behalf of their 
members . Large employers act as sponsors for their employees in much the same way 
they do now . New structures , regional purchasing alliances , act as sponsors for 
individuals and small employers . Individual employees in both large and small 
companies , choose a health care plan from among those offered . Health care plans 
combine insurer and provi der responsibilities by assuming risk and providi ng heal th 
care to enrollees . Heal th plans compete on the basis of price . Purchasing 
all i ances provide consumer information to members so that they can make informed 
decisions about which health plan to purchase . 
Florida introduced a version of managed competition in the Heal th Care and Insurance 
Reform Act of 1993 (SB 1914) . Small employers (1 - 50 employees) will have the option 
to enroll in one of Florida ' s eleven newly- created purchasing alliances , called 
Community Heal th Purchasing Alliances (CHPAs) . Medicaid beneficiar i es wil l be able 
to enroll in CHPAs after state agency " consultation " with the state legislature . 
State employees may be required to enroll in CHPAs if this move ensures comparable 
or richer benefits for state employees at no extra cost to the state . 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida Position 
Reform of the health care system is necessary and shoul d support programs that 
encourage private sector solutions . We support the intent of the Health Care and 
Insurance Reform Act of 1993 to use the private market system to improve the health 
care system in Florida , and the state ' s efforts to improve competition. We also 
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support the legislation ' s reliance on managed care as a basis for reforming the 
state ' s health care system . However , Florida ' s current version of managed 
competition may not be the best way to obtain the desired effects of greater 
competition , nor the best way to increase access to quality health care coverage 
at affordable prices . 
Specific areas of concern include the following : 
• It will be crucial for the state to give these reforms time to work . The public ' s 
expectations about SB 1914 ' s effects and especially about the timetable for 
improvements may be unrealistic . Because of the size and complexity of 
Florida ' s health care delivery and financing system , any beneficial change 
will require adjustments from many different parties . If the public , the 
legislature , or the governor expect overnight results from SB 1914 , or any 
other reforms , they will be disappointed . 
• The purchasing alliances have a chance at being successful to the extent that they 
act as market makers - bringing buyers and sellers together . If they try 
to micromanage the system by telling providers what they can do or how they 
should provide services , they will fail and will add a huge layer of bureaucracy 
to the system with no real benefit . 
• The law , correctly , makes information on quality and cost a centerpiece o f Florida ' s 
reforms . Better information on the value buyers are receiving for their 
heal th care dollars is essential to making the system work better . The problem 
is that many of the data and tools necessary to provide better information 
are only now being developed . If the state tries to push too fast in requiring 
physicians , hospitals , AHPs and CHPAs to disseminate and use information 
that doesn ' t exist , it could do more damage than good . 
• Unlike the Jackson Hole managed competition model in which the board of directors 
is elected by the purchasing alliance members , in Florida ' s version of managed 
competit i on board members are political appointees . This raises concerns 
about the politicization of the purchasing alliances in Florida . It increases 
the likelihood that CHPAs will act based on political influence rather than 
the interests of CHPA members . 
• The community rating provision for small groups may not have the unintended result 
of reducing the number of uninsured Floridians . While community rating will 
make health plans more affordable to high risk groups , it will raise prices 
to many more low risk groups . These low risk groups are the people we need 
to bring into the market to make the whole system work better ; the higher 
prices will not encourage their participation . 
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MANDATORY MEDICAID ENROLLMENT IN HMOs 
Issue 
•At the end of the 1993 session , Senate Bill 1802 (Appropriations Implementing 
Law) was passed . This bill requires all licensed health maintenance 
organizations having less than 40 percent of their enrollment comprised 
of Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries to contract with the AHCA to enroll 
Medicaid beneficiaries up to at least five percent of their total enrollment . 
•Since this mandate was passed in the Appropriations Implementing Law , it must 
be proposed and passed this year to remain in effect . 
•Current Medicaid HMO payment is at 95 percent of Medicaid fee - for - service 
reimbursement rate . Medicaid fee - for-service reimbursement is 
approximately 68 percent of Medicare fee-for - service reimbursement rate . 
Effects 
•Medicaid beneficiaries will not be helped by this mandate . They are a unique 
population that have certain special health care needs . Medicaid 
beneficiaries will be placed in the position of seeking services from 
providers and organizations who can not or do not want to serve them . 
•Medicaid HMO rates are low ; under the Florida Health Security Program they would 
be even lower in the future relative to HMO costs . To stay in business , 
HMOs will have to pass the additional cost on to the non - Medicaid HMO members . 
As a result , non - Medicaid HMO members end up subsidizing the state ' s 
Medicaid program. 
• Florida HMOs will experience greater regu l ation and much higher costs . HMOs 
will be less likely to expand their business. This law wi ll l imit the access 
of many Floridians to HMOs , a proven cost saving alternative . 
• This mandate discourages new managed care companies from entering the Florida 
market . It will limit competition and eventually drive health care costs 
even higher . 
• The Florida Health Security Program would require that an additional 400 , 000 
Medicaid beneficiaries be enrolled in HMOs . If the state uses a mandate 
rather than adequate funding to reach that level of enrollment , the state 
will need a mandate much higher than five percent (an independent study 
by Tillinghast estimated that the additional 400 , 000 Medicaid beneficiaries 
would make Medicaid enrollees 36 percent of today ' s total HMO population . 
Therefore , the negative impact of a mandate would be even greater . 
Alternative Proposal 
Health plans should not be mandated to enroll Medicaid beneficiaries in HMOs . 
If the state provides adequate payment rates , health plans will compete to serve 
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Medicaid enro llees (as happens now in South Florida) . This would be best for 
the Medicaid beneficiaries as well as the entire Fl o rida HMO p opulation . 
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MANDATORY POINT - OF- SERVICE 
Proposal 
Mandatory po i nt - of - service health maintenance organization (POS HMO) legislation 
would mandate HMOs and Florida employers to offer a POS product to employees in 
addition to the standard HMO product . 
Myths 
Organized medicine promotes mandated POS HMO as 
oproviding choice to many Floridians who currently lack choice 
ohaving no effect on the cost of HMO coverage in Florida 
ogood public policy 
oa good " compromise solution " between organized medicine and the position of 
network- based plans , Florida employe r s , and members of network- based plans 
The Facts 
Do Floridians lack choice? 
- No . Most --- 99% of the 11.2 million Floridians with health care coverage 
have a choice of provider or of types of health care plans. The number 
who choose HMOs --- the type of health plan i n which members agree to use 
network providers --- is growi ng . Approximately 1% of insured Floridians 
are enrolled in HMOs by their employers without the choice of another type 
of plan. 
Will mandated POS HMO really have no effect on the cost of HMO coverage in Flor i da? 
-Mandated POS HMO will increase the cost of HMO coverage for Floridians: 
This legislation would force many HMOs into a new type of business . Start - up 
costs and the costs of maintaining a new and different business wi l l drive 
up costs for HMOs . To stay in business , HMOs must pass these costs along 
to customers . 
In addition to higher premiums , employers will face increased costs when 
they have to educate employees about and administer the government product 
in addition to the health care benefits they already provide. 
Is mandated POS HMO good public po l icy? 
POS HMO is a new and evolving product . It is a good example of what a market 
does well : customers wanted a personal physician- based network product 
that also allowed employees to receive benefits out - of - network . POS HMO 
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was developed to meet that need , and while it is still a very young product 
with relatively small enrollment , it is an important part of the product 
mix available to Floridians . Mandating POS HMO is an example of bad 
regulation: it will make the HMO product line more expensive and freeze 
the mandated product in its current form, not allowing it to evolve as the 
market and customers' needs change. This mandate will likely increase the 
number of uninsured Floridians . 
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The POS HMO will be a product dictated by the government , not defined by 
customers . Many HMOs and employers will have to admin i ster three HMO 
products : the standard HMO already popular , the POS HMO that customers 
want , and the government - mandated POS HMO product . The cost of maintaining 
a product that cannot change to meet customer needs and that eventually 
few purchase will increase the cost of HMO coverage without adding any value 
to Florida ' s health care system . 
Some employers offer HMOs to their employees as the only affordable option 
for both the employer and the employee . Mandating another option will raise 
administrative costs for both the HMO and the employer and could put quality 
health care coverage out of reach . 
Why is mandated POS HMO a good " compromise solution? " 
-It's not; there is simply no need for a mandate. Floridians already have a wide 
choice of products in the heal th care market - - - including POS HMO products . 
Nearly all i nsured Floridians have a choice among various types of health 
plans . This proposal would add unnecessary regulation and in the process 




The bottom line is there is no problem to which mandated POS HMO is a solution . 
Florida doe s not need unnecessary regulation . 




Med.Access is a new program created under the Health Care and Insurance Reform Act 
of 1993 . The program will be developed and administered by the Agency for Health 
Care Administration (AHCA) to offer health insurance to people with incomes up to 
250 % of the federal poverty level and who are not served by Medicaid . It is an 
insurance program designed to be sustained by the premiums paid by participants . 
Med.Access is being presented as part of the state ' s attempt to provide all Floridians 
with health care coverage . 
Analysis 
With the creation and implementation of Med.Access , the state is moving into the 
insurance business (premium collection , provider contracting , claims payment , etc) . 
However , the AHCA will have special advantages over private insurers who might 
be interested in serving this population , since Med.Access will be exempt from 
regulations that add cost to private insurance products . With the exemption from 
regulations applicable to private insurers , the state will now be competing with 
the private market , but not on a " level playing field ." By establishing the state 
in the insurance business , Med.Access lays the foundation for increasing government 
control of the health care industry . 
Position 
The role of government should be to facilitate private market solutions to health 
care system problems . The government should not become an advantaged competitor 
to the private market system . 
• If the state believes that exemptions from its own regulations are necessary to 
provide affordable health care coverage , then this exemption should be 
extended to private insurers to encourage the development of low cost products. 
•An effective private market system can provide universal health care coverage 
efficiently , at affordable prices to all Floridians . We support the intent 
of the state to ensure that all Floridians receive health care coverage. 
However , we do not believe that the state can provide this service more 
cost - effectively than the private market , nor that a government - run program 
can respond as effectively as a private market to the changing needs of 
consumers . 
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Medicaid is a large issue that needs further analysis to establish our definitive 
position. This paper is intended to provide background for discussion of what 
we should say about this program in the core proposal . 
MEDICAID 
Background 
In 1965 the Medicaid program was created to finance minimum health care coverage 
for people who were denied access to care because of their inability to pay for 
it. Medicaid is a means - tested program. An individual ' s income level and other 
resources are considered in determining eligibility for the program . Medicaid 
is a federally mandated program , jointly financed by the state and federal 
governments , and administered by the states . The federal government sets broad 
financial and service guidelines for the Medicaid program , but states have great 
flexibility in its implementation . State responsib i lities for the program 
include : ( 1) establishing eligibility standards ; ( 2) determining the type , amount , 
duration , and scope of services ; (3) setting the rate of payment for services ; 
and , ( 4) administering the program . This results in wide variations between states 
on income eligibility requirements , covered services , and provider participation 
in the program . 
Medicaid is a program of federal requirements and state choices . States define 
their programs to meet federal requirements but can choose to broaden coverage 
to include other benefits and groups . To receive federal funds , states must offer 
a minimum set of federally mandated services to individuals participating in the 
welfare - related Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) programs . Federal legislation during the 1980 ' s broadened 
these guidelines to include additional groups of people (such as pregnant women) 
to whom states must offer coverage. 
However , under the current guidelines , there are categories of people who will 
never be eligible for Medicaid although they are poor . This is because Medicaid 
eligibility is contingent not only on meeting strict financial requirements , but 
also on meeting certain federal and state designated status requirements . Being 
poor does not automatically qualify individuals for coverage under Medicaid , 
although the program was originally intended to help states finance medical 
coverage for their poor constituents . For example , 1 25 year - old childless man 
who works full time at a minimum wage job earning just over insurance , cannot 
qualify for Medicaid coverage . 
Federal and state designated status categories can be classified broadly into 
the following groups : 
Mandatory Groups 
•Low-income single - parent families and two - parent families with an unemployed 
princi pal earner (historically composed of individuals receiving cash 
assistance through the AFDC program , although the guidelines for inclusion 
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in this group have been expanded recently) 
• Low- income pregnant women and children who do not qualify for AFDC 
• Low- income Medicare beneficiaries (Medicaid pays only required Medicare premiums , 
deductibles and coinsurance unless the beneficiary qualifies for Medicaid 
in some other way) 
• Low- income aged , blind, or disabled individuals (usually individuals receiving 
cash assistance through the SS I program, but includes some who do not) 
• Persons requiring institutional care (individuals receiving care in nursing 
facilities or intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded) 
Optional Groups 
In addition to the mandatory Medicaid groups, states have the option to extend 
Medicaid coverage to several other groups . 
•States may expand the eligibility requirements for the mandatory groups to allow 
more people into the Medicaid program if federal funding has been made 
available for them 
•Medically Needy (individuals whose income or resources are above the levels 
generally required for eligibility but who have incurred large medical 
expenses) 
•State - only Eligible (groups o f people the state wishes to include , but who do 
not qualify for matching federal funds) 
Historically, these eligibility groups have been separated into two broader 
classifications -- the "categorically needy " and the "medically needy ." 
Individuals whose eligibility for Medicaid was linked to the welfare program were 
considered " categorically needy ." Individuals eligible for Medicaid under 
special Medicaid rules were classified as "medically needy ." Over the years , 
nonwelfare - related groups have been added to the "categorical l y needy " list making 
the distinction between the two groups less clear . The difference between the 
categorically and medically needy groups is important , however , since the scope 
of services that states must cover for the categorica l ly needy is much broader 
than those for the medically needy . This can have great impact on state and federal 
budgets since they share in financing the program . 
Analysis 
Medicaid expenditures have received increased attention from the federal and state 
governments during the past few years . The federal government is facing a record 
deficit and state governments are increasingly challenged to meet their 
const ituents' needs with fewer resources. In FY 1992 , Medicaid cost federal , 
state , and local governments $118 . 8 billion , about 15 % of total national health 
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spending . The federal share is estimated to have been $67 . 8 billion , about 57 % 
of the total . Medicaid is the third largest social program in the federal budget , 
after Social Security and Medicare , and is one of the fastest growing components 
of federal and state budgets . There are several reasons why Medicaid costs have 
ballooned . 
In 1984 , the Federal government began An incremental , but continuous , broadening 
of the eligibility criteria for participation in the Medicaid pro gram . This 
coincided wi t h an economic downturn that increased the number of people eligible 
to apply for Medi ca i d . Additionally , between 1 985 and 1991 , the rate of average 
annual increase in health care inflation was at its highest since the early 1970 ' s . 
While there is controversy over how much of the percentage increase in medicaid 
spending is attributable to medical price inflation , there is agreement that 
changes in the practice of medicine (in the amount and intensity of services 
provided -- especially to hospitalized patients -- and in the use of new , expensive 
technology) have increased the cost of medical care . 
In Florida , the combined effect of these factors resulted in unprecedented growth 
in the Medi caid program during the 198 0 ' s . The number of Medicaid claims processed 
more than doubled from 1980 to 1990 . In FY 1980 , there were 15 , 096 , 933 Medicaid 
claims processed ; in FY 1990 , 48 , 633 , 073 claims were processed . The average cost 
per year per eligible tripled . In FY 1981 , the average cost per eligible was 
$1 , 149 ; in FY 1990 , it was $3 , 443 . 
Legal decisions in the late 1980 ' s directly impacted state Medicaid payment rates . 
Medicaid law required hospitals and nursing homes to be paid rates that are 
" reas onab le and adequate " to meet the costs of facilities that are "efficiently 
and economically " operated . Providers have successfully brought suits against 
several states for payment rates that failed to meet this standard . As a 
consequence , several states increased their payments to these providers . 
Demographics and epidemiology are also influencing Medicaid spending as the U. S. 
population ages and the incidence of AIDS increases . These factors especia l ly 
impact Florida which has a large retirement community and one of the highest per 
capita rates of AIDS . 
Al though Medicaid was intended to increase the poor ' s access to mainstream medical 
care , it has not been very successful in this regard . Medica i d provides health 
care coverage to specific groups among the low- income population . In 1991 , 42 . 2 % 
of Medicaid expenditures paid for long- term care (nursing home care , i ntermediate 
care facilities for the mentally retarded , and home heal t h care) . The aged and 
disabled accounted for nearly two - thirds of the costs of acute and long- term care 
(among the Medicaid elderly , two - thirds of Medicaid spending in FY 1990 was for 
nursing home care) . In 1992 , 36 % of the U. S . population below the federal poverty 
level did not have insurance coverage or fall within the Medicaid eligibility 
requirements . 
Medicaid ' s f inancing and delivery systems do not reflect the changes that have 
occurred since the program ' s inception in 1965 . The Medica i d financing system 
is inherently inflationary . Physicians are reimbursed on a fee - for-service basis , 
hospitals are reimbursed on a cost or per diem basis , depending on state 
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regulations. Reimbursement practices encourage delivery systems to be slanted 
toward providing acute rather than preventive care services . Providers have no 
incentive to provide cost - effective care , although in the mainstream health care 
system financing mechanisms are now widely used that encourage providers to offer 
preventive care and cost - effective care . 
Conclusions 
Medicaid needs to be reformed in order to serve its original purpose to provide 
low- income individuals with greater access to mainstream medical care . 
• To control the rising cost of preventive and acute care services , Medicaid 
beneficiaries should be encouraged to enroll in private managed care systems , 
and the government should work with private industry efforts to include 
the Medicaid population in managed care programs . Through reform of the 
program , Medicaid benefic i aries wil l receive access to more preventive care 
services which will be provided in a high quality , cost - effective manner . 
• Long - term care financing comprises a significant portion of Medicaid 
expenditures . Moving Medicaid beneficiaries into more efficient de l ivery 
arrangements for preventive and acute care will not alleviate federa l and 
state budget issues . The financing of long- term care for the poor should 
be addressed separately. 




The Medicaid program does not fully protect the indigent from high health care 
expenses , or promote efficient patterns of care -- that is the lowest use of resources 
to achieve given outcomes . Many poor people are screened out of Medicaid by 
categorical welfare eligibility rules . Extremely low payment rates discourage 
providers from serving Medicaid patients , leading to inappropriate patterns of care 
such as use of emergency rooms for primary care , and , in some cases , delayed and 
ultimately costlier care . 
Recommendations 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida feels that much work needs to be done to better 
understand the role of Medicaid in the overall heal th care system, and specifically 
as a program to provide health care for low- income individuals and families . The 
following approaches deserve consideration as the state deals with Medicaid issues : 
•Analyzing existing Medicaid expenditures to determine whether funds could be 
allocated more efficiently by: 
- determining whether the state is buying services that provide the highest benefit 
for the cost . Consider use of the Oregon approach to establishing 
priori ties among services as the basis for reallocation among services ; 
and consider shifting some resources to preventive services and those 
services provided at the earliest stage of disease. 
- determining whether the state is buying services from efficient providers 
• Using more selective cont racting in buying services , in order to secure a better 
price 
- using competitive bidding to award contracts to hospitals , physicians, and other 
providers 
-awarding contracts for some services, such as maternity on a global fee basis to 
cover a l l the providers in a given case 
• Promoting greater use of managed care programs to serve Medicaid enrollees 
- evaluate the cost and quality results of existing use of HMOs and other managed 
care programs in Florida and other states ; based on this analysis , 
develop a plan for shifting Medicaid beneficiaries into private managed 
care programs 
- provide rewards (possibly tax credits) to managed care companies for participating 
in the Medicaid program 
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MEDICAL PRACTICE PARAMETERS 
Background 
Medical practice parameters or guidelines are established recommendations for 
clinical treatment in specific situations . Practice parameters can be used by 
managed care companies and providers as criteria for judging the necessity or 
appropriateness of medical services . A variety of efforts are currently underway 
to develop practice parameters . 
Recommendations 
Practice parameters are an important component of efforts to increase the cost 
effectiveness and quality of health care . Provider groups , insurers , managed care 
plans , employers and the government should work together to design mechanisms for 
using practice parameters to determine the appropriateness of medical services . 
The following points should guide the approach . 
• Practice parameters vary widely in the methods used to construct them . We should 
look to practice parameters which are based on sound scientific research 
(as opposed to the consensus approach) and which are being established at 
the national level. 
•Study the Value Health Sciences program for using practice parameters and other 
leading initiatives to determine their soundness and applicability in Florida . 
•Explore the use of medical practice parameters as a defense in medical malpractice 
suits , as some other states have begun to do . 
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MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY REFORM 
In Florida , as in other areas of the country , professional liability is cited by 
physicians as well as other key players as a cause of rising medical costs. The 
cost factors include both the direct cost of professional liability insurance 
premiums and the practice of "defensive medicine ," i . e ., justifying each action 
with d i agnostic results such as l aboratory tests or x - rays . 
Others defend the current professional liability tort system by noting the benefits 
of the status quo . They would claim that negligent physicians may only be 
disciplined economically , and that other groups charged with quality assurance , 
including the Florida Department of Professional Regulation , professional societies 
and hospitals , are ineffective and/or unwilling to discipline physicians . 
Some approaches to malpractice reform that should be considered are : 
1 . Use of binding arbitration for malpractice claims could be built into contracts 
between/among network physicians , hospital and members/subscribers 
2 . Use of the fol l owing as a means to reduce the number of suits filed : 
- expanding the no - fault medical injury concept; and 
- revitalizing and expanding the state patient compensation funds 
3.Review and redefinition of the process of tort law making it more rational and 
less emotional by : 
- increasing the plaintiff ' s burden of proof in malpractice cases from "greater weight 
of the evidence " to " clear and convincing " 
- expanding juries from six to a greater number of persons in medical malpractice 
cases 
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Background 
Medical Savings Accounts would allow people to use tax exempt income to pay for 
medical expenses . Some proponents see them as an alternative to the comprehensive 
insurance or heal th benefit programs most people have today ; the MSA could be combined 
with a catastrophic policy to provide coverage for both routine and high cost , less 
probable medical expenses. 
-Most often proposed as income tax reform - Republicans will propose at national 
level this year . 
- FMA is proposing at state leve l with corporate income tax relief for small businesses 
that create MSAs for their employees . 
Assessment 
Pros 
- Might put some people in a better position to pay for medical care . 
- Uses pure insurance - avoids the moral hazard problem for rout i ne medical expenses . 
- Consistent with our stated philosophy of encouraging choice among a wide variety 
of approaches for protecting against medical expenses . 
Cons 
- Under some proposals , MSAs threaten group insurance because the best risks would 
take advantage of MSAs and poor risks would remain in the group . 
- Under some conceptions , entire employer groups would convert to MSAs/catastrophi c 
insurance . That would make MSAs less a threat to group insurance but it would 
still be anti - managed care . 
- The FMA proposal is probably not viable since small business payment of corporate 
income taxes is extremely rare . 
Potential BCBSF Posit i on 
- Support MSAs that could be used for COBRA premiums , conversion policies , periods 
of unemployment , and long- term care . 
- Support MSAs for expenses not covered by insurance ( change FSAs to allow 
accumulation beyond one year). 
- Support MSAs for individuals whose employers don ' t provide insurance . 
- Oppose MSAs that would spl i t groups - don ' t allow employers to provide a 
comprehensive health benefit to some and an MSA/catastrophic program for 
others . 
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MEDICAL LIABILITY 
Issue 
To achieve greater cost containment, the 1993 Legislature directed AHCA to consider 
tort reform as a mechanism for reducing health care costs . 
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes 
• Studying the effectiveness of previous reform measures and the impact of other 
recent health care reforms on the costs and efficiency of Florida ' s medical 
liability system . 
•Enacting legislation to allow a provider ' s failure to comply with a state- endorsed 
practice parameter to be admitted as evidence that the provider did not meet 
the prevailing standard of care . 
Effects 
•Patients would suffer if their physicians cannot adopt innovative techniques for 
fear that any deviation from the state - endorsed practice parameters would 
lead to malpractice litigation . Mandating the use of practice parameters 
is inappropriate government intrusion in medical practice . 
•The overall cost of health care would continue to rise as providers: 
- become over reliant on practice parameters which may be excessive or unnecessary , 
and 
-"defensive " medical practices increase to assure demonstrated compliance with 
parameters . 
As a result , Floridians would see health insurance premiums rise . 
•Physician discontent would greatly increase with such a significant increase in 
external interference in the practice of medicine , further lowering physician 
morale and convincing new physicians not to practice in Florida. 
•Patients will be put at risk needlessly if unnecessary or excessive procedures 
or tests are performed in response to this legislation . 
Alternative Proposal 
The wording of AHCA ' s proposal on practice parameters is the opposite of the standard 
legislation adopted by other states . Most states have adopted legislation stating 
that adherence to a practice parameter can be admitted as a defense in a malpractice 
action . The AHCA ' s proposal takes the opposite stance , allowing failure to follow 
a practice parameter to be introduced against a medical provider in a malpractice 
action. This would only worsen the malpractice crisis . 
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A more appropriate approach to tort reform as a mechanism to contain costs would 
be to concentrate on 1) reducing defensive medicine practices ; 2) developing usable 
standards for appropriate care ; and 3) testing alternative dispute resolution 
techniques . 
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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
Background 
The medical malpractice system influences all aspects of the health care system : 
cost , access , and quality . 
Cost 
The cost factors include the direct costs of professional liability insurance 
premiums which can exceed 20 percent of a physician ' s revenue , and the practice 
of "defensive medicine ," (i . e ., justifying each action with diagnostic procedures 
such as laboratory tests or x - rays) . Recent studies indicate that defensive 
medicine may increase medical costs by as much as 15 percent of the cost of physicians ' 
services (Relman , 1990) . 
In a 1991 medical malpractice background paper , the Blue Cross and Blue Shi eld 
Association estimated that health care premiums might be reduced by 1 - 1 . 5 percent 
if tort reform lowers physicians ' liability premiums by 10 - 20 percent. 
Access 
Whereas some people may be receiving more care than they really need because of 
defensive medicine practices , others may find their access limited by providers ' 
malpractice concerns . A 1987 survey conducted in Maryland found that 51 percent 
of physicians made practice changes to reduce or avoid risk . Twelve percent of 
internists , 20 percent of family or general practice physicians , and 30 percent 
of OB/GYNS indicated cutting back on the number of high- risk patients they treated 
(Weisman , et . al ., 1989) . 
Quality 
The current malpractice system provides little evidence of i mproving the quality 
of care by deterring negligence . First , only substandard care that results in injury 
is identified and penalized . Many times negligent care does not cause lasting injury 
and thus goes unrecognized and unpenalized . 
Second , relatively few claims are filed . A recent study found that there was one 
malpractice tort claim filed by patients for every 7 . 5 negligently i nflicted i njury 
(Weiler , et . al ., 1992) . 
Third , the system for recovering damages is imprecise and often arduous . A plaintiff 
in a malpractice case must establish the duty or standard of care owed to him/her , 
prove the provider ' s conduct breached that duty or standard of care , and demonstrate 
that it caused harm that constitutes legally compensable damaged . 
Fourth , the effectiveness of malpractice claims in deterring negligence is diluted 
by liability insurance (which is rarely experience rated) and the physician ' s ab i lity 
to absorb liability premium expenses by raising prices to patients . 
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Finally , the current litigious climate has caused an erosion of the patient/doctor 
relationship . This erosion is perceived as reducing quality by reducing the level 
of trust between doctors and patients which is necessary for the best care . Many 
physicians feel the threat of a public suit and trial has changed their relationships 
with patients to one of suspicion. 
Efforts to Reform the Malpractice System 
During the early 1970s and again in the mid- 1980s , significant increases in premiums 
for professional liability insurance for physicians , and in some cases the refusal 
of insurers to offer coverage , caused what is commonly referred to as medical 
malpractice crises . 
Following each crisis , states enacted legislation to reform the professional 
liability system . These efforts focused on improving the availability and 
affordability of medical liability coverage for physicians . Some reforms , 
particularly alternative dispute resolution systems and no - fault compensation 
funds , have also sought to improve the injured person ' s access to a fair hearing 
and to increase the proportion of system cost that goes toward compensation of claims . 
In Florida , the skyrocketing cost for professional liability insurance prompted 
the Florida Legislature to enact a number of reform measures in 197 5 . These efforts 
(mandated internal risk- management , informed consent , a patient ' s compensation 
fund , and medical liability mediation panels) stabilized the malpractice system 
in Flor i da until the mid- 1980s . 
Between 1979 and 1986 , professional liability claims increased at an annual compound 
rate of 16 percent (Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort System, 
1987) . The increase in claims was followed by a significant increase in premiums . 
The result of these premium increases caused some insurers to restrict and even 
eliminate liability coverage for certain high risk medical special ties (e . g ., 
obstetrics/gynecology) . In response , the Florida Legislature passed the 
"Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985 " that further reformed 
Florida ' s professional liability system . Provisions include : 
•certificate of good faith must be provided by the plaintiff ' s attorneys based on 
reasonable investigation prior to initiation of a malpractice lawsuit ; 
•per- suit notice requirements and screening periods ; 
• comparative fault and contribution in malpractice cases ; 
•disciplinary actions for engaging in unnecessary diagnostic testing ; 
• court ordered non- binding arbitration ; 
•mandatory settlement conferences ; and 
•percentage fee schedules for attorney ' s fees in malpractice cases . 
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BCBSF Position 
The current medical malpractice system is a growing concern for health plans --
both because of the increased claims cost from defensive medicine practices and 
because of the potent i al exposure to increased liability . 
Defensive medicine practices and the added care necessitated when providers are 
negligent contribute to the overall inflation of health care costs . Additionally , 
health plans that adopt a more active role in health benefits management (i. e ., 
the development of managed care products ) increase their potential liability when 
adverse medical outcomes occur . 
To address these concerns and c oncerns about the overall health care system , Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield of Florida is supportive of reform efforts that focus on : 
1) reducing professional liability premiums and defense medicine practices ; 2) 
developing usable standards for appropriate care ; and 3) testing alternative dispute 
resolution techniques . 
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BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF FLORIDA'S PROPOSAL FOR MEDICARE REFORM 
We believe that curbing Medicare spending trends for the long term necessitates 
significant improvement in the efficiency with which the program operates . The 
most effective way to improve efficiency is to restructure the program to take 
advantage of private market methods . We support restructuring the Medicare program 
to gradually move beneficiaries away from the current government - run , traditional 
insurance program and into the mainstream, private- market based U. S . health care 
system. 
This paper describes our vision of the restructured Medicare program in the next 
decade. It also describes the significant technical barriers which must be overcome 
to establish this vision . These technical barriers require the development of 
mechanisms , processes , and systems not available today and therefore , require some 
time . Finally , given the urgent need for improvement in the Medicare program, the 
last section offers recommendations for changes which can be undertaken immediately , 
to begin moving the current program in the right direction . 
The Medicare Program of the Future 
Overview 
The Medicare program of the year 2005 should look quite different from the program 
in existence today . Changes made over the next decade will result in a program 
which uses competition to achieve efficiency and enhances the exercise of personal 
responsibility and consumer power in heal th care . These changes ensure the 
viability of the program for future beneficiaries . 
This future Medicare program offers beneficiaries a wide range of choices among 
competing health plans . Beneficiaries share in the cost of coverage and select 
plans which best match their own perceptions of value -- where value is a combination 
of quality and cost . They use comparative information about the various plans to 
make their selection. The government provides Medicare participants a set amount 
of funding regardless of the plan they choose . 
For new Medicare beneficiaries , the transition from the private market - based system 
enjoyed during their working eyars to the Medicare program is relatively easy , since 
they continue to participate in that same private market system . Older 
beneficiaries appreciate the restructured program because it maintains the " safety 
net ," yet allows them to exercise greater consumer power and control over their 
health care decision- making. 
Competition among health plans for customers in this large and growing market is 
strong . The competitive climate ensures that heal th plans 1) strive for efficiency 
in health care delivery and plan administration , and 2) continually innovate to 
improve existing products and offer new products which effectively meet their 
customers ' needs . This market is open to entry by all health plans meeting basic 
standards for solvency and quality which are set , in large part , by private 
organizations . 
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Regulation of the Medicare program is limited and focuses on ensuring fair 
competit i on , so that the successful health plans and providers are tho se which 
provide the greatest va l ue to beneficiaries . The government does not manage product 
design or the deli very of heal th care . Private heal th plans detect and punish fraud 
and other system abuses . Funding for other programs , such as medica l research and 
graduate medical education , is handled directly through other government funding 
mechanisms . 
Program Characterist i cs 
This restructured program incorporates the following general characteristics . 
Beneficiary Choice . Medicare beneficiaries are able to choose from a wide array 
of products , ranging from classic HMOs , through point - of-service managed care 
products such as PPOs , to traditional coverage . 1 Catastrophic coverage plans are 
also available . Federal law preempts state laws l imi ting the availability of 
classic HMOs or other types of managed care products . Beneficiaries select health 
plans annually during an open enrollment period . Beneficiaries have comparative 
information on health plans for a defined set o f characteristics ; much o f this 
information comes fr om private organizations offering health plan c omparisons and 
evaluations . 
Benefits . A basic set of benefits is available to all Medicare participants . 
Establishing a benefit standard aids comparison across health plans and ensures 
a certain level of services arecovered for all beneficiaries, regardless of the 
plan selected . All health plans particiapting in the Medicare market offer this 
baisc package . Health plans may offer products with additional benefits, but the 
basic benefit package marks the minimun level of coverage . 
Medicare Contribution . The Medicare contribution toward coverage reflects a 
sliding scale based on a beneficiary ' s income. The Meedicare contribution could 
be based on the premium prices of competing health plans ; or it could be independent 
of the cost of health care coverage . The Medicare contribution level ensures that 
beneficiaries 1) have financial incentives to seek efficient health plans , and 2) 
have the financial resources to choose among several plans when making their purchase 
decisions . 
Eligibility. Eligibiilty for Medicare benefits remains the same. To maximize the 
incentives for selecting efficient heal th plans , all benef i viaries with income above 
the federal poverty level pay something toward the cost of coverage . Dual 
eligibility for Medicaid acute care benefits is no longer necessary . Lower - income 
Medicare beneficiaries receive the maximum Medicare contribution , which provides 
the full premium cost of several health plans offered in their area . doing away 
with dual eligibility raises a set of difficult problems that must be resolved , 
but this step is important for reducing program complexity and ensuring adequate 
1 The entire range of products might not be available in every 
depending on that market ' s particular characteristics . 
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market 
financing for Medicare participants . 
Pricing/ Payment . Premium pricing is set by health plans competing for business 
in the competit i ve Medicare market . In order to attract customers , plans have strong 
incentives to achieve quality care and service at the lowest possible price . 
Product Flexibility. Health plans are able to develop and offer new and innovative 
products and services to Medicare beneficiaries , as long as the products cover at 
l east the basic set of benefits . This flexibility in product design and development 
allows the strangth of the market towork for Medicare beneficiaries : their consumer 
demands and , to some extent , different needs will drive the development of new 
products . A weakness ofgovernment programs is that they become frozen in the form 
in which they are implemented . Over- regulation would thwart the market and 
contradict the reasons for using private market methods . 
Health Plan / Provider Participation . Health plans and providers can participate 
in the Medicare market by meeting basic quality and financial criteria , and by 
agreeing to provide certain comparative information for consumers . Private market 
organizations play a large role in setting the standards for health plans and 
providers . 
Governance . The government finances care for Medicare beneficiaries . It has 
oversight responsibility to ensure that public monies are spent respnosibly . The 
goernment does not manage/direct product design or the delivery of care . There 
are a variety of alternatives for establishing and enforcing fair rules of 
competition which ensure that the plans providing the best value (lowest price for 
a given level of quality and service) are the ones that succeed in the Medicare 
market . Non- government alternatives , such as boards or commissions , should be 
seriously explored . Under any alternative , Medicare regulation is streamlines and 
focuses on performance . In the competitive Medicare market , private health plans 
take the lead in identifying and eliminating fraud and abuse in the system . 
Barriers to Establishing the Future Medicare Program 
We believe that the future Medicare program described above will meet the needs 
of beneficiaries for quality , accessible care and also bring program costs under 
control . However , it is important to recognize that there are significant technical 
barriers to implementing the changes needed . With work , these barriers can be 
overcome , but they prohibit establishing the future Medicare program via legislation 
in 1995/96 . Instead, interim changes (described in the next section) must be 
implemented while resolving these problems . 
1.Adverse Risk Selection 
The proposal above establishes Medicare as an individual market in which 
beneficiaries choose their coverage from a variety of health plans. 
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Unlike the group market , individual markets pose unique risks for health plans . 
If a health plan enrolls a greater number of individuals with medical problems 
compared to its competitors , its costs will rise higher than competitors ' costs . 
The health plan will raise prices to cover its higher costs . Higher prices make 
it less attractive to healthy individuals , and its own healthy enrollees switch 
to other , lower - priced plans . Sick individuals stay with the plan and the cost 
spiral continues upward , eventually threatening the health plan ' s solvency . 
Some insurers in the private individual market , well aware of the dangers of adverse 
risk selection , have developed marketing practices to attract and keep healthy 
enrollees and limit the number of enrollees with more costly medical problems . 
Since a relatively small percentage of Medicare beneficiaries account for a large 
portionof the program ' s total costs , a plan can limit losses signi ficantly through 
small reductions i n high risk enrollees . 
In order to establish a good individual market for Medicare , in which competition 
among health plans is based on quality and cost and not health status , the probl em 
of adverse risk selection must be addressed . Many proposals assume a " risk 
adjuster ," a mechanism which would measure the health of a plan ' s enrollees and 
adjust the payment to the heal thpl an up or down accordingl y . Thus , this risk 
ad j uster would ensure that all heal th plans rece i ve adequate payment because payment 
would be linked to the health risk of their enrollees . 
The probl em is that a risk adjuster is a theoretical construct . No adequate risk 
adjuster has yet been developed . Much more technical work i s needed to resolve 
the issue of adverse risk selection , including work on the potential for a " risk 
adjuster ." 
2 . Adverse Experience 
Adverse risk selection refers to differential risk of il lness at the time of 
enrol l ment . However , even if a perfect risk adjuster were developed there would 
still be a problem wi th di f ferential experi ence . In an indivi dua l choice situation , 
differential i l lness experience poses a significant prob l em that is not part of 
the group health insurance market . Both health plans and the sick individuals in 
this situation have strong incentives to engage in practices which would damage 
the market (health plans could encourage sick enrollees to change plans ; people 
could change plans to maximize benefits related to their new health care needs) . 
This is not a problem in the large group market . Health plans would not drop a 
large group because one employee has incurred major health care bills ; nor would 
larger groups change plans to accomoda te the hea l th care needs of one member . Much 
more technica l work is needed on the problem of adverse experience . 
3 . Comparative Information 
One of the most important conditions for a competitive market is that consumers 
have adequate information about the cost , quality , and other characteristics of 
heal th plans . With adequate information , consumers can base their purchase 
decisions on the perceived value of a product . 
One of the most striking characteristics of the health care market is that such 
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informationsimply has not been available . Both private and public organizations 
are working on various aspects of this complex issue , including 1) defining and 
organizing the development of the tools needed to measure performance inthe health 
care system; and 2) developing standards for information reporting by providers 
and health plans . 
These tasks require considerable technical work . The definition and measurement 
of quality in health care is a good example of some of the challenges . Relative 
to the number of treatments and services available , we have little scientific 
information on the costs and benefits of different treatments/services for specific 
conditions . These data are essential for defining quality care and setting quality 
standards . Further , there are as yet no standard industry mechanisms for gathering 
information on specific patient conditions , treatments applied, and results 
achieved . Developing these mechanisms is essential for monitoring and evaluating 
provider and health plan performance relative to quality standards . 
Progress is being made toward developing meaningful consumer information , but the 
preliminary forms of information are in the testing stages , and not ready f or 
wholesale application in the Medicare market . 
4.Setting the Medicare Contribution Level 
Determining the Medicare contribution level is a significant issue . Policymakers 
must consider a number of factors , including the broad range of income levels of 
Medi care participants ; the wide variation in medical costs per Medicare beneficiary 
across different areas of the United States ; and the nation's budget and deficit 
situation . Technical work is needed to develop a Medicare contribution mechanism 
which capitalizes on the price - competition among health plans , is fair to Medicare 
beneficiaries with different income levels and living in different areas of the 
country , and meets federal budget goals . 
5 . Capacity 
Most metropol itan areas today have a wide range of tpes of health plans competing 
for business in the private market . However , this is not the case for all areas 
of the United States . Some areas have few managed ca re products available ; many 
rural areas have relatively few providers , making it difficult to develop competign 
health care products. Competition among a variety of health plans is necessary 
for optimum pricing and market conditions . More technical study is needed on this 
issue to ensure that Medicare benef i ciaries all over the count ry will have several 
types of products from which to choose , and that compet ition among health plans 
is occurring . 
Steps to Take Immediately 
The Medicare program is in a fiscal crisis . In order to preserve the viability 
of the program for future beneficiaries , the program must be more cost effective 
than it has been in the past. Initial steps toward improvi ng the program should 
be taken this year . The longer policymakers wait to implement improvements , the 
worse the fiscal problem becomes , and the harsher the measures to mi prove the program 
must be . These initial steps must be consistent with and support the vision of 
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policymakers for the Medicare program in the future . 
BCBSF proposes that the following changes be implemented in the near- term to begin 
gaining control over program costs . These program changes establish the foundation 
for the 2005 restructured Medicare program described above. 
•Means testing 
When the Medicare program was established, 4 7 % of the elderly were living in poverty . 
Today , only 1 7 % o f the elderly have incomes below the federal poverty leve l . 
Means testing should be established for the Medicare premium amount: 
wealthier beneficiaries should pay a higher premium . Means testing for 
deductibles should also be considered . Al though this makes the payment 
process more complex , there are benefits to establishing means testing for 
deductibles , and deductibles need to be higher f or this group to have the 
intended dampening effect on decisions to utilize benefits . Lower- income 
beneficiaries , on the othe r hand , could have lowe r deductibles , so that the 
deductible is not a barrier to seeking needed care . 
• Indexing deductibles 
The Medicare Part B deductible has been frozen for years and bears little relation 
to today ' s cost of health care and health care coverage. The $100 deductible 
is far below the typical deductible for private coverage , an dit i s one -e ighth 
of what it was in 1967 , compared to the annual average charges per person . 
This low deductible distorts beneficiaries perceptions about the value of 
their benefits , and further insulates them from the cost of health care . 
It also increases the proportion of Medicare Part B paid by the government . 
The deductible amount should increase in relation to increases in the cost 
of other goods and services . Increases in the deductible should be based 
on some know measure, such as the Consumer Price Index, so that it better 
tracks the cost of Medicare benefits . Means testing for the deductible would 
protect lower - income beneficiaries from any adverse effect of the rising 
deductible. 
•Medigap policy requirements 
Many Medicare beneficiaries purchase Medigap policies to cover the out - of- pocket 
costs of the Medicare program -- such as deductibles and co-insurance . There 
are ten standardized Medigap products available to Medicare beneficiaries , 
and Medicare Select . Medicare coverage itself, like all third party payment 
arrangements , insulates beneficiaries from the cost of their care . Medi gap 
policies magnify this effect . Thus , many Medicare beneficiaries have few 
incentives to seek efficient care . For this reason , some proposals call for 
banning Medigap policies . However , 
we believe that a more prudent course would be to eliminate the two Medigap products 
which offer the most " first dollar " coverage , and replace it with a new Medigap 
product which provides catastrophic coverage . 
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• HMO enrollment period 
Today, Medicare beneficiaries who enroll in HMO plans can disenrol l on a monthly 
basis . This enrollment policy aggravates the problem of adverse risk 
selection . People know their health status and can often predict or p l an 
for needed treatments . Monthly enrollment allows beneficiaries t o make 
enrollment decisions based on treatment expectatinos , biasing the enrollment 
process . In most employee groups, including the Federa l Employee Health 
Benefits Program ( FEHBP) , enrollees can only change their plan choices 
annually . Medicare policy should change to set an annual enrollment period 
for beneficiaries to choose either traditional Medicare or HMO/CMP coverage . 
• HMO application process 
HMOs must apply to HCFA to participate in the Medicare program . This application 
process can be very lengthy and is a barrier t o HMOs entering the Medicare 
market . HCFA should 1) reduce the time it takes to process and approve 
applications from HMOs (both initial applications and applications for service 
area expansions), and 2) simplify procedures for submitting and processing 
applications . Streamlining the application process requires that HCFA 
standardize the policies and procedures o f regional offices reviewing 
applications . 
•Alternative plan information for beneficiaries 
HCFA provides relatively little i nformation to Medicare beneficiaries about the 
health plans available to them as alternatives to the traditional Medicare 
program . HCFA should work with Medicare participating heal th plans to develop 
comparative information for beneficiaries , and send this information to all 
beneficiaries periodically . 
• Fraud and abuse 
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) estimates that 10-20 % of every dollar Medicare 
spends is wasted due to fraud and abuse . Unde r any circumstances, this is 
an unacceptable figure ; in the current climate of financial crisis for the 
Medicare program, this level of waste must be addressed urgently . HCFA needs 
to work with Medicare contractors and carriers, law enforcement officials, 
and others to establish mechanisms to counteract fraud and abuse in the 
program . 
•Market ing practices 
Health plans at risk for the medical costs of Medicare beneficiaries have strong 
financial incentives for trying to enroll beneficiaries with lower health 
risks. Relative l y subtle marketing techniques, such as offering exercise 
classes , can be remarkably effective at attracting a larger portion of younder , 
healthier beneficiaries. Medicare should work with health plans to ensure 
that beneficiaries receive structured, comparable information from 
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participating health plans in a given regi on . 
• Health plan payment 
There are many problems with the current method of determining payment for Medicare 
alternative health plans . The government should work with health plans to 
develop several alternative models for revising the payment method . These 
models should 
- eliminate the link between costs for the traditional Medicare (fee-for- service) 
program and the payment to alternative health plans 
- account for the differential heal th risk of different enrollees , and adjust payment 
accordingly 
- be piloted in limited demonstrations before a new program payment method is 
selected. 
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BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF FLORIDA'S PROPOSAL FOR MEDICARE REFORM 
• Vision . Curbing Medicare spending trends for the long term necessitates 
significant improvement in program efficiency . Improving efficiency 
requires restructuring the program to take advantage of private market 
methods . We support restructuring Medicare to gradually move beneficiaries 
away from the current government - run , traditional insurance program and into 
the mainstream, private - market based U. S . health care system . 
• By 2005 , the Medicare program looks quite different : 
- Beneficiaries choose from a range of competing health plans , ranging from classic 
HMOs to traditional insurance coverage . They use comparative 
information , much of which is provided by private organizations , to 
compare and evaluate competing health plans . 
- The government provides Medicare beneficiaries a set amount of funding regardless 
of the plan they choose . The amount is based on a sliding scale 
reflecting a beneficiary ' s income . 
- A basic set of benefits is available to all Medicare beneficiaries , aiding 
comparison across health plans , but plans can also offer products with 
additional benefits . 
- Premium prices are set by health plans competing for business in the competitive 
Medicare market. 
- Health plans and providers can participate in the Medicare market by meeting basic 
quality and financial criteria , and by agreeing to provide certain 
comparative information for consumers. 
- The government finances care for Medicare beneficiaries and has oversight 
responsibilities , but does not manage/direct product development or 
the delivery of care . Medicare regulation is streamlined and focuses 
on performance. Private health plans take the lead in identifying 
and eliminating fraud and abuse in the system . 
• Barriers . There are significant technical barriers to establishing the Medicare 
program of 2005 . These barriers can be overcome , but they require the 
development o f mechanisms , processes , and systems not available today . Maj or 
barriers include : 
- adverse risk selection 
- adverse experience 
- comparative information 
- setting the Medicare contribution level 
- capacity 
• Steps to take immediately . The difficulty of removing these barriers prohibits 
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establishing the 2005 Medicare program via 1995/96 legislation . Therefore 
interim changes are needed to preserve the viability of the program for future 
beneficiaries . We recommend that the following steps be taken this year: 
- Means testing should be established for the Medicare premium amount -- wealthier 
beneficiaries should pay a higher premium . Means testing for 
deductibles should also be considered . 
- The size of deductibles should increase in relation to increases in the cost of 
other goods and services . Increases in the deductible should be based 
on some known measure , such as the Consumer Price Index, so that it 
better tracks the cost of Medicare benefits. 
- Eliminate the two Medigap products which o ffer the most " first dollar" coverage , 
and replace them with a new Medigap product which provides catastrophic 
coverage . 
- Set an annual enrollment period for beneficiaries to choose either traditional 
Medicare or HMO/CMP coverage . 
- HCFA must reduce the time it takes to 1) process and approve applications from 
HMOs (both initial applica t i ons and applications for service area 
expansions ) and 2) simplify procedures for submitting and processing 
applications . 
-HCFA should work with alternative health plans to develop information on these 
plans in comparison to traditional Medicare , and send this information 
to all beneficiaries periodically . 
- HCFA should work with Medicare contractors and carriers , law enforcement officials , 
and others to establish mechanisms to counteract fraud and abuse in 
Medicare . 
- HCFA should work with heal th plans to ensure that beneficiaries receive structured , 
comparable information about participating health plans in a given 
region . 
- HCFA should work with alternative health plans to develop several models for 
revising payment methods and set up pilot programs to test these models . 
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Medicare is a large issue that needs further analysis to establish our definitive 
position. This paper is intended to provide background for discussion of what we 
should say about this program in the core proposal. 
MEDICARE 
Background 
In 1965 Medicare was established as a federally- financed program to ensure that 
Americans aged 65 and older would have access to a minimum level of mainstream medical 
care . The Medicare program was built around several principles that continue to 
shape (and restrict change in) the program . These principles include: 
1 . Mainstreaming : Beneficiaries are covered under a program based on the financing 
and delivery arrangements that existed in 1965 -- unrestricted choice of 
providers who are reimbursed on a fee - for - service basis . 
2 . Choice of Participation in Managed Care : Where federally - approved Medicare 
managed care programs exist , beneficiaries have the choice of participating 
in them , or continuing under the traditional Medicare financing and delivery 
system . Approximately 2 . 5 million (out of 36 million) Medicare beneficiaries 
have enrolled in managed care programs . 
3 . Entitlement , Contribution , and Means - Testing : Beneficiaries are entitled to 
receive the benefits of Part A Medicare as soon as they become eligible for 
Medicare. Part A pays for most hospital care and some non- physician nursing 
home and home heal th care services. To receive benefits from Part B Medicare , 
beneficiaries must contribute a premium or qualify for coverage by passing 
the means test for Supplemental Security Income ( SSI) . Part B covers 
physician services and related expenses . 
4 . Lifetime Entitlement : Most Medicare beneficiaries become eligible at the age 
of 65 and remain eligible until death . Medicare will pay for the costs related 
to the final illnesses of virtually every beneficiary . In 198 9 , approximately 
one third of all Medicare claims expenses were incurred by the five percent 
of beneficiaries who were in their last year of life . 
5 . Pay- As - You- Go : The Medicare program follows the same principles as Social 
Security . The cost of benefits for current beneficiaries are paid from taxes 
assessed on the currently employed (i . e ., future Medi care beneficiaries) . 
Analysis 
Medicare expenditures have received increased attention from the federal government 
during the past few years . Entitlement programs are consuming an increasingly 
larger portion of federal revenues at a time when the government is pressured to 
reduce a record deficit without significantly increasing federal taxes . Due to 
the structure of the Medicare program, the growth in expenditures is virtually 
uncontrollable . 
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The elderly represent the fas t est growing segment of the U. S . population and tend 
to use health care services more than other segments of the population . Reducing 
Medicare expenditures will necessitate restricting eligibility requirements or 
increasing the efficiency of the health care system . The federal government has 
chosen to support the latter approach. It has attempted to encourage greater 
efficiency in hospital services through implementation of the DRG reimbursement 
program . However , Medicare ' s physician reimbursement system remains inherently 
inflationary . Medicare reimburses physicians on a fee - for - service basis . This 
encourages over - use of the health care system (more office visits , tests , and 
procedures generate more income for physicians) . In general , the Medicare program 
does not promote cost - effective practices , and overall program costs continue to 
rise . Since the mid- 1970 ' s , Medicare costs have risen at a higher rate than 
inflation and have outpaced the Consumer Price Index . 
Because of its size , the Medicare program has a significant effect on health care 
spending and on provider practice patterns . In FY 1990/91 , Medicare expenditures 
were $117 . 8 billion , or 17 % of tota l U. S . health care expenditures . Medicare 
expenditures account for a large portion of overall heal th care spending in Florida . 
According to data from the Health Care Financing Administration , total Medicare 
expenditures in Florida amounted to $8 . 3 billion in 1991 . For many health care 
providers in Florida , Medicare reimbursement comprises over 50 % of their revenues . 
Through the Medicare program, the federal government can amplify or cushion the 
impact of heal th care reform . Reform measures will have a limited impact on 
improving the effic i ency of the overall heal th care deli very system if the Medicare 
program is not also reformed . 
The primary purpose of the Medicare program , when it was established , was to provide 
the elderly and disabled with access to mainstream medical care . Mainstream medical 
care has changed since 1965 , but Medicare has not. Since Medicare was established , 
new financing and delivery systems have emerged . Providers are being encouraged 
to provide preventive care , and to seek cost - effective methods to deliver preventive 
and acute care services . Medicare beneficiaries are increasingly being left behind . 
Rather than benefiting from innovations in health care financing and delivery , 
they are being served by providers who are motivated to offer as many services as 
possible for acute care needs . 
Conclusions 
Reform of the Medicare program should be inst i tuted with the goal of bringing it 
back in line with mainstream heal th care financing and deli very . In this way , 
beneficiaries , and tax- payers , can benefit from the program ' s use of health care 
systems that provide more services , at a lower cost , while maintaining a high standard 
of quality . 
Reform will need to be introduced gradually . Most Medicare beneficiaries are 
unfami l iar with the changes that have occurred in mainstream medical care . They 
would probably resist mandator y part i cipation in alternative delivery systems . 
Beneficiaries should be encouraged to voluntarily participate in alternative 
programs , and the federal government should make these programs more accessible 
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to the Medicare population . Mandatory participation in alternative de l i very 
programs can occur after the Medicare population has become more familiar with 
alternative health c are delivery systems . 
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NATIONAL HEALTH BOARD 
We believe that the heal th care industry should establish a private - industry 
organization to develop information standards to allow informed c onsumer purchasing . 
This organization would have as members all the stakeholders in the health care 
market : consumers , employers , providers , and insurance . The organizat i on would 
be governed by a board of directors composed of representatives from the stakeholder 
groups , and would be funded by the stakeholders . 
The organization would have five main functions : 
1 . define , guide , and organize the development of the tools needed to measure 
performance in the health care system; 
2 . develop standards for informati on reporting by providers and insurer ; 
3 . set standards for disseminating consumer inf ormation ; 
4 . coordinate research and development on data reporting ; and 
5 . establ i sh a benchmark benefit package . 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida believes that creating a new 
government - sponsored national health board is not necessary and would politicize 
the process and restrict the public ' s involvement and input . 
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PATIENT CHOICE AND MANAGED CARE 
Patient Choice of Health Care Plan 
The most essential element in managed care programs is the selection of providers 
who can best serve the target population . Selection enables the managed care 
organization to work with the numbers and kinds of providers who can most effectively 
and efficiently meet the needs of its customers . 
For the patient , enrollment in a managed care program entails a sacrifice of some 
choice of provider for the lower cost and greater assurance of quality that managed 
care plans achieve through selection . Because people have varying needs and wants 
regarding cost , quality , and provider choice , an ideal system would afford them 
clear opportunities to make tradeoffs based on their own values . 
Three conditions help maximize such opportunities : 
l . There is a broad array of health insurance and managed care products available 
in the marketplace . They vary from traditional products that leave the 
patient on his own to deal with the health delivery system to tightly integrated 
HMOs that manage the delivery process. 
2 . Employers have good informat i on about the benefits , rules of operation , quality , 
cost , patient satisfact i on , and financial conditions of the various companies 
and their products . Employers use this i nformation to provide heal th benefits 
that best suit their employee ' s needs . 
3.Most employers provide their employees the opportunity to select the plan that 
best suits their needs and wants . The employer supplies comparable 
information on each plan in a way that enables the individual employee to 
consci ously and deliberately choose the right plan for his or her family . 
We can confidently make two conclusions about these conditions . First , the Florida 
marketplace meets these conditions today and it is meeting them more completely 
all the time . We have a broad array of products and it is getting broader . In 
recent years , HMO point - o f - service has become more widely available and care manager 
PPOs are also developing . These new products are appearing while the older products 
-- HMO , PPO , and traditional , remain available . 
Whereas employers once were only able to compare the costs of the plans available , 
they increasingly are getting comparable information on quality and patient 
satisfaction . And most employers enable employees to choose from a menu of health 
plans . Among Florida HMO enrollees , for example , more than 95 % could have chosen 
some other plan . 
The second conclusion is that government mandates could not improve patient choices . 
For example , a government mandate to require managed care plans to accept any 
provider who wants to contract with them (AWP) would significantly reduce patient 
choice . Since , as stated above , provider selection is essential to managed care 
programs , AWP would effectively eliminate HMOs and similar products from the 
marketplace . 
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A mandate that managed care plans or employers provide certain products , such as 
HMO POS , also does not benefit patient choice . HMO POS and other products are being 
developed in response to customer wants and needs . As managed care companies , their 
customers and providers gain experience with these products , they will be refined 
and improved . A government mandated HMO POS would only stifle this process . The 
product would be defined by law and regu l ation , not by patient needs . Managed care 
companies would be constrained from working with customers and providers to improve 
the product . 
Pat i ent Choice Within Managed Care 
It should be clear that , in electing a managed care plan , the patient is not giving 
up choice al together . PPOs provide broad choice of physician for most special ties . 
For most people who have a personal phys i cian , his participation i n an HMO is an 
important criterion in their choice of plan . When new members enroll in an HMO , 
they select a primary care physician (PPC) from the participating provi ders and , 
periodically , they have opportuni ties to change their PPC . 
As with the choice of plan , government intrus i on is not l ikely to improve the 
patient ' s choice within managed care plans . An example is the "direct access " ( DA) 
proposal . While ostensibly providing the patient more freedom to see a spec i alist , 
i t would actually be a government mandate prohibiting pat i ents and managed care 
plans from defining a coordinating role for the primary care physician . If products 
that include direct access are needed and wanted in the marketplace , managed care 
companies will develop them (as they have with PPOs) . 
The AWP , DA , and mandated POS examples point out the paradox of government attempts 
to improve choice. Government mandates , as the term implies , can not broaden choice , 
they can only sustain it . If government does more to define how people must have 
choice , it will only inhibit managed care plans and their customers from improving 
choice in ways that meet the patient ' s needs and wants . 
IP45 
POS COMPROMISE 
1 . " Point of Service Plan " means a plan that provides payment of non- emergency , 
self- referred covered health care services obtained from providers who are 
not otherwise employed by , not under contract with , and not otherwise 
affiliated with the HMO or services obtained from an affiliated specialist 
without a referral . 
2 .A "nonparticipating provider " is a provider who is not employed by or under contract 
with the health maintenance organization . 
3. Each heal th maintenance organization shall annually make available in its service 
area , upon the request of a group purchaser , a point of service plan as an 
option to any other plan offered to the group purchaser . Contracts sold to 
individuals shall not be subject to this ACT . 
4 . Prior to issuing a point of service plan , a health maintenance organization shall 
meet the requirements for health insurers licensed in the State of Florida 
(e . g ., reserve requirements) to underwrite benefits payable under the health 
maintenance organization contract to nonparticipating providers . 
S . The indemnification of subscribers for the covered services of a nonparticipating 
provider may be subject to deductibles , copayments , and differentials . 
Differentials between the level of coverage offered through the heal th 
maintenance organization for these out - of - network heal th care services which 
health care services are not otherwise covered by the health maintenance 
organization shall not exceed 40 %. Differences in price between POS and 
non- POS products must be actuarially derived . Charges payable under the POS 
option may be based upon reasonable and customary charges , as defined under 
plan . 
6 . A health maintenance organization may also satisfy the requirements of this section 
by offering the group purchaser an option of using a preferred provider plan 
or indemnity plan of an affiliated insurer . 
7.Subject to review by the Department of Insurance , the point of service option 
may deny payments to providers who refuse to cooperate with health plan 
requirements , including requirements related to quality assurance , data 
collection and utilization management . 
IP46 - May 25 , 1994 
PRACTICE PARAMETERS 
Issue 
The Health care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993 requires the AHCA to coordinate 
the development , endorsement , implementation , and evaluation of scientifically 
sound, clinically relevant-practice parameters . 
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes 
•Requiring the use of practice parameters by AHPs . 
•Authorizing AHCA to deny provider membership in AHPs unless utilization of practice 
guidelines and medical review criteria are disclosed along with related 
patient outcomes data . 
• Disseminating practice parameters as consumer/patient guidelines to aid patient 
decision making . 
Effects 
•Mandating the use of practice · parameters is inappropriate government intrusion 
in medical practice . Patients who enroll in AHPs would suffer from the 
inability of their physicians to adopt innovating techniques . Citizens 
concerned about big government, patients, and providers will not approve 
of the heavy handed intrusion i nto the practice of medicine by one governmental 
agency . 
• The potential for causing confusion and jeopardizing sound clinical practices is 
very high if these recommendations come about . Floridians would not be 
well - served if this occurs . 
• There is limited scientific experience in the application o f practice parameters . 
Many versions of practice parameters have been developed by various 
organizations , some of which are conflicting. Mandating that AHPs use 
practice parameters would not be in the best interest of Floridians. 
•AHPs and their customers would not favor requiring all AHPs to use the AHCA ' s 
practice parameters since this could place the AHPs in a situation where 
they are contradicting the medical judgment of physicians and health care 
specialty societies . 
•Providers could be put at greater malpractice risk and their reputation in the 
community jeopardized if they deviate from the practice parameters , even 
if the medical situation warranted such deviations . 
•AHPs (and therefore health plan members) would experience increases in 
administrative costs and bureaucracy as they develop a system to use the 
practice parameters . 
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Alternative Proposal 
•Reaffirm the voluntary and educational use of practice parameters . After all , 
that was the original intention of the Health Care and Insurance Reform Act 
of 1993 . 
• Educate consumers on the value and effectiveness of universally accepted practice 
parameters so that the competitive market can drive their adoption and be 
used by health plans and providers . 
IP 4 7 - Feb r ua r y 1 , 1994 
PRACTICE PARAMETERS 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida strongly supports the development of 
information to help define appropriate patterns of care , against which providers ' 
performance can be measured . 
Critical Issues 
•A critical obstacle to efforts to define practice parameters is the availability 
of valid and reliable information for identifying effective treatments and 
cost - efficient providers . 
- Practice parameters are not characterized by a single , standard approach to the 
degree of flexibility allowed a practitioner , the structure of a 
parameter , or the method used to develop parameters . The term 
"practice parameters " actually refers to a variety of approaches to 
guiding appropriate medical care . Parameters with different levels 
of flexibility will have very different effects on patterns of medical 
care . 
- There is substantial variation being introduced because of the number of players 
entering the field of parameter development . Practice parameters are 
currently being developed by a variety of organizations , including 
specialty societies , research groups , purchasers , the National 
Institutes of Health , and commercial utilization review and 
precertification programs . The result is tremendous variation in 
parameters . 
• Practice parameters will undoubtedly alter deli very patterns , but they will 
probably not automatically result in reduced costs. Practice parameters will 
have different impacts on costs for different condi tions . For some conditions 
a reduction in cost will result , for others a higher cost may result because 
a parameter calls for more and more expensive services relative to current 
practice . 
• The government should encourage and support the development and application of 
practice parameters , not take an active or directive role in this process . 
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PRICE CONTROLS 
• Government - imposed price controls have not successfully controlled costs in health care 
or in other industries . 
• Price controls tend to have higher volumes and therefore higher total costs . 
• Price controls affect everyone equally -- both the bad and the good players . They have 
no means to reward efficiency and effectiveness . 
•Limiting prices does not limit costs . Costs will continue to rise rapidly until we 
work on the underlying problems . Limiting prices eventually drives players out 
of business , as prices lag behind costs. 
• Public price setting is a slow and bureaucratic process . It will take years , and many 
resources , to develop the studies , regulations and enforcement mechanisms to budget 
U. S . health care . 
•A market - based approach which changes the incentives in the health care system will 
be more effective at holding down costs , and rewarding quality , efficiency , and 
innovation . It will be much more responsive to the consumers ' own decisions about 
value for their health care dollar . 
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PRICING PRACTICES 
1.Background 
Several major health care reform proposals call for " Community Rating " in setting 
premiums for health insurance products. Some states (including Florida) have 
already passed laws requiring insurers to use this pricing system. 
Legally imposed Community Rating limits insurers ' freedom to distribute premiums 
among purchasers . Without Community Rating , insurers generally charge higher 
premiums to those whose expected expenses are above average. 
expected costs are l ow , premiums fall below the average . 
For those whose 
Community Rating is viewed as a solution to the abusive pricing practices of some 
insurers. The most common abuses are called "durational rating " and " full 
credibi lity experience rating ." 
• Durational rating is a system whereby premiums for new insureds are reduced to 
reflect the very low early claims levels which result from underwriting. 
As t ime passes, the health of those who bought policies changes to 
more normal levels , and claims occur ; premiums in later years are 
allowed to climb to levels considered unaffordable . 
• Full credibility experience rating uses actual claims to determine future premium 
levels . For a small employer with a catastrophic c laim, this practice 
can produce unaffordable premium levels virtually overnight . 
As described below, both systems are based on sound principles carried to an extreme . 
In fact , full credibility experience rating is the norm for large employers ' 
plans , though it creates poor results for small employers . 
Community Rating represents the opposite end of the spectrum of pricing practices. 
It is the averaging of premium costs among purchasers. " Pure " Community 
Rating requires a single, average premium ; "modified " Community Rating or 
" Community Rating by Class " allows recognit i on of some (usual l y demographic) 










Under Community Rating, both Durational and Experience rating are eliminated , so 
the system is commonly viewed as a " solution" to those abuses . This is the 
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most common reason offered by those who favor it. It is possible , however , 
to prohibit the abuses and avoid unreasonable rate increases , without imposing 
the opposite extreme in pricing practice . 
Proponents of Community Rating usually claim that it is a " fair " system . No one 
is forced to pay more for insurance because of poor heal th status or 
greater - than- average chance of using services . Those with known or expected 
medical expense needs have a greater need for insurance coverage . Proponents 
believe it is more important to reduce premiums for those purchasers than 
for those wi th lower - than- average needs . 
They argue that all insurance involves pooling risk to some degree , and that this 
merely extends that principle . The implication is that Community Rating 
merely redistributes funding for identical total costs , from those with less 
need for medical care to those with more . 
3."Risk-Adjusted Pricing 
The fundamental principles and assumptions applied by those who oppose Community 
Rating are : 
a . In a free market , total costs will be higher under a Community Rating system . 
b. Reassigning the funding of costs from low to high users is not necessarily " fair. " 
In order to keep insurance costs reasonable , the "pool " must include many people 
with low costs . Unless this happens , the overall (average) premium cost will 
rise . At the same time , healthy people , when given a choice , will only buy 
i nsurance if they view it as a reasonable deal . 
Increasing premiums for heal thy people will discourage purchase , and many will choose 
not to join the insurance pool . This makes the average health of those in 
the pool poorer , so total costs ( and ave r age premium) will rise . This starts 
a spiral of rising costs and of fewer and fewer i nsureds . 
Not all high medical expenses can be anticipated ; many people with l ow expected 
expenses will , in fact , need significant and costly health care . This is 
the element of pooling which exists in all insurance . It is also the element 
of chance that is most easily overlooked by potential purchasers and by those 
who favor the Community Rating concept . The chance of unexpected illness 
or accident argues for keeping premiums low for those in good health , since 
they are least likely to recognize risk (and , therefore , most likely to opt 
against purchase when the cost is high) . Failure to purchase until the need 
for health services arises has two effects ; it lowers the revenue in the 
insurance pool , and in increases the chance of uncovered services used by 
otherwise healthy people . 
Those who favor risk rating believe it is more " fair " to provide lower- than- average 
premiums for those with low anticipated medical expenses than to reduce 
premiums for those with higher - than- average needs . This is especially true 
when lifestyle - related illnesses and accidents are considered . 
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Not surprisingly , proponents of Durational Rating and Experience Rating apply these 
same principles . Durational and Experience Rating provide the lowest 
possible premiums for those in good health , t hough they also create the highest 
premiums for those in poor health . Premiums immediately after initial 
underwriting are lowest , so the purchase of insurance is appealing to the 
majority of the population. In theory , these practices should d o the most 
to minimize the problem of the uninsured , at least in terms of numbers of 
people not covered . The unfortunate consequence of the system is that those 
who may have had coverage when they are healthy are likely to lose coverage 
when they become ill the exact opposite of the situation created by 
Community Rating . 
4.Balanced Approach 
As in so many other business decisions , a pricing strategy which falls between the 
two extremes is best . It is this strategy which also produces the most rate 
stability over time . Statute o r regulation may be needed to prohibit abuse , 
but forcing a pricing system to the other extreme will also surely deter 
purchase among those in good health . 
One other aspect of Community Rating ' s premium redistribution should also be 
mentioned . Charging more to those in good health to subsidize those in bad 
health confuses the issues of health status and affordability . The issues 
are not necessarily related . Put simply , poor heal th is not confined to those 
with low income . Attempting to implement social goals through insurance 
pricing may have unanticipated and undesirable effects . 
5.Impact on the Health Care Problem 
Many small businesses do not provide heal th insurance to their employees. The most 
common reason these employers report is that they do not offer coverage because 
it is unaffordable . Community Rating does not reduce average premiums ; it 
increases them. It tends to have a negative effect on those who can least 
afford to purchase health care coverage . Low- risk customers may choose to 
drop coverage and join the ranks of the uninsured . 
Community rating is not a good solution for the small group market , and may actually 
increase the number of uninsured . If the Legislation ' s result is that many 
high risk groups take advantage of Community Rating , premiums wil l rise and 
low cost groups will be inclined to drop coverage . (Historically , this has 
been characteristic of carriers ' attempts to use Guaranteed Issue for small 
groups . ) If , on the other hand , few high cost groups join the pool , the 
" solution " will have had negligible impact , or even an unfavorable impact , 
on the problem of the uninsured . 
Our proposal is to prohibit use of abusive rating practices , perhaps by defining 
allowable premium rate deviations from average (per year and/or cumulatively) . 
Beyond that , those whose heal th is better- than- average should receive 
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treatment which will encourage them t o purchase . 




In the Florida Health Security Plan , the Agency for Health Care Administration 
identifies the need to provide Floridians with timely primary care . 
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes 
•Adopt into law a definition of primary care . 
•Adopt into law primary care objectives that include quotas for primary care 
physicians . 
• Study a feasibility of limiting by specialty the number of out - of - state physicians 
securing Florida licenses . 
Effect 
•Heal th care providers and citizens concerned about big government would be concerned 
about any state- established quota system . Quota systems usually have 
unintended effects . The private sector is already effecting a change through 
managed care programs that feature primary care providers. 
•All players in the health care market and patients would be short - changed by the 
state ' s efforts to limit the ability of the marketplace to respond creat i vely 
and cost - effectively to shortages. In the past , the marketplace has done 
this successfully (e . g ., substituting physician extenders for primary care 
physicians). 
• Industry innovations in heal th care deli very and financing have resulted in various 
forms of managed care. Managed care is now demonstrating excellent results 
in containing costs while maintaining quality care . Floridians will not 
benefit from further innovations in managed care if the government f reezes 
the system by adopting into law definitions of basic "managed care " concepts . 
•Limiting, by specialty , the entry of out - of- state physicians securing Florida 
licenses will act as a barrier to the free entry of professionals into the 
marketplace . Competition will suffer and all players in the health care 
market, including patients, will be poorly served by the state ' s imposition 
of barriers on market entry . A study to implement these actions should not 
be pursued . 
Alternative Proposal 
• The state should encourage the continued evolution of innovative approaches to 
the financing and delivery of care to meet Floridians ' needs . The state's 
policy for primary care should be consistent with the Florida Health Care 
and Insurance Reform Act of 1993 , which intends to use competition and market 
forces to improve the accessibility and efficiency of health care . Rather 
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than establish quotas for pr i mary care physicians and barriers to licensure 
for specialists , the state should rely more on the continued evolution of 
managed care to solve specialty distribution problems . 
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PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVING ACCESS TO CARE 
I. Introduction 
The United States health care system is among the best in the world. It provides 
users with sophisticated , technologically advanced services , ready access to a broad 
range of medical specialties , and care in comfortable surroundings . 
These qualities are greatly valued by Americans . However , there are some aspects 
of the heal th care system which must be improved for it to continue to meet Americans ' 
standards for quality , access , and cost . Concern about the number of uninsured 
Americans , and their risk of financial hardship if they face a severe illness or 
injury , is one of the factors underlying efforts to reform the health care system . 
The purpose of this paper is to define the problem called " the uninsured ," and to 
propose actions needed to make significant progress toward solving this problem 
in Florida . 
II. Understanding the problem 
Who are the uninsured? 
Despite the attention focused on the uninsured , it is surprisingly difficult to 
develop a clear picture of this population . There are relatively few academic 
studies devoted to analyzing their characteristics . Contradictions exist among 
the studies available , and there is little objective information on how different 
characteristics overlap or interact . 
Much of our information about uninsured Americans and their characteristics is based 
on data collected annually in March by the Census Bureau in its Current Population 
Survey (CPS) . Most of the widely- quoted statistics regarding the uninsured come 
from the CPS data . The CPS sample is based on the civilian , non-institutionalized 
population , and interviews are conducted with approximately 60 , 000 households . 
The data collected in March each year are for the previous year (i . e ., the data 
from the March 1994 CPS reflect calendar year 1993) . 
The CPS i s the most up- to - date and comprehensive source of information on health 
insurance coverage available . However , analysts stress that the information the 
CPS provides must be interpreted carefully , based on the nature of the survey ; and 
they question the accuracy of some of the health care coverage data . 1 Concerns 
about the CPS include : 
•The CPS data probably represent the number of people without coverage at the time 
of the survey -- not for the entire year . If the CPS heal th insurance coverage 
questions are answered correctly by respondents , the survey should capture 
as "uninsured" only people who were without health care coverage for the 
entire previous calendar year . However , comparison of the CPS results with 
other national studies which count people uninsured for the entire year shows 
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that the CPS number is much larger ; 2 and comparisons of CPS numbers to studies 
which count the uninsured at a g i ven time show much more similar results . 3 
•The CPS data significantly underreport Medicaid coverage. The number of people 
reporting Medicaid coverage on the CPS is significantly lower than the number 
of participants reported as enrolled in the program . For example , the March 
1991 CPS number is 21 % lower than the figures reported by HCFA . This indicates 
that self- reporting of Medicaid coverage by CPS respondents is inaccurate , 
understating the importance of this program and overstating the number of 
uninsured . 
•The CPS data probably understate the number of people covered by special 
state-sponsored programs. Analysis of the CPS questions shows that 
respondents have no opportunity to report that they have coverage under some 
of the special programs for the poor and medically indigent set up by many 
states . People covered under these types of programs could be l isted i n the 
CPS data as uninsured . 
There are other concerns about interpreting the CPS data on the uninsured . 
Descriptions of the uninsured population based on the CPS data seem often to result 
in a view of the uninsured as a static , little- changing group of people who never 
have insurance coverage . Other studies , structured to look at the uninsured 
population over a period of time , yield a much different picture . 
Both the Census Bureau4 and the Urban Institute5 have conducted long- term studi es 
o f the uninsured . The results of these studies are consistent and indicate that 
more than half of people who are un i nsured go without coverage for relatively short 
periods -- five months or less . That is , many of the uninsured are people facing 
a brief gap in their coverage. Far fewer go wi thout coverage for long periods . 
The Census Bureau study estimates that about 4 % of the population are chronically 
uninsured , going without coverage for a ful l two years or more . 
Two key points are clear from these ana l yses . First , the CPS is best used to count 
the people uninsured at the time of the survey. The CPS survey probably somewhat 
overestimates the number of uni nsured at that time . However , the survey l ikely 
underestimates the number of people who are without coverage for some period during 
a calendar year , since many people who have a sho r t spell of uninsurance may not 
be in that spell at the time of the survey. Second , uninsured Americans are not 
a static , changing group of people who are without health care coverage for long 
periods . In fact, the uninsured population is a very fluid, constantly changing 
set of people. 
There are several statistics about the characteristics of the uninsured population 
which are often quoted and which must be understood in the context of the fluid 
nature of th i s populat i on . These statistics include : 
•There are 37 million uninsured Americans, and 2.7 million uninsured Floridians. 
Both these f i gures come from recent CPS surveys (the Florida data are from 
the March 1994 CPS survey -- reflecting calendar year 1993) . These numbers 
are fairly accurate (probably somewhat high) as estimates of the number of 
IP49 .l (sh ) - Revi sed July 13 , 2017 
2 
uninsured on any given day . However , more people are probably without 
coverage for some period in a calendar year , and a substantial portion of 
the total number of uninsured (as many as half) will be without coverage 
for less than six months . People may temporarily lack coverage for a variety 
of reasons - - for example , changing jobs , getting married , returning to school, 
going off welfare , moving , divorcing, etc ., but they have probably left some 
form of employment - based coverage and will soon have coverage again . 
•More than half of the uninsured are full-time workers or their dependents, both 
nationally and in Florida. To reconcile this figure with the information 
on the prevalence of brief spells of uninsurance, a substantial number of 
full - time workers must be without coverage only briefly . American workers 
are fairly mobile. They move and change jobs frequently and thus may often 
face qualifying periods before they are eligible for coverage in their new 
jobs . In addition , many of the uninsured are young people . At least some 
may choose not to purchase health care coverage , even if it is offered by 
their employer , because they see little value from dollars spent on a health 
insurance policy when they are healthy and rarel y vis it a doctor . 
•A large number of the uninsured are children. Nationa lly, among the long- term 
uninsured identified by the Census Bureau , more than a quarter (27 %) are 
children under the age of 16 , and nearly another quarter (23 %) are young 
people between the ages of 16 and 25 . 6 People who have been unemployed for 
a long period are more likely to also be uninsured . 
•A relatively small number of Americans, between 1 and 3 million nationally, have 
medical conditions which make them uninsurable. 7 Many o f the descriptions 
of problems with access to health insurance focus on people who have medical 
problems and cannot purchase coverage . However , the vast majority o f the 
uninsured are not excluded from the insurance system because of heal th status , 
and could purchase a heal th insurance policy if their income made it possible , 
or if they chose to purchase . For people with existing medical conditions , 
the commercial insurance system, with its fundamental concept of protecting 
aga i nst the risk of illness , does not work well . 
Other data about the uninsured , especially for a single state , are less well known , 
but contribute significantly to our understanding of this population in Florida . 
•Ma.ny of those eligible for Medicaid do not enroll. 
eligible for Medicaid are actually enrolled . 8 
In Florida , only 50 % of people 
Some of those eligible under 
the higher - income aid categories (for example , 185 % of the Federal Poverty 
Level for pregnant women and infants) may have employer- sponsored coverage ; 
but many Floridians eligible for this program are in the ranks of the uninsured . 
•Just under half (47%) of the small companies in Florida do not provide health care 
coverage for employees. 9 It is important not to assume that all the employees 
of these companies are without heal th care coverage . Some have coverage under 
a spouse ' s policy; others may have individual policies . Nevertheless , 
employees of small companies probably represent a significant portion of 
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the uninsured in Florida . 
It i s clear from the data available that the uninsured are not a homogeneous group 
of people , with similar characteristics and reasons for being without coverage . 
In fact , the uninsured population is quite heterogeneous . The main shared 
characterist i c may well be lack of health care coverage . This heterogeneity calls 
for a multi - faceted solution . 
III. Solving the Problem 
Our Proposal 
Our II solution II is multi - faceted , containing a range of elements , because the problem 
is complex. The elements we propose are directly linked to the key characteristics 
of the uninsured outlined in the first section . 
l . Problem : The majority of the uninsured are without coverage for a relatively 
brief period . These are people who had coverage , lost it for a period of 
time , and then gained it back . I f an illness or accident occurs during the 
peri od without coverage , it can devastate an indi vidual or family . 
Solution : Make it far more attractive for those who leave an employer - sponsored 
plan to remain in the II insured II pool , and not join the ranks of the uninsured . 
- Encourage people to pre - fund the cost of continuing coverage , through , for example : 
1) some form of flexib l e spending account (FSA) or medical savings 
account (MSA) (these accounts would have to be carefully designed to 
avoid biasing purchasers against managed care , splitting groups , or 
discouraging employer sponsorship) ; 2) no penalty for 4 0lK withdrawals 
for thi s purpose ; 3) early cash- in of savings bonds used for this purpose 
would incur no tax penalty ; and so on . 
- Establish a state - level , COBRA- like coverage option for people l eaving an 
employer - sponsored plan in firms with 2 to 19 employees . 
- Establish a COBRA subsidy program to help those who are unable to pay the full 
cost of COBRA coverage . 
Goal: Reducing the number of uninsured who are temporar i ly without coverage would 
significantly reduce the number of uninsured in Florida . 
2 . Problem : A substantial number of working Floridians do not have employment - based 
coverage. Many of these people work for small employers . These people are 
long- term uninsured . 
Solution : Make it more attractive for employers to offer coverage to employees , 
br i nging the employed uninsured and their dependents under employer - sponsored 
coverage , and making it likely that employers who already offer coverage 
wi l l continue to do so. Some possible approaches include : 
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- Allow insurers to offer a " good health " discount to employers with less than ten 
employees and average wages below some amount who have not had coverage 
for at least three years . 
- Discount the workers ' compensation coverage cost for employers who also offer heal th 
insurance to employees . 
- Eliminate rules or laws which increase the cost of coverage for small employers 
(under 50 employees) -- for example , modified community rating , 
mandated benefits . 
- Guarantee renewal of policies , or prohibit cancellation of policies for health 
or claim reasons (carriers could cancel policies for fraud or 
non- payment of premium) . 
Solution : Make it more attractive for employees with dependents to opt for dependent 
coverage , especially in cases where the spouse is covered under his/her 
employer ' s p l an . 
- Encourage insurers to include a " children only " dependent rate in all group policies 
(thus , four group policy options would be available : employee only ; 
employee plus spouse ; employee plus spouse and children ; and employee 
plus children) . 
Solution : For those who do not have access to employer- sponsored coverage , improve 
the indivi dual insurance market . 
- Eliminate rules or laws which increase the cost of coverage for individuals . 
- People who lose coverage because their insurer no longer has a Florida license 
or who move to a location where their company is not licensed to operate , 
should not face preexi st i ng condition exc l usions under their new 
coverage . El iminate preexisting condition exclusions for these 
individuals who have ma i nta i ned continuous coverage with no more than 
a 62 - day break . 
- Guarantee renewal of policies , or prohibit cancellation of policies for health 
care or claim reasons (carriers could cancel policies for fraud or 
non- payment of premium) . 
Goal : Substantially expanding the number of small employers sponsoring heal th care 
coverage for employees would further reduce the number of uninsured 
Floridians . According to the AHCA, 2 . 1 million people are employed by small 
companies and approximately half of these firms do not offer health care 
coverage . 10 Some of these people already have coverage , because they have 
indi victual policies or coverage under a spouse ' s policy , but many are probably 
uninsured . 
3 . Problem : A significant portion of the uninsured in Florida are living in poverty . 
Many are eligible for Medicaid but are not enrolled in the program . 
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Solution : Enroll the eligible uninsured in Medicaid . 
- Move Medicaid AFDC and SSI populations into quality managed care in order to improve 
efficiency of care delivery and ensure coordinated care . 
·Apply quality and utilization management standards to the MediPass program . 
·Require Medicaid pre - paid health plans to be licensed as HMOs , meeting HMO quality, 
financial solvency , and applicable enrollment standards before 
Medicaid recipients are enrolled. 
•Create incentives for providers and health plans to participate in the Medicaid 
program . 
- Reform Medicaid administration to ensure accuracy and efficiency . 
- Use savings from these two measures to extend Medicaid coverage to a greater number 
of the poor , targeting those who are eligible for Medi caid but have 
not signed up , with children as the top priority . 
- Retain the Medically Needy program. 
Goal: Based on AHCA data , there are 700 , 000 people eligible for but not enrolled 
in Medicaid . Some of them may have employment - based coverage , but many are 
probably uninsured . Targeting children in enrolling Medicaid eligibles would 
significantly ease the uninsured problem in Florida . It is also important 
to acknowledge that there will always be some number of people in the "Medicaid 
eligible but not enrolled " category . If people do not have a presenting 
medical problem they are unlikely to apply for Medicaid . Nevertheless , those 
who are eligible but do not sign up for Medicaid do have access to health 
care and comprehensive coverage benefits -- although they will be counted 
as "uninsured ." 
4 . Problem : A small number o f Floridians do not have group coverage and cannot 
purchase insurance coverage because they have existing medical problems . 
Solution : Subsidize the cost of care for the medically uninsurable . 
- Re-engineer the state ' s approach to high - risk coverage . 
·Fund a study by an outside firm to analyze the experience of othe r states and 
recommend a program structure and financing method which 
incorporates the best aspects of these programs . Program 
structure should not provide perverse incentives for people to 
stay uninsured until they have medical problems. 
Goal : Achieving the o ther goals would stop the flow of new people who have existing 
medical problems but do not have heal th care coverage . Over time , this 
category will be eliminated as a problem . 
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Effect of Our Proposal 
Implementing these measures would significantly reduce eh number of uninsured 
Floridians . Florida should continue to search for ways to ensure that people have 
some type of financing available for accidents or i llness . 
It is important to recognize , however , that ours is a voluntary insurance system . 
Realistically , there will always be some number of people who choose not to purchase 
health care coverage (for example , young people in the 18 to 35 age range who have 
had few hea l th probl ems may view dollars spent on health care coverage as dollars 
wasted) . Some employers will never offer coverage to the i r employees ; and some 
employees will not buy the coverage their empl oyers offer . 
IV. This Proposal Versus Other Alternatives 
This proposal offers a much different approach to the problem of uninsured Floridians 
from more familiar alternatives . We believe that the approach presented here is 
compelling for severa l reasons . Foremost is that the elements of our solution 
origi nate in the var i ed characteristics of the people who are uninsured . To truly 
help the uninsured , solutions must be targeted at their real problems . Second , 
this approach recognizes and concentrates i mprovement efforts on the neediest of 
our citizens -- those hundreds of thousands of poor and uninsured Floridians who 
do not take advantage of the existing program designed to ensure their access to 
care . Finally , this proposal openly describes the principles which underlie the 
elements which make up the solution , and we believe these principles are shared 
by most Floridians. 
I n the sect i ons below , we discuss two major a l ternatives to our proposal . 
Insurance Reforms 
Under the label " insurance reforms " a r e proposals at the national and state leve l 
to change the private insurance market , ostensibly wi th the goal of increas i ng access 
for the uninsured . Targeting mainly small compani es (less than 50 employees) and 
individuals , these proposals would require that all health insurers guarantee the 
issue of heal th insurance po l icies to small group and individual applicants , 
regardless of their health status . Preexisting condition exclusions wou l d be 
strictly limited . Pricing for products in the small group and individual insurance 
market would be based on a " community average ," with no direct relation to the 
appl i cant ' s risk of accident or il l ness . 
Instead of improving access for the uninsured , these proposals would have the 
unintended and unfortunate result that more people would be uninsured . Why? The 
vast majority of the uninsured have no trouble getting a health insurance pol i cy ; 
they have troubl e paying for it . The only segment of the uninsured who are helped 
by guaranteed i ssue are the medically uninsurable - - a tiny segment of the uninsured 
population . 
The Sma l l Group Market 
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Results from a recent national survey of small employers underscore the fact that 
the problem is affordability , not being denied coverage due to health problems. 10 
Similar to the Florida experience noted above , overall about half (51 %) of all 
small companies (less than 50 employees) offer health insurance. The size of the 
firm is strongly related to the likelihood of coverage being offered -- 85 % of 
companies with 25 - 49 employees offer coverage , 70 % of those with 10 - 24 employees 
offer coverage , and 44 % of companies with fewer than 10 employees offer health care 
coverage . 
Why did firms not offer coverage? The most common reason given was that premiums 
were too high . Many a l so said that their profits were variable , year- to - year , and 
premium increases too uncertain , and they worried that they would have to take this 
benefit away in the future . Another reason frequently given was that their employees 
did not value the benefit -- they preferred higher wages , or were already covered 
elsewhere . A majority also cited adrninistrati ve hassles or not qualifying for group 
rates as problems . Firms who had recently dropped coverage cited similar reasons . 
Is coverage available to smal l er firms (that is , is guaranteed issue needed)? The 
study reports that health insurance is widely available to small companies . They 
are approached by agents frequently , and often follow up on these contacts . 
Preexisting conditions or other hea l th-related eligibility problems do not appear 
to prevent small companies from getting coverage : few companies report a worker 
or dependents being denied coverage due to poor heal th , and even fewer report being 
denied group coverage for this reason. 
A final point in the study is that small companies are very price- sensitive . As 
the price comes down even 10 %, an additional 10 % of the companies could be expected 
to purchase coverage . However , this prediction must be tempered by the knowledge 
that companies fear having to withdraw coverage , and the workers may not value the 
benefit highly . 
In 1993 , Florida passed sweeping reforms of the small group ( 1 - 50 employees) market , 
including requiring guaranteed issue , modi fi ed community rating, and the offer of 
two standard hea l th plans . Many of these changes took effect in 1994 , barely a 
year ago, and it is too early to judge their effect on the uninsured problem in 
Florida . 
The Individual Market 
The same types of reforms are now being proposed in Florida for the individual market . 
The effect of guaranteed issue and community rating will be severe in this market . 
Unfortunately , these measures will not help the long- term uninsured , for most of 
whom affordability is the key issue . 
However , guaranteed issue wil l have an effect on the people who already have 
individual coverage : they wil l drop their coverage. In theory , if people are 
guaranteed a health insurance policy after becoming ill , ultimately no one will 
purchase coverage before any sign of medical problems and pay all those premium 
dollars before coverage is needed . Limiting preexisting condition exclusions further 
strengthens the economic incentives to forego insurance until becoming sick , since 
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coverage would have to include current medical problems . 
Combining guaranteed issue with modified community rating is especially devastating . 
Community rating says that there must be one price for everyone covered ; guaranteed 
issue ensures that only the sick will purchase coverage , so that the one price will 
be very high . 
products . 
Before too long , no one will be able to afford individual insurance 
With the proposed individual market insurance reforms , a tiny segment of the 
individual uninsured population , the medically uninsurable , will have access to 
heal th care policies in the short term . Most individuals or family purchasers will 
see rising prices put coverage even further out of reach . Over some period of time , 
few will be able to afford an individual market policy , and the private market for 
individual coverage will collapse. 
Subsidy Programs 
Some proposals , at both the state and national level , would reduce the numbers of 
uninsured by offering subsidies for the purchase of coverage to low- income families 
and individuals . The subsidy proposals recognize that the cost of coverage is the 
key factor for most of the uninsured . By lowering the out - of- pocket cost of coverage 
via a subsidy , more uninsured people would be able to purchase private health care 
coverage . However , subsidy proposals tend to ignore the data indicating that the 
majority of the uninsured are only temporarily without coverage . 
In a system in which most people already have private coverage , analysts warn that 
designing an effective subsidy program is very difficult . At most income levels 
above the federal poverty level , far more people are insured than uninsured , and 
the majority of those uninsured are not without coverage for long . A subsidy tied 
to income levels may well give current or soon- to - be purchasers an incentive to 
drop/not purchase coverage for some period in order to take advantage of a government 
subsidy program . An income - based subsidy can also provide a disincent i ve for people 
to achieve promotions or salary increases or to move from part - time to full - time 
work . If an increase in income makes a person or family ineligible for a subsidy , 
people might find themselves working longer and harder and yet receiving very little 
return in terms of their total wages and benefits . 
A recent study offers additional information on the effectiveness of subsidies for 
purchasing private coverage . 11 The study analyzed data from a national survey of 
medical care spending (including buying health care coverage) to better understand 
people ' s decisions to purchase coverage , especially at lower income levels . The 
study concludes that 
• the availability of Medicaid and other public health services is a disincentive 
for the poor and near- poor to purchase health care coverage ; and 
•because of Medicaid and other factors , the perceived value of coverage relative 
to premiums is low for lower- income families , and a small subsidy may not 
encourage them to purchase coverage . 
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There is much to be considered in designing an effective subsidy program to ensure 
that it 1) does not undermine the existing system in which 8 in 10 people have coverage 
and are satisfied with it ; 2) targets the neediest people first -- that is , children 
and the very poor ; and 3) effectively brings the price of coverage within reach 
for the targeted population. 
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APPENDIX A 
Insurance Portability In Florida 
Most Americans have hea l th care coverage sponsored by their employer . Some have 
raised concerns that these people may be " locked into " their current jobs because 
they fear losing their health care coverage if they change jobs . Such loss of 
coverage could occur if the new employer ' s heal th plan excludes benefits for 
preexisting health conditions for some period , or if the employer has a waiting 
period before new employees are eligible for the health coverage benefit . 
For that reason , the U. S . Congress and Florida Legislature have extended 
"portability" protection to most Floridians : 
1 . Floridians who leave/lose employment 
• Federal law (COBRA) requires companies (both insured and self-insured) with 20 
or more employees to offer continuing coverage to employees who leave 
the company , and/ or to their dependents . Employees pay the group- rate 
premium for the coverage plus a 2 % administrative fee . For those who 
quit their jobs or reduce their work hours , this coverage lasts 18 
months . 
• For empl oyees and their families who leave companies with insur ed programs , Florida 
law requires insurers to offer a " converted policy" to anyone who has 
been covered under the group policy for at least three months . For 
insured groups with 20 or more employees , the conversion right is 
available when COBRA benefits expire. The converted policy cannot 
add any preexisting condition exclusions . ERISA ( self- insured) groups 
are exempt from convers i on requirements . 
2 . Floridians who die or divorce and leave dependents uncovered , or who become 
eligible for Medicare but still have non- Medicare - el i gible dependents 
• In companies with 20 or more employees , Federal COBRA requires that a widow/widower , 
a divorced spouse and children , and a spouse nd children of an employee 
who gains coverage through Medicare , be offered continuing coverage 
for up to 36 months . 
• For dependents of employees who die or divorce and who work/worked in companies 
with fewer than 20 employees covered under an insured group policy , 
Florida law requires insurers to offer a converted policy . This offer 
is also made to COBRA recipients after the COBRA period expires . 
3 . Children who reach an age when they no longer qualify under their family ' s plan 
• For group p l ans , in companies with 20 or more employees , Federal COBRA requires 
that employers offer these children continuing coverage for up to 36 
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months . After COBRA coverage expires (for those who had coverage in 
an insured group) , insurers must offer a converted policy . 
• For individual policies , Florida law requires that a converted policy be offered 
to these children . ERISA ( self- insured) plans are exempt from 
conversion requirements . 
4 . Floridians with health problems 
• Florida law requires that an insured group policy give a person credit for the 
time the person was covered previously under similar coverage in 
determining if a preexisting condition exists . A gap of no more than 
30 days must have occurred between the ending of the previous coverage 
and the effective date of new coverage . 
• If a person has not had continuous coverage (with a gap of less than 30 days) : 
- a maximum 12 - month preexisting condition exclusion can be applied to a person 
covered under a small group policy in a company with 3- 50 
employees . During this period , the only conditions which can 
be excluded are those which would have caused a "prudent " person 
to seek care in the 6 months before the coverage took effect ; 
and pregnancy existing on the effective date . 
- a maximum 24 - month preexisting condition exclusion can be applied to a person 
covered under a small group policy in groups with 1- 2 employees . 
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PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVING ACCESS TO CARE 
I. Introduction 
The United States health care system is among the best in the world . It provides 
users with sophisticated , technologically advanced services , ready access to a broad 
range of medical specialties , and care in comfortable surroundings . 
These qualities are greatly valued by Americans . However , there are some aspects 
of the heal th care system which must be improved for it to continue to meet Americans ' 
standards for quality , access , and cost . Concern about the number of uninsured 
Americans , and their risk of financial hardship if they face a severe illness or 
injury , is one of the factors underlying efforts to reform the health care system . 
The purpose of this paper is to define the problem called " the uninsured ," and to 
propose actions needed to make significant progress toward solving this problem 
in Florida . 
II. Understanding the problem 
Who are the uninsured? 
Despite the attention focused on the uninsured , it is surprisingly difficult to 
develop a clear picture of this population . There are relatively few academic 
studies devoted to analyzing their characteristics . Contradictions exist among 
the studies available , and there is little objective information on how different 
characteristics overlap or interact. 
Much of our information about uninsured Americans and their characteristics is based 
on data collected annually in March by the Census Bureau in its Current Population 
Survey (CPS) . Most of the widely- quoted statistics regarding the uninsured come 
from the CPS data . The CPS sample is based on the civilian , non-inst i tutionalized 
population , and interviews are conducted with approximately 60 , 000 households . 
The data collected in March each year are for the previous year (i.e., the data 
from the March 1994 CPS reflect calendar year 1993) . 
The CPS is the most up - to - date and comprehensive source of information on health 
insurance coverage available . However , analysts stress that the information the 
CPS provides must be interpreted carefully , based on the nature of the survey ; and 
they question the accuracy of some of the health care coverage data . 1 Concerns 
about the CPS include : 
•The CPS data probably represent the number of people without coverage at the time 
of the survey -- not for the entire year. If the CPS heal th insurance coverage 
questions are answered correctly by respondents , the survey should capture 
as "uninsured " only people who were without health care coverage for the 
entire previous calendar year . However , comparison of the CPS results with 
other national studies which count people uninsured for the entire year shows 
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that the CPS number is much larger ; 2 and comparisons of CPS numbers to s t udies 
which count the uninsured at a given time show much more similar results . 3 
•The CPS data significantly underreport Medicaid coverage. The number of people 
reporting Medicaid coverage on the CPS is significantly lower than the number 
of participants reported as enrolled in the program . For example , the March 
1991 CPS number is 21 % lower than the figures reported by HCFA . This indicates 
that self- reporting of Medicaid coverage by CPS respondents is inaccurate , 
understating the importance of this program and overstating the number of 
uninsured . 
•The CPS data probably understate the number of people covered by special 
state-sponsored programs. Analysis of the CPS questions shows that 
respondents have no opportunity to report that they have coverage under some 
of the special programs for the poor and medically indigent set up by many 
states . People covered under these types of programs could be listed in the 
CPS data as uninsured. 
There are other concerns about interpreting the CPS data on the uninsured . 
Descriptions of the uninsured population based on the CPS data seem often to result 
in a view of the uninsured as a static , little- changing group of people who never 
have insurance coverage. Other studies , structured to look at the uninsured 
population over a period of time , yield a much different picture . 
Both the Census Bureau4 and the Urban Institute5 have conducted long- term studies 
of the uninsured . The results of these studies are consistent and indicate that 
more than half of people who are uninsured go without coverage for relatively short 
periods -- five months or less. That is , many of the uninsured are people facing 
a brief gap in their coverage. Far fewer go without coverage for long periods . 
The Census Bureau study estimates that about 4 % of the population are chronically 
un i nsured , going without coverage for a full two years or more . 
Two key points are clear from these analyses . First , the CPS is best used to count 
the people uninsured at the time of the survey. The CPS survey probably somewhat 
overestimates the number of uninsured at that time . However , the survey likely 
underestimates the number of peopl e who are without coverage f or some period during 
a calendar year , since many people who have a short spell of un i nsurance may not 
be in that spell at the time of the survey . Second, uninsured Americans are not 
a static , changing group of people who are without health care coverage for long 
periods . In fact, the uninsured population is a very fluid, constantly changing 
set of people. 
There are several statistics about the characteristics of the uninsured population 
which are often quoted and which must be understood in the context of the fluid 
nature of this population . These statistics include : 
•There are 37 million uninsured Americans, and 2.7 million uninsured Floridians. 
Both these figures come from recent CPS surveys (the Florida data are from 
the March 1994 CPS survey -- reflecting calendar year 1993) . These numbers 
are fairly accurate (probably somewhat high) as estimates of the number of 
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uninsured on any given day . However , more people are probably without 
coverage for some per i od in a calendar year , and a substantia l portion of 
the total n umber of uninsured (as many as half) wil l be without coverage 
for less than six months . People may temporarily lack coverage for a variety 
of reasons -- for example , changing jobs , getting married , returning to school , 
going off welfare , moving , divorcing , etc ., but they have probably left some 
form of employment-based coverage and will soon have coverage again . 
•More than half of the uninsured are full-time workers or their dependents, both 
nationally and in Florida. To reconcile this figure with the information 
on the prevalence of brief spells of uninsurance , a substantial number of 
full - time workers must be without coverage only briefly . American workers 
are fairly mobile . They move and change jobs frequently and thus may often 
face qualifying periods before they are eligible for coverage in their new 
jobs . In addition , many of the uninsured are young people . At least some 
may choose not to pur chase health care coverage , even if it is o f fered by 
their empl oyer , because they see little value from dollars spent on a health 
insurance policy when they are healthy and rarely visit a doctor . 
•A large number of the uninsured are children. Nat i onally , among the long- term 
un i nsured i dentified by the Census Bureau , more than a quarter (27 %) are 
children under the age of 16 , and nearly another quarter (23 %) are young 
people between the ages of 16 and 25 . 6 People who have been unemployed for 
a long period are more l ikely to also be uninsured . 
•A relatively small number of Americans, between 1 and 3 million nationally, have 
medical conditions which make them uninsurable. 7 Many of the descriptions 
of problems with access to health insurance focus on people who have medical 
problems and cannot purchase coverage . However , the vast majority of the 
uninsured are not excluded from the insurance system because of health status , 
and could purchase a heal th insurance policy if their income made it possible , 
or if they chose to purchase . For people with existing medical conditions , 
the commercial insurance system, with its fundamental concept of protecting 
against the r i sk of i llness , does not work well . 
Other data about the uninsured , especially for a singl e state , are less well known , 
but contribute significantly to our understanding of this population in Florida . 
•Many of those eligible for Medicaid do not enroll. In Florida , only 50 % of people 
eligible for Medicaid are actually enrolled . 8 Some of those eligible under 
the higher - income aid categor i es (for example , 185 % of the Federal Poverty 
Level for pregnant women and infants) may have employer - sponsored coverage ; 
but many Floridians eligible for this program are in the ranks of the uninsured . 
•Just under half (47%) of the small companies in Florida do not provide health care 
coverage for employees. 9 It is important not to assume that all the employees 
of these companies are without hea l th care coverage . Some have coverage under 
a spouse ' s policy ; others may have individual policies . Nevertheless , 
empl oyees of small companies probably represent a significant portion of 
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the uninsured in Florida . 
It is clear from the data available that the uninsured are not a homogeneous group 
of people , with similar characteristics and reasons for being without coverage . 
In fact , the uninsured population is quite heterogeneous . The main shared 
characterist i c may well be lack of health care coverage . This heterogeneity calls 
for a multi - faceted solution . 
III. Vision for Improving Access 
Vision Statement 
Our proposal for improving access to care for Floridians is built on vision of 
coverage in Florida . Our vision is that 
the number of uninsured in Florida will be reduced significantly during the 
next five years. 
To achieve this vision , Florida must focus on improving the affordability of heal th 
care coverage . We believe this realistic vision will come to fruition through three 
main methods , all founded on a private market system which offers coverage at 
affordable pri ces . These three methods are : 
1 . expanding the number of employers participating in the group insurance market , 
and keeping those employees/families with a group product in the group market ; 
2 . for those to whom a group product is not available , easy access to individual 
coverage ; and 
3 . appropriate sponsorship by the state for financing care for those who cannot pay 
for it themselves . 
At the end of five years , most Floridi ans , including those who work for small 
companies (less than 50 employees) , are covered under a group plan sponsored by 
an employer . Most sma l l employers offer and contribute to the cost of coverage 
for employees because of incentives which make this benef i t for employees both 
affordable and attractive . Small employers unable to contribute to the cost of 
coverage help employees with administrative services related to getting and paying 
for coverage (for exampl e , automat i c payroll deduct i on/payment of premiums) . 
For near - poor Floridians and their families whose employers do not provide coverage 
or who are self- employed , and for whom cost is a major barrier to purchasing coverage , 
there are a variety of lower - cost coverage options in the individual insurance 
market . 
May of the poor , for whom paying anything for coverage is not an option , have their 
care financed by the state Medicaid program . Many are enrolled in commercial managed 
care programs which ensure that quality care is delivered in an effic i ent manner . 
Medicaid recipients who participate in managed care programs understand the 
benefits of managed care , know how their program works , and are pleased with the 
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care they receive . The Medicare program itself is a model of an efficient state 
program , streamlined administration , and a policy which supports privatization of 
services where appropriate . 
For the poor who do not qualify for Medicaid , public heal th clinics and other heal th 
care facilities provide care . County governments continue to support local indigent 
hea l th care programs and financing. 
For the relatively small number of Floridians who already have major health problems , 
an insurance product , with its fundamental concept of protection against the risk 
of illness , is not a good solution . These "medically uninsurable " people have their 
care subsidized by the state based on income , so that the cost of the care does 
not exceed a certain percentage of income. Participants ' contribution to the cost 
of their own care is high , so that this program does not make it attractive for 
people to stay uninsured unti l they are sick . The number of Floridians who are 
medically uninsurable gradually shrinks as more have insurance coverage before 
needing care . 
Gu i ding Principles 
Certain fundamental principles have guided our search for solutions to the problem 
of uninsured Floridians . 
1 . The employment - based system , through which most insured Fl oridians receive 
coverage , has many positive characteristics . It should be improved and 
strengthened , so that as many uninsured Floridians as possible gain and keep 
employer - sponsored coverage . 
2.Since the insurance system is voluntary , and should remain so , the system must 
have rewards for employers who provide coverage , and legal, regu l atory , or 
tax disincentives to providing coverage must be removed . 
3 . The hea l th care system must promote individual responsibility for taking care 
of one ' s own health and for being conscious of health care costs . While 
structured so that most people have coverage sponsored by their employer , 
the system should reward people for pursuing healthy l i festyles and 
accepting/purchasing health care coverage , so that Floridians exercise their 
responsibility . 
4 . Both the government and the pr i vate sector have a role in reducing the number 
of uninsured Floridians . Government and the private sector must work together 
to achieve this vision . The role of the private sector is to continue to 
improve the functioning of the market to ensure access to quality , affordable 
care . Government must ensure fair competition i n the marketplace , and 
eliminate laws and/or rules that interfere with the competitive market and 
increase costs . 
on their own . 
Government must also help those who cannot purchase coverage 
IV. Solving the Problem 
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Our Proposal 
Our " solution " is multi - faceted , containing a range of elements , because the problem 
is complex . The elements we propose are directly linked to the key characteristics 
of the uninsured outlined in the first section . 
l . Problem : The majority of the uninsured are without coverage for a relatively 
brief period . These are people who had coverage , lost it for a period of 
time , and then gained it back . If an illness or accident occurs during the 
period without coverage , it can devastate an individual or family . 
Solution : Make it far more attractive for those who leave an employer-sponsored 
plan to remain in the " insured " pool , and not join the ranks of the uninsured . 
-Encourage people to pre-fund the cost of continuing coverage , through , for example : 
1) some form of flexible spending account (FSA) or medical savings 
account (MSA) (these accounts would have to be carefully designed to 
avoid biasing purchasers against managed care , splitting groups , or 
discouraging employer sponsorship); 2) no penalty for 401K withdrawals 
for this purpose ; 3) early cash- in of savings bonds used for this purpose 
would incur no tax penalty; and so on . 
-Es tablish a state - level , COBRA- like coverage option for people leaving an 
employer - sponsored plan in firms with 2 to 19 employees . 
- Establish a COBRA subsidy program to help those who are unable to pay the full 
cost of COBRA coverage . 
Goal : Reducing the number of uninsured who are temporarily without coverage would 
significantly reduce the number of uninsured in Florida . 
2 . Problem : A substantial number of working Floridians do not have employment - based 
coverage . Many of these people work for small employers. These people are 
long-term uninsured . 
Solution: Make it more attractive for employers to offer coverage to employees , 
bringing the employed uninsured and their dependents under employer - sponsored 
coverage , and making it likely that employers who already offer coverage 
will continue to do so . Some possible approaches include: 
-All ow insurers to o ffer a "good health " discount to employers with less than ten 
employees and average wages below some amount who have not had coverage 
for at least three years. 
- Dis count the workers' compensation coverage cost for employers who also offer heal th 
insurance to employees . 
-E l iminate rules or laws which increase the cost of coverage for small employers 
(under SO employees) for example , modified community rating , 
mandated benefits . 
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- Guarantee renewal of policies , or prohibit cancel l ation of policies for health 
or claim reasons (carriers could cancel policies for fraud or 
non - payment of premium) . 
Solution : Make it more attractive for employees with dependents to opt for dependent 
coverage , especially in cases where the spouse is covered under his/her 
employer ' s plan . 
- Encourage i nsurers to include a " children only " dependent rate in all group policies 
(thus , four group po l icy options would be available : employee only ; 
employee plus spouse ; employee plus spouse and children ; and empl oyee 
plus children) 
Solution : For those who do not have access to employer - sponsored coverage , improve 
the individual insurance market . 
- Eliminate rules or laws which increase the cost of coverage for individuals . 
- People who lose coverage because their insurer no longer has a Florida license 
or who move to a location where their company is not licensed to operate , 
should not face preexisting condition exclusions under their new 
coverage . Eliminate preexisting condition exclusions for these 
individuals who have maintained continuous coverage with no more than 
a 62 - day break. 
- Guarantee renewal of polici es , or prohibit cancellation of policies for health 
care or c l aim reasons (carriers could cancel po l icies for fraud or 
non- payment of premium ) . 
Goal : Substantially expanding the number of small employers sponsoring heal th care 
coverage for employees would further reduce the number of uninsured 
Flo r idians . According to the AHCA , 2. 1 million people are employed by small 
companies and approximately ha l f of these f i rms do not offer health care 
coverage . 10 Some of these people already have coverage , because they have 
indi victual policies or coverage under a spouse ' s policy , but many are probably 
uninsured . 
3 . Problem : A significant portion of the uninsured in Florida are living in poverty . 
Many are eligible for Medica i d but are not enrolled in the program . 
Solution : Enroll the eligible uninsured in Medicaid . 
- Move Medicaid AFDC and SSI populations into quality managed care in order to improve 
efficiency of care delivery and ensure coordinated care . 
·Apply quality and utilization management standards to the MediPass program . 
·Require Medicaid pre - paid hea l th plans to be licensed as HMOs , meeting HMO qual i ty , 
f i nancial solvency , and applicable enrollment standards before 
Medicaid recipients are enrolled . 
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·Create incentives for providers and health plans to participate in the Medicaid 
program . 
- Reform Medicaid administration to ensure accuracy and efficiency. 
- Use savings from these two measures to extend Medicaid coverage to a greater number 
of the poor , targeting those who are eligible for Medicaid but have 
not signed up , with children as the top priority. 
- Retain the Medically Needy program . 
Goal : Based on AHCA data , there are 700 , 000 people eligible for but not enrolled 
in Medicaid . Some of them may have employment - based coverage , but many are 
probably uninsured . Targeting children in enrolling Medicaid eligibles would 
significantly ease the uninsured problem in Florida . It is also important 
to acknowledge that there will always be some number of people in the "Medicaid 
eligible but not enrolled " category . If people do not have a presenting 
medical problem they are unlikely to apply for Medicaid . Nevertheless , those 
who are eligible but do not sign up for Medicaid do have access to health 
care and comprehensive coverage benefits -- although they will be counted 
as "uninsured ." 
4.Problem : A small number of Floridians do not have group coverage and cannot 
purchase insurance coverage because they have existing medical problems . 
Solution : Subsidize the cost of care for the medically uninsurable . 
- Re - engineer the state ' s approach to h igh - risk coverage . 
·Fund a study by an outside firm to analyze the experience of othe r states and 
recommend a program structure and financing method which 
incorporates the best aspects of these programs . Program 
structure should not provide perverse incentives for people to 
stay uninsured until they have medical problems . 
Goal : Achieving the other goals would stop the flow of new people who have existing 
medical problems but do not have health care coverage . Over time , this 
category will be eliminated as a problem . 
Effect of Our Proposal 
Meeting our goals would significantly reduce the number of uninsured Floridians . 
Florida should continue to search for ways to ensure that these people have some 
type of financing available for accidents or il lness . 
Implementing these measures would significantly reduce the number of uninsured 
Floridians . Florida should continue to search for ways to ensure that people have 
some type of financing available for accidents or illness . 
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It is important to recognize , however , that ours is a voluntary insurance system . 
Realistically , there will always be some number of people who choose not to purchase 
health care coverage (for example , young people in the 18 to 35 age range who have 
had few health problems may view dollars spent on health care coverage as dollars 
wasted) . Some employers will never offer coverage to their employees ; and some 
employees will not buy the coverage their employers offer . 
V. This Proposal Versus Other Alternatives 
This proposal offers a much di£ ferent approach to the problem of uninsured Floridians 
from more familiar alternatives . We believe that the approach presented here i s 
compelling for several reasons . Foremost is that the elements of our solution 
originate in the varied characteristics of the people who are uninsured . To truly 
help the uninsured , solutions must be targeted at their real problems . Second , 
this approach recognizes and concentrates improvement efforts on the neediest of 
our citizens -- those hundreds of thousands o f poor and uninsured Floridi ans who 
do not take advantage of the existing program des i gned to ensure their access to 
care . Finally , this proposal openly describes the principles which underlie the 
elements which make up the solution , and we believe these principles are shared 
by most Floridians . 
In the sections below , we discuss two major alternatives to our proposal . 
Insurance Reforms 
Under the label " insurance reforms " are proposals at the national and state level 
to change the private insurance market , ostensibly with the goal of increasing access 
for the uninsured . Targeting mainly small companies (less than 50 employees) and 
individuals , these proposals would require that all health insurers guarantee the 
issue of heal th insurance po l icies to small group and indi victual applicants , 
regardless of their heal th status . Preexisting condition excl usions would be 
strictly limited . Pricing for products in the small group and indi victual insurance 
market would be based on a " community average ," with no direct relat i on to the 
appl i cant ' s risk of accident or illness . 
Instead of improving access for the uninsured , these proposals would have the 
unintended and unfortunate result that more people would be uninsured . Why? The 
vast majority of the uninsured have no troubl e getting a health insurance policy ; 
they have trouble paying for i t . The only segment of the uninsured who are helped 
by guaranteed issue are the medically uninsurable -- a tiny segment of the uninsured 
population . 
The Small Group Market 
Results from a recent national survey of small employers underscore the fact that 
the problem is affordability , not being denied coverage due to health problems . 10 
Similar to the Florida expe r ience noted above , overall about half (51 %) of a l l 
small compani es (less than 50 employees) offer health insurance . The size of the 
firm is strongly related to the likelihood of coverage being offered -- 85 % of 
companies with 25 - 49 employees offer coverage , 70 % of those with 10 - 24 employees 
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offer coverage , and 44 % of companies with fewer than 10 employees offer health care 
coverage . 
Why did firms not offer coverage? The most common reason given was that premiums 
were too high . Many also said that their profits were variable , year - to - year , and 
premium increases too uncertain , and they worried that they would have t o take this 
benefit away in the future . Another reason frequently given was that their employees 
did not value the benefit -- they preferred higher wages , or were already covered 
elsewhere . A majority also cited adrninistrati ve hassles or not qualifying for group 
rates as problems. Firms who had recently dropped coverage cited similar reasons . 
I s coverage available to smaller firms (that is , is guaranteed issue needed)? The 
study reports that health insurance is widely available to small companies . They 
are approached by agents frequently , and often follow up on these contacts. 
Preexisting conditions or other health- related eligibility problems do not appear 
to prevent small companies from getting coverage : few companies report a worker 
or dependents being denied coverage due to poor health , and even fewer report being 
denied group coverage for this reason . 
A final point in the study is that small companies are very price - sensitive . As 
the price comes down even 10 %, an additional 10 % of the companies could be expected 
to purchase coverage . However , this prediction must be tempered by the knowledge 
that companies fear having to withdraw coverage, and the workers may not value the 
benefit highly . 
In 1993 , Florida passed sweeping reforms of the small group ( 1 - 50 employees) market , 
including requiring guaranteed issue , modified community rating , and the offer of 
two standard health plans . Many of these changes took effect in 1994, barely a 
year ago , and it is too early to judge their effect on the uninsured problem in 
Florida. 
The Individual Market 
The same types of reforms are now being proposed in Florida for the individual market . 
The effect of guaranteed issue and community rating will be severe in this market. 
Un f ortunately , these measures will not help the long- term uninsured , for most of 
whom affordability is the key issue . 
However , guaranteed issue will have an ef feet on the people who already have 
individual coverage : they will drop their coverage . In theory , if people are 
guaranteed a health insurance policy after becoming ill , ultimately no one will 
purchase coverage before any sign of medical problems and pay all those premium 
dollars before coverage is needed . Limiting preexisting condition exclusions further 
strengthens the economic incentives to forego insurance until becoming sick , since 
coverage would have to include current medical problems. 
Combining guaranteed issue with modified community rating is especially devastating . 
Community rating says that there must be one price for everyone covered ; guaranteed 
issue ensures that only the sick will purchase coverage, so that the one price will 
be very high . Before too long , no one will be able to afford individual insurance 
products . 
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With the proposed individual market insurance reforms , a tiny segment of the 
individual uninsured population , the medically uninsurable , will have access to 
heal th care policies in the short term . Most indi victuals or family purchasers will 
see rising prices put coverage even further out of reach . Over some period of time , 
few will be able to afford an individual market policy , and the private market for 
individual coverage will collapse . 
Subsidy Programs 
Some proposa l s , at both the state and national level , would reduce the numbers of 
uninsured by offering subsidies for the purchase of coverage to low- income families 
and individuals . The subsidy proposals recognize that the cost of coverage is the 
key factor for most of the uninsured . By lowering the out - of- pocket cost of coverage 
via a subsidy , more uninsured people would be able to purchase private health care 
coverage . However , subsidy proposals tend to ignore the data indicating that the 
majority of the uninsured are only temporarily without coverage . 
In a system in which most people already have private coverage , analysts warn that 
designing an effective subsidy program is very difficult . At most income levels 
above the federal poverty level , far more people are insured than uninsured , and 
the majority of those uninsured are not without coverage for long . A subsidy tied 
to income levels may well give current or soon- to - be purchasers an incentive to 
drop/not purchase coverage for some period in order to take advantage of a government 
subsidy program . An income - based subsidy can also provide a disincentive for people 
to achieve promotions or salary increases or to move from part - time to full - time 
work . If an increase in income makes a person or family ineligible for a subsidy , 
people might find themselves working longer and harder and yet receiving very little 
return in terms of their total wages and benefits . 
A recent study offers additional information on the effectiveness of subsidies for 
purchasing private coverage . 11 The study analyzed data from a national survey of 
medical care spending (including buyi ng health care coverage) to better understand 
people ' s decisions to purchase coverage , especially at lower income levels . The 
study concludes that 
• the availability of Medicaid and other public health services is a disincentive 
for the poor and near- poor to purchase health care coverage ; and 
•because of Medicaid and other factors , the perceived value of coverage relative 
to premiums is low for lower - income families , and a small subsidy may not 
encourage them to purchase coverage . 
There is much to be considered in designing an effective subsidy program to ensure 
that it is attractive to the people it targets and does no harm to the existing 
system in which 8 in 10 people have coverage and are satisfied with it . 
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APPENDIX A 
Insurance Portability In Florida 
Most Americans have health care coverage sponsored by their employer . Some have 
raised concerns that these people may be " locked into " their current jobs because 
they fear los ing their health care coverage if they change jobs. Such loss of 
coverage could occur if the new employer ' s heal th plan excludes benefits for 
preexisting health conditions for some period , or if the employer has a waiting 
period before new employees are eligible for the health coverage benefit . 
For that reason , the U. S . Congress and Florida Legislature have extended 
"portability" protection to most Floridians : 
l .Floridians who leave/lose employment 
• Federal law (COBRA) requires companies (both insured and self- insured) with 20 
or more employees to offer continuing coverage to employees who leave 
the company , and/or to their dependents . Employees pay the group- rate 
premium for the coverage plus a 2 % administrative fee . For those who 
quit their jobs or reduce their work hours , this coverage lasts 18 
months . 
• For employees and their families who leave companies with insured programs , Florida 
law requires insurers to offer a " converted policy" to anyone who has 
been covered under the group policy for at least three months . For 
insured groups with 20 or more employees , the conversion right is 
available when COBRA benefits expire . The converted policy cannot 
add any preexisting condition exclusions . ERISA (self- insured) groups 
are exempt from conversion requirements. 
2 . Floridians who die or divorce and leave dependents uncovered , or who become 
eligible for Medicare but still have non- Medicare-eligible dependents 
• In companies with 20 or more employees, Federal COBRA requires that a widow/widower , 
a divorced spouse and children , and a spouse nd children of an employee 
who gains coverage through Medicare , be of fered continuing coverage 
for up to 36 months . 
• For dependents of employees who die or divorce and who work/worked in companies 
with fewer than 20 employees covered under an insured group policy , 
Florida law requires insurers to offer a converted policy. This offer 
is also made to COBRA recipients after the COBRA period expires. 
3 . Children who reach an age when they no longer qualify under their famil y ' s plan 
• For group plans , in companies with 20 or more employees , Federal COBRA requires 
that employers of fer these children continuing coverage for up to 36 
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months . After COBRA coverage expires (for those who had coverage in 
an insured group) , insurers must offer a converted policy . 
• For individual policies , Florida law requires that a converted policy be offered 
to these children . ERISA ( self- insured) plans are exempt fr om 
conversion requirements. 
4 . Floridians with health problems 
• Florida law requires that an insured group policy give a person credit for the 
time the person was covered previously under similar coverage in 
determining if a preexisting condition exists . A gap of no more than 
30 days must have occurred between the ending of the previous coverage 
and the effective date of new coverage . 
• If a person has not had continuous coverage (with a gap of less than 30 days) : 
- a maximum 12 - month preexisting condition exclusion can be applied to a person 
covered under a small group policy in a company with 3 - 50 
employees . During this period , the onl y conditions which can 
be excluded are those which would have caused a "prudent " person 
to seek care in the 6 months before the coverage took effect ; 
and pregnancy existing on the effective date. 
- a maximum 24 - month preexisting condition exclusion can be applied to a person 
covered under a small group policy in groups with 1- 2 employees . 
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PURCHASING ALLIANCES 
Florida ' s CHPAs 
We support Florida ' s CHPAs , established in the Health Care and Insurance Reform 
Act of 1993 , because they are designed to be market makers . If CHPAs provide buyers 
with good information , ensure that everyone follows the same rules , and lets the 
market do the rest , this plan should help moderate costs over time . BCBSF 
participates in all CHPA regions . 
Purchasing Alliances 
In the debate about how the American health care system can be improved , the use 
of purchasing groups has received a lot of attention . Purchasing alliances are 
being introduced as a way to provide affordable heal th care coverage · to small groups 
and individuals . Purchasing alliances can be structured in many different ways , 
which affects the i r impact on cost and access to health care coverage. 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida believes the best way to assist small groups 
and individuals is to allow the market to respond to the needs of consumers . 
Private - sector alliances -- many of which are already in existence throughout the 
United States (i . e ., Florida Gulf Coast Health Coalition , the Council of Smaller 
Enterprises/Group Services , Inc . in Cleveland) -- are already working to accomplish 
this . These organizations meet the needs of their members by providing them with 
useful purchasing information and drawing them together to help them influence the 
market in the same manner as large groups . Because these alliances are voluntary 
and competing in the market , they are well - suited to respond to the changing needs 
of their members . 
Government - sponsored alliances are another proposed way to provide coverage to small 
groups and individuals . However , government - sponsored alliances have the potential 
to interfere with the market and add another layer of government to the system, 
adding cost without accompanying benefits . For example , health alliances in the 
Clinton proposal are large , regulatory entities that have the power to limit 
competition and stifle the market . These types of purchasing alliances will force 
most people to enroll in them and then largely determine which hea l th p l ans may 
be offered . If the purchasing alliances fail to achieve the expected savings , become 
unresponsive bureaucracies , or unacceptably limit the public ' s choices , no 
alternatives exist. A large , costly regulatory system will have been created , 
displacing existing ( and future) financing and deli very systems in favor of a system 
that may be unsatisfactory or inappropriate in the long run . 
We are opposed to mandatory government - sponsored health alliances . We think they 
would harm the development of the competitive market . However , we can support 
government - sponsored purchasing organizations for small businesses as long as they 
are market - makers ; voluntary and nonexclusive . These types of purchasing pools 
must prove their value if they are to survive because they operate under competitive 
market principles . Ideally , they should compete with privately- organized 
purchasing organizations and the traditional market for small employer business . 
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PURCHASING ALLIANCES 
In the debate about how the American health care system can be improved , the use 
of purchasing groups has received a lot of attention . Purchasing alliances are 
being introduced as a way to provide affordable heal th care coverage to small groups 
and individuals . Purchasing alliances can be structured in many different ways , 
which affects their impact on cost and access to health care coverage . 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield believes the best way to assist small groups and 
individuals is to allow the market to respond to the needs of consumers . The type 
of purchasing alliance that can best accomplish this is a private- sector alliance 
- - many of which are already in existence throughout the United States (i . e ., Florida 
Gulf Coast Health Coalition , the Council of Smaller Enterprises/Group Services , 
Inc . in Cleveland) . These organizations meet the needs of their members by providing 
them with useful purchasing information and drawing them together to help them 
influence the market in the same manner as large groups . Because these alliances 
are voluntary and competing in the market, they are well - suited to respond to the 
changing needs of their members . 
On the other hand , government - sponsored alliances are not the best way to provide 
coverage to small groups and individuals , and we do not support their establishment . 
Government - sponsored alliances interfere with the market and add another layer 
of government to the system , adding cost without accompanying benefits . For 
example , health alliances in the Clinton proposal are large , regulatory entities 
that have the power to limit competition and stifle the market . These types of 
purchasing alliances will force most people to enroll in them and then largely 
determine which health plans may be offered . If the purchasing alliances fail to 
achieve the expected savings , become unresponsive bureaucracies , or unacceptably 
limit the public ' s choices , no alternatives exist . A large , costly regulatory 
system will have been created , displacing existing ( and future) financing and 
delivery systems in favor of a system that may be unsatisfactory or inappropriate 
in the long run . 
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QUALITY 
Myths 
Physician specialists insist that personal physician based plans restrict patient 
access to providers. They claim that members of such plans are forced into them 
and that they have no choice . Finally , they contend that the quality of care in 
network based plans is lacking in comparison to traditional fee - for - service plans . 
Facts 
Choice -- People in Florida do have a choice in which type of health plan they 
purchase , and personal physician based plan members specifically are enrolled by 
choice . According to a survey of over 12 , 000 consumers (Sachs Group/Scarborough 
Research Corp . ) , 67 % of enrollees in personal physician based plans had a choice 
of plans , compared to only 42 % in fee - for-service plans. 
Quality Medical Care 
• Personal Physician Based Network Plan members were diagnosed at considerably 
earlier stages for four types of cancer than those enrolled in fee - for - service 
plans. (The American Journal of Public Health.) 
• Personal Physician Based Network Plan results equal to or better than results in 
fee - for - service plans in 14 of 17 quality of care measures . (Journal of the 
American Medical Association . 
•According to the National Health Interview Survey , physician based network plans 
offered screening in 5 out of 6 cancer screening tests , more often than 
fee - for - service providers . (Medical Care . ) 
Patient Satisfaction with Personal Physician Based Network Plans 
•According to a December 1994 public opinion poll , (Luntz Research Cos . ) : 
- 91 % o f personal physician based network plan members are satisfied with the quality 
of care , 87 % are satisfied with their choice of provider , and 77 % are 
satisfied with the cost of their health plan . 
Action Recommended 
None . Personal physician based plans offer unequivocal quality , choice , and savings 
for the consumers who choose them . Any legislation which restricts network based 
plans would harm the consumer by eliminating the type of plan they have already 
chosen , and increase health care costs for all . 
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QUALITY OF CARE REGULATION 
Issue 
The Heal th Care Reform Act of 1992 directed the Agency on Heal th Care Administration 
to simplify and modernize their regulatory programs , including those directed to 
quality of care . 
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes 
• Enhance quality assurance programs that rely on the measurement of desired outcomes 
and the identification of deficient care . 
• Ensure the delivery of high quality care and prevent quality of care deficiencies 
prior to their occurrence . 
Effects 
•Providers and citizens concerned about big government would be disturbed by the 
vague wording of these recommendations , which would give a government agency 
inordinate power in developing policies , measures , and standards to define 
the quality of care . 
•Providers would question the AHCA ' s purpose in this area given the fact that there 
is currently little scientific experience in the development and utilization 
of quality of care standards . 
•Patients and providers would be concerned that these recommendations would cause 
confusion and jeopardize sound clinical practices . 
•Taxpayers would criticize the state for wasting large sums of money to develop 
policies and standards when the federal government and national organizations 
are already committing vast resources to this effort. 
•Patients and providers would resent the heavy- handed intrusion into the practice 
of medicine by one governmental agency . 
Alternative Proposals 
The state ' s proposa l s rely too heavily on the AHCA to develop quality of care 
policies , measures , and standards . Quality of care policies , measures and standards 
should be developed through health care industry consensus , then adopted by the 
AHCA. The industry and the AHCA ' s efforts should be guided by the following: 
• Use scientifically- tested standards and policies supported by the federal 
government and private , national organizations as they are released . 
• Have the AHCA adopt only standards and policies for which scientific , medical 
consensus has been reached . 
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•Reaffirm the voluntary and educat i onal use o f practice parameters , (as was the 
original i ntention of the Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993) 
•Support the qual i ty assurance programs which are driven by customer needs . 
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RURAL HEALTH CARE 
Issue 
The Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993 authorizes the development of rural health 
networks as a means to ensure that quality health care is available and efficiently 
delivered to all persons in rural areas of Florida . 
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes 
•Continue implementation of the rural heal th networks , defined as anon- profit legal entity , 
consisting of rural and urban health care providers and others , that is organized 
to plan and deliver health care services on a cooperative basis in the rural area. 
•Al low the Agency specific rule writing authority . 
• Broaden network membership requirements to require all providers to abide by conditions 
of provider network agreements , including reimbursement and criteria for provision 
of uncompensated care . 
Effects 
• Requiring physicians to participate in rural health networks could result in physicians 
leaving rural areas and could increase the difficulty of recruiting physicians into 
these areas . 
•Commercially insured individuals currently living in rural areas may face fewer choices 
in the number of physicians available to them if greater numbers leave and fewer 
enter . 
•An intent of rural health networks is to maintain the existence of rural hospitals and 
reduce outmigration of health care services . Patients and taxpayers may not want 
some of these facilities to survive if they are inefficient (costly) , or substandard 
because they have insufficient patients for the staff to maintain their medical 
skills at a consistently high level . 
•Players in the competitive health care market would be harmed . Proliferation of 
regulatory control in rural areas would be a barrier to the development of managed 
competition . Once a monopoly environment was established through state 
intervention , it would be difficult for the marketplace to change it . 
•Citizens concerned about big government and urban health care market players will be 
concerned with the AHCA ' s use of a regulatory approach to rural health networks . 
No one knows what the impact of rural health networks will be ; the only model 
presented by the state is a private sector initiative in Iowa , not a regulatory 
approach . 
Alternative Proposals 
• The marketplace should determine which services are provided cost - effectively . 
• Rather than expanding a program whose implications are unknown , the state should evaluate 
the ability of the rural health networks established in 1992 legislation to meet 
the needs of their markets . 
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• Participation in rural health networks should be voluntary and more than one rural health 
network should be allowed to operate in an area to promote competition and give 
consumer choice . 
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SELF-REGULATION 
A . Introduction 
A major component of BCBSF ' s draft comprehensive reform proposal is the establishment 
of a priva t e organization to develop information standards to allow informed 
consumer purchasing. Called the Health Insurance Standards Board (HISB) , 
this organization would establish a form of self- regulation of the health 
care industry by 1) defining tools needed to measure heal th plan and provider 
performance , 2) developing standards for information reporting , 3) setting 
standards for disseminating consumer information , and 4) developing a 
benchmark benefit package for comparison shopping . 
The purpose of this brief paper is to explain industry self- regulation , and describe 
the elements that make self- regulation effective . 
B.Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation of an industry exists when members from within an industry develop 
regulatory or standard-setting activities in the absence of explicit legal 
requirements . Self- regulation can take a number of forms . The most 
prevalent form is establishment of codes of ethics , mostly associated with 
professional organizations . Other forms include standard- setting 
organizations like the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and 
accreditation organizations such as the Joint Commission of Accreditation 
of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO ) . 
The primary reason industries establ ish self- regulation efforts is to adopt 
regulation at their own initiative and to respond in their own style to 
opportunities and threats posed by the external environment . Industries that 
self- regulate can use it to their advantage by control l ing the f l ow of 
information a regulatory agency receives , and by getting the government to 
endorse industry self- regulation so that t he i ndustry can manage itself . 
C.Effective Self-Regulation 
Effective self- regulation depends on three things : 1) intra- industry cooperation ; 
2) agreement upon the regulation ; and 3) mechanisms for monitoring and 
compliance . 
Intra- Industry Cooperation 
The first step to achieving intra-industry cooperat i on is to bui l d consensus among 
members of an industry that there is a problem and self- regulation is needed . 
The threat of governmenta l regulation to so l ve the problem is often a powerful 
motivator to spur industry action . However , the movement of an industry to 
regulate itself must be perceived t o be in the public interest and not 
self- serving . The development of authority solely in the self- interest of 
the industry may provide government with an impetus to init i ate its own 
regulation . 
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For example , the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) has recently called 
for self- regulation to restrict prescription drug prices in an effort to 
limit average annual drug price increases to the general rate of inflation. 
Their initiative came within weeks of a damaging Congressional report which 
suggested the industry was pricing products too high . In this case , PMA ' s 
voluntary effort to self- regulate was too late 
and perceived as self-interested regulation , and only reinforced perceptions 
generated by the Congressional report that prescription drug prices need 
to be controlled. 
Agreement on the Regulation 
Once agreement within the industry is reached on the need for self- regulation and 
the regulatory activity is not perceived as industry self- interest , effective 
self- regulation requires uniform acceptance of regulation . That is , all 
members of the industry must agree on similar processes for guiding the 
development of regulation . When building agreement on regulation , one 
important aspect to consider is the members ' interpretation of the regulation . 
While some members will follow the regulation very narrowly and 
legalistically, some will allow for more individual interpretation . To 
resolve this problem , industry members need to be monitored and held 
accountable for their actions . 
Monitoring and Compliance Mechanisms 
Monitoring and compliance also requires industry- wide acceptance of standards and 
agreed upon sanctions to be effective . Some experts believe that 
effectiveness of self- regulation is positively related to the number of 
provisions for sanctions for noncompliance and their perceived threat of 
sanctions . Critics of self - regulation claim that regulation by an industry 
often lacks adequate sanctions because regulators many times do not have 
legal mandates for compliance . They claim that without legal mandates, 
industry compliance and monitoring may be superficial . Furthermore , unless 
the audit procedure used for monitoring is seen as a legitimate and effective 
vehicle of accountability , it will serve more as a buffer from criticism 
than as a true monitoring device . 
The problem of compliance without legal mandate is illustrated in FASB ' s history . 
Originally , FASB ' s authority for setting general accepted accounting 
principles was established when it was endorsed by state boards of public 
accounting and by major professional organizations . However , real authority 
did not come until the Securities and Exchange Commission required that all 
registrants ' reports filed with the Commission follow FASB standards . 
In sum , effective self- regulation depends on 1) intra- industry attention to a problem 
and cooperation in establishing self- regulation that is perceived to be in 
the public interest ; 2) industry agreement on the processes used for developing 
regulation; and 3) industry consensus on the standards that will be used 
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to monitor and agreed upon sanctions for noncompliance (it is also helpful 
if industry self- regulation receives government endorsement to strengthen 
member compliance) 
D.BCBSF Position 
The external conditions necessary to initiate self- regulation of consumer 
i nformation are present within the heal th care industry . There is widespread 
agreement that our current system does not allow for informed consumers , 
an essential ingredient of a well - functioning market . Additionally , there 
is a real threat of more government regulation . However , despite the 
recognition of these problems and external threat , the health care industry 
is so complex , with such variety of stakeholders , that building intra - industry 
cooperation to address these problems is probably the most difficult step 
in implementing effective self- regulation . 
BCBSF believes that the HISB organization designed comprehensive reform proposal 
will be able to effectively initiate and implement self- regulation that will 
improve conditions in the system, eliminating the need for further government 
regulation . First , the HISB organization would have members from all 
stakeholders in the heal th care market (e . g ., consumers , employers , providers , 
insurers) , and be governed by a Board of Directors composed of representatives 
from each stakeholder group . This will facilitate cooperation within the 
industry and open the way for successful self- regulation . Secondly , the HISB 
organization will work closely with the government to craft legislation that 
grants the HISB organization authority to develop information standards , 
set information reporting and collection requirements , and establ i sh 
monitoring and compliance rules . This will strengthen HISB ' s influence 
within the industry and provide for effective self- regulation . 
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STANDARD BENEFIT PACKAGE 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida supports a benchmark benefit package to be 
used to promote comparability between health plans , in support o f employer and 
employee decision making . The purpose of this package would not be t o limit the 
products offered in the market or make this package t he minimum (the floor ) . Rather , 
the benchmark package would provide a baseline measure , against which industry 
actuaries , employers , employees , and individual consumers could evaluate health 
plans for comparability of services and price . 
Government could use the cost of the benchmark package to establish the basis for 
a purchase subsidy for low- income Americans . Purchasing groups could use the 
benchmark as a measuring tool for providing information to members . 
We envision that the benchmark plan would be relatively lean in terms of benefits , 
to keep it affordable for most people . 
I P55 
STANDARD BENEFIT PLAN - ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL 
Background 
• SB 2390 (1992) directed 
1 . the Department of Insurance (DOI) to update the Basic and Standard plans for small 
employers , which insurers in the small group market were mandated to 
offer (inside and outside the CHPAs) ; and 
2 . the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) to develop by 12/31/93 , and 
subject to legislative approval , a Basic Benefit Standard to be used 
as the " floor " set of benefits for all Floridians . 
• Insurers in the small group market began offering the DOI ' s revised Basic and 
Standard products on 01/01/94. 
•AHCA has proposed its Basic Benefit Standard be adopted by the 1994 Legislature . 
Analysis 
•There is a need for a standardized set of benefits to allow consumers in the small 
group market to compare health care plans . 
•A standardized set of benefits is also necessary to establish a benchmark premium 
for a state - funded subsidy program for low- income Floridians to purchase 
private health insurance . 
•AHCA ' s Basic Benefits Standard (BBS) is not a good "package " for low- income 
Floridians : to keep the premium price down , the co - insurance amounts are 
extremely high for the non- HMO versions (50 - 50 or 60 - 40) Low- income 
Floridians cannot afford this level of out - of - pocket costs . 
• The DOI ' s Standard product reflects the benefits included in traditional insurance 
products . It is priced a little lower than independent actuarys ' estimated 
prices for the AHCA ' s BBS ; more importantly , it has 80 - 20 co- insurance , making 
out - of- pocket costs much lower for this product . 
Proposal 
• Do not enact the AHCA ' s BBS . 
• Consumers in the small group market should use the DOI ' s Basic and Standard products 
for comparison purposes . 
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• Joint Commission of Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 3 - 5 
• Financial Accounting Standards Board 6- 7 
• (Florida ' s) Health Care Board 9- 10 
•National Association of Insurance Commissioners 11 - 13 
• National Committee for Quality Assurance 14 - 17 
•Other organizations 18 
Federal Reserve Board 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Prospective Payment Assessment Commission 
Physician Payment Review Commission 
NOTE : 




- Financing and cost 
- Relationship to the industry 
- Regulatory authority 
- Relationship to the government 
- Mechanisms for dissemination of information 
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HIGHLIGHTS 
Joint Commission of Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
• Not - for - profit organization that sets standards of quality for accreditation of 
hospitals 
• Twenty- eight member Board of Commissioners with 22 members from the medical industry 
and 6 from the general public 
• Financed from survey fees and membership dues 
Financial Accounting Standards Board 
• Independent , private - sector organization that sets general accounting standards . 
• Six member board with senior- level accounting experience appointed by the Financial 
Accounting Foundation 
• Funded by the Financial Accounting Foundation through sales of publications and 
donations from constituents 
Florida ' s) Health Care Board 
•Arm of the Agency for Health Care Administration that reviews and approves all 
Florida hospital and nursing home budgets 
• Eleven member board appointed by the Governor 
•All fund i ng is from HCA 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
• Private organization of state insurance commissioners that sets reporting 
requirements for U. S . licensed insurers and optional standards for regulators 
• Twelve member Executive Committee with representation for all regions of the country 
• Financed from filing fees , publication , and subscription sales 
National Committee for Quality Assurance 
• Independent quality assurance review organization for managed care organizations 
• Fourteen member Board of Directors comprised of providers , users , and purchasers 
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• Financed from accreditation review fees and grants 
IP56 - July 1993 
JOINT COMMISSION OF ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS (JCAHO) 
History/Origins 
In 1917 , the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hea lthcare Organ izat ion (JCAHO) 
was established by the American Col lege of Surgeons to survey hospitals and accredit 
them for minimal acceptable standards. 
In 1966 , JCAHO refocused its direction and revised its standards to reflect optimal 
achievable standards , rather than minimal acceptable standards. This change 
occurred for two reasons: 1) most hospita ls in the country had achieved the minimum 
standards , and 2) other organizat i onal entities , such as federal and state regulatory 
agencies , had incorporated similar standards into their regulations . 
In addition , during the 1960's , there was increased concern about the quality of 
care provided by other types of healthcare organizations . The JCAHO took this 
opportunity to expand its original scope, and , in collaboration with national 
professional organizations , began developing standards and programs to accredit 
other facilities , such as: 
- long term ca re facilities (established in 1965) ; 
- psychiatric/substance abuse/community mental health programs (1970) ; 
- ambulatory care (1975) ; 
-hospi ces (1983 , terminated in 1990) ; 
- managed care (1988 , terminated in 1990) ; and 
- home care (1988) . 
In the past few years , criticism from external groups that the JCAHO is "merely 
a t rade organization " has prompted additional significant changes . These changes 
include : 
- requiring that the commission share more information and liberalize its 
confidentiality policy ; and 
- appointing non- health care professionals to the board ; and 
- developing more sophisticated accreditation categories. 
Miss i on 
" The mission of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
is to improve the quality of heal th care provided to the public . The Joint Commission 
develops standards of quality in collaboration with heal th professionals and others 
and stimulates health care organizations to meet or exceed the standards through 
accreditation and the teaching of quality improvement concepts ." 
Structure 
The Joint Commission is governed by a 28 - member Board of Commiss i oners with the 
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members from the following organizations : 
- 7 from the American Medical Association 
- 7 from the American Hospital Association 
- 3 from the American College of Physicians 
- 3 from the American College of Surgeons 
-1 from the American Dental Association 
- 1 from the American Nurses Association 
- 6 from the public (2 seats will be filed in 1994) 
JCAHO staff is made - up of more than 500 physicians , nurses , health care 
administrators , medical technologists , psychologists , respiratory therapists , 
pharmacists , durable medical equipment providers , and social workers who are 
employed part of full - time to perform surveys . 
JCAHO surveys are scheduled every three years . Accreditation requirements for 
hospitals consist of compliance with 2 , 000 standards in 23 general categories , 
including medical staff , governing body , quality assurance , surgical and anesthesia 
services , social work , special care units , utilization review and plant , technology 
and safety management. 
Financing 
The JCAHO is a not-for - profit organization (files a 990 form) financed from survey 
fees and membership dues . In 1990 , total revenues of $44 . 4 million were up 16 . 5 % 
from the previous year . JCAHO ' s net income also rose more than 300 % to $1 . 4 million 
in 1990 from $329 , 631 in 1989 . The increase in revenues was largely due to a 20 % 
increase in the number of surveys performed by the JCAHO and a corresponding 16.7 % 
increase in survey fees collected . 
Relationship to the Industry 
In 1990 , 5 , 408 accreditation surveys of various healthcare facilities were performed 
collecting $30 . 9 million in survey fees , or an average of $5 , 710 per survey. About 
80 % of the nation ' s hospitals are accredited by the commission . Fewer than 1 % of 
hospitals surveyed fail to meet standards and are denied accreditation outright . 
However , the JCAHO has long maintained that it is an "educational and consultative 
service " less interested in not granting accreditation than it is in improving the 
situation . 
Regulatory Authority 
JCAHO has no statutory authority to regulate hospitals . However , JCAHO ' s hospital 
accreditation program is recognized by 43 states for hospital licensure purposes 
and , more importantly , by the federal Health Care Financing Administration as a 
requirement to receive Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements . 
Relationship to the Government 
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In recent years , HCFA (and some consumer groups) has expressed concern that the 
JCAHO is too close to the industry and that its surveys were too lax in some areas . 
In Congressional testimony in 1990 , Gail Wilensky reported that HCFA began to see 
an increase in the number of significant deficiencies found by state agencies , which 
had not been identified by the Joint Commission . HCFA found about one - third of 
the hospitals reviewed were out of compliance with Medicare conditions . 
Mechanisms for Dissemination of Information 
Information is disseminated to facility members in a number of ways : publications , 
seminars , and telephone help- lines. 
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FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD (FASB) 
History/Origins 
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were passed to 
help get the U. S . economy moving again in the midst of the Depression and bring 
confidence to the financial markets by regulating and setting accounting and 
reporting standards . These laws also granted authority to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue regulations concerning the contents o f financial 
statements. 
From the onset , it was clear that the SEC would require experts to provide adequate 
guidance in the development of standards . Thus , in 1938 , the American Institute 
of Accountants (now the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) 
responded by upgrading the activity of its Committee on Accounting Procedure to 
help auditors identify "generally accepted accounting principles " (GAAP) . This 
committee (whose name has changed over the years) operated until 1970 , when the 
perception that it was protecting the interests of auditors and their clients more 
effectively than the public ' s interest caused irreparable damage to its credibility . 
In response , a cross - section of business leaders agreed to establish the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in 1973 , as an independent , private- sector 
organization that sets accounting standards . 
The FASB organization differed from its predecessors by not being part of the auditing 
establishment . FASB was designed to stand alone with full - time Board members , 
accountable only to the public for their performance in determining what constitutes 
GAAP . 
Mission 
FASB , empowered by the Securities and Exchange Commission , has a fiduciary duty 
to protect the public interest by gett ing relevant and reliable information to the 
capital markets and identifying and setting "generally accepted accounting 
principles ." 
Structure 
Located in Norwalk , CT , FASB has six board members and a chairman . Board members 
are appointed by a 16 member board of trustees from the Financial Accounting 
Foundation (FAF) . All seven members are experienced senior- level accountants with 
different backgrounds (public accounting firms , university faculties , and corporate 
settings) . The members serve a five year term with the possibility for one 
reappointment. The Board is supported by a 40 person professional staff . 
In 1991 , members received $290 , 000 annual sa l ary and the chairman $350 , 000 . 
FASB , usually follows a six step problem- solving process : 
Step lidentifying a problem : A problem is identified when FASB discovers divergent 
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practices for reporting transactions resulting in significantly different 
presentations and impaired comparability . Sources for problems are: SEC , 
business publications , and corporate financial managers and analysts . 
Step 2Agenda setting : The Board determines what issues they will address . One 
of their criteria is that a consensus is likely to be reached -- if consensus 
seems difficult to achieve , a project is typically not created . 
Step 3Preliminary deliberations : The Board , with staff support , defines the issues 
and identifies all possible resolutions . This step involves a substantial 
amount of time and effort . Input is requested from constituents through 
formal channels , such as task force meetings , responses to "discussion 
memoranda ," and occasionally public hearings. Once research is complete , 
the Board turns to sorting through the arguments , prioritizing and building 
consensus . 
Step 4Tentative solution : A working draft is produced which includes all the 
arguments and possible outcomes . 
Step SContinued deliberations : The Board firms up the tentative resolution and 
works out the technical glitches . Some input from outside sources takes 
place at this phase , primarily through informal channels . 
Step 6Final resolution : A final resolution is released in a " Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards ." These resolutions must be used in financial 
statements. The compulsion comes from professional ethics standards , state 
licensing laws , and the SEC . 
Financing 
In an attempt to insulate the Board from political pressures , the Financial 
Accounting Foundation ( FAF) was given responsibility for raising the funds to operate 
FASB . In 1991 , the operating budget was approximately $12 million . The two primary 
revenue sources are sales of publications and donations from constituents . 
FASB does not receive any government funding . 
Relationship to the Industry 
Considered at one time to be protecting the interests of auditors and their clients , 
the present FASB organization was established in 1973 by a cross - section of business 
leaders. Although not as damaging , the influence of special interest groups in 
today ' s FASB continues to cause credibility problems . The appointment of FASB board 
members and a large portion of funding (companies and accounting firms provided 
35 % of FASB ' s $15 million annual budget in 1992) is conducted by the Financial 
Accounting federation which is heavily influenced by accounting firms and corporate 
America . 
Regulatory Authority 
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FASB ' s authority for setting GAAP was established when it was endorsed by state 
boards of public accounting and by major professional organizations (including the 
AICPA , the Fi nancial Executives I nstitute , the National Association of Accountants , 
the Securities Industry Association and the American Accounting Association) . 
However , real authority did not come until the SEC required that all registrants ' 
reports filed with t he Commission follow FASB standards . 
Relationship to Government 
FASB ' s relationship to government is one of a standard and policy setting 
organization . The FASB organization i s a political structure designed to settle 
significant financing and accounting controversies . FASB is not designed to be 
a democratic body , in that i ts r ulings are not supposed to reflect the desires of 
the majority of those who participate in the process . Instead , FSB is supposed 
to protect the public interest and bring confidence to the financial markets when 
resolving problems . 
Mechanisms for Dissemination of Information 
Final resolutions are typ i cally expressed in the " Statement of Financia l Accounting 
Standards ." 
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(FLORIDA'S) HEALTH CARE BOARD 
History/Mission 
The Heal th Care Reform Act of 1992 created the Agency for Heal th Care Administration 
and also established the Heal th Care Board . The 11 member board is a reconstituted 
Heal th Care Cost Containment Board , responsible for hospital and nursing home budget 
and expenditure regulation , other health care provider data reporting , and special 
studies requested by the governor and the legislature . 
Structure 
The board is made up of 11 members appointed by the governor , subject to confirmation 
by the Senate , to service a 3 year term. Members of the board consist of : 
- four members from the provider community ; one individual physician with experience 
in a ambulatory setting , one representative of nursing homes , and two 
representatives from hospitals (one for - profit and one from a not - for - profit) , 
- three members from the business community , 
- one member f r om the insurance industry , and 
- three members that are consumers (one from a major consumer organization) . 
The board reviews each hospital and nursing home budget on a micro - management level 
to determine whether the gross revenue per adjusted admission or the net revenue 
per adjusted admission contained in the budget is " just , reasonable , and not 
excessive ." 
In determining the budget , the board considers the following criteria : 
a . the ability of the hospital to earn a reasonable rate of return based on reasonable 
and justifiable costs , 
b . the impact of patient days attributable to the medically indigent , 
c . the impact of patient days reimbursed by Medicaid and Medicare , 
d . the research and educational services provided by the hospital if it is a teaching 
hospital , 
e . the cost and efficiency of providing the current and proposed services , 
£ . the change in hospital costs as measured by changes in the severity of illness , 
including changes in the case mix , and 
g . the accuracy of precious budget submissions compared to the actual experience 
of the hospital . 
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The board is also responsible for hearing all appeals . 
Financing 
All funding for the Health Care Board is from AHCA . 
Relationship to the Industry 
The board works on a individual basis with hospitals and nursing homes . Presently , 
there is movement by AHCA to be more supportive of the hospital industry in an effort 
to enlist their support for the agency ' s reform efforts . 
Regulatory Authority 
The board has statutory authority to review and approve all Florida hospital and 
nursing home budgets . 
Relationship to the Government 
The Health Care Board is a heavily politicized organization . In addition to all 
the members being appointed by the governor , all resources ava i lable to the board , 
including staff , is controlled by the agency . 
Mechanics for Di ssemination of Information 
Pursuant to the statute , the board may "publish its finding in connection with any 
review conducted under this section in the newspaper of the largest circulation 
in the county in which the hospital is located. " 
Moreover , AHCA has recently expressed some desire t o move the board away from a 
micro - management level of budget review to a more informational type funct i on . 
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 
History/Origins 
Created in 1871 to help the states monitor multi - state insurance companies , the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) established reporting 
requirements for U.S . licensed insurers and optional standards for regulators. 
NAIC is a voluntary association made up of the heads of the insurance departments 
of the 50 states , the District of Columbia , and four U. S . territories . 
NAIC also develops and adopts model laws and regulations that state insurance 
commissioners collectively believe are needed to regulate the insurance business . 
Many states adopt NAIC ' s models , but NAIC has no authority to require individual 
states to adopt these models . 
Mission 
" The objective of this body is to serve the public by assisting the several state 
insurance supervisory officials , individually and collectively , in achieving the 
following fundamental insurance regulatory objective : 
l . Maintenance and improvement of state regulation of insurance in a responsive and 
efficient manner ; 
2 . reliability of the insurance institution as to financial solidity and guaranty 
against loss ; 
3 . fair , just , and equitable treatment of policyholders and claimants. " 
Structure 
Membership of the NAIC is made up of the heads of each state insurance department , 
the Distr i ct columbi a , and four U. S . territories . NAIC divides the country into 
four regional zones where a chairperson , v i ce - chairperson , and secretary are 
elected . These officers serve on the national Executive Committee that is in charge 
of managing and directing subcommittees , task forces , and the Support and Services 
Office (SSO). 
The SSO is the management and staff for the NAIC and i s responsible for research , 
analysis , data collection , report generating and dissemination , government liaison , 
regulatory drafting and educational development. Staffing of the SSO has grown 
in the last few years , from 72 in 1987 , to 142 in 1991 . NAIC ' s employment growth 
reflects its efforts to provide more service to state regulators. Much of the staff 
expansion has occurred in the information systems department . 
NAIC holds two national meetings in June and December . 
Financing 
In 1991 , NAIC estimated its total revenue to be $16 . 2 million . NAIC relies on 
insurance data filing fees for the majority of its funding , (46 % of its revenue) . 
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The remaining revenues are received through the sale of publications , 
subscriptions , services , and software. State assessments ( government funding) were 
estimated to be about 5 . 3% for 1991 . 
Relationship to the Industry 
NAIC establishes solvency regulations and insurance standards for insurers and state 
regulators . However , NAIC has no governmental authority to enforce its standards . 
That authority resides with state insurance departments . 
Regulatory Authority 
In 1945 , Congress enacted the McCarran- Ferguson Act delegating the day- to- day 
business of insurance to the states ; each state has the exclusive authority to 
establish and implement solvency regulation within its jurisdiction . 
Relationship to the Government 
As mentioned above , NAIC establishes only voluntary standards for insurers and state 
regulators . In the state- by- state system of solvency regulation now in place , NAIC 
cannot compel states to accept and implement its standards because Congress has 
allocated that authority to the states themselves . Even if states voluntarily 
granted the authority to the NAIC to enforce solvency standards on insurers , the 
NAIC ' s standing as a regulator would always be weak because its authority would 
be subject to revocation at any time by each state ' s legislature . Moreover , even 
with universal adoption by state insurance departments , NAIC ' s solvency standards 
are too genera l to be effective to achieve uniformity since they do not set specific 
criteria or practices . 
In an effort to strengthen the relationship to government , NAIC recently adopted 
an accreditation program to encourage state insurance departments to comply with 
its new financ i al regulation standards . States that satisfy NAIC ' s financial 
regulation standards wi l l be publicly recognized by NAIC as " accredited" while 
departments not in compliance will rece i ve guidance on how to comply . (The 
accreditation period lasts for 5 years . ) 
Mechanisms for Dissemination of Information 
NAIC has expanded its data base services extensively in the l ast few yea r s . The 
most recent s i x years of financia l data for about 5 , 200 i nsurance companies are 
maintained on- line for regulatory analysis . 
NAIC has legal and regulato r y data bases to help state regulators share information 
about troubled multi - state insurers . Among these data bases there was an on-l ine 
access to the names of more than 49 , 000 insurance companies , agencies , and agents 
that have been subject to some type of formal regulatory or disc i plinary action . 
NAIC has also developed a national complaint data base that will help each state 
assess policyholder complaints from other states about multi - state insurers and 
agencies . 
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In 1990 , NAIC established a new computer - based financial analysis system to identify 
potentially troubled companies requiring state action. 
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NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE 
(Prepared by : Karen Stoops , Quality/Utiliza t ion Program Mana gemen t) 
History/Origins 
NCQA is part of a unique partnership between Managed Care Organizations and 
purchasers of managed care . The organization was founded in 1979 as a joint effort 
by Group Health Association of America (GHAA) and American Managed Care and Review 
Association (AMCRA) in response to Federal concern about the quality of care and 
service delivered by Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) . In 1987 , NCQA revised 
their Board of Directors . In 1988 , the organization conducted a feasibility study 
relative to the NCQA becoming independent. NCQA received a grant from the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation for $308 , 000 . In addition , GHAA conducted a " fund drive " 
with Managed Care Organizations and purchasers and matched grant funds . NCQA is 
currently self- supporting through Accreditation Review fees and grants . 
The organization has performed external reviews since 1979 and began accreditation 
surveys in January 1991. NCQA Standards include Quality , Improvement , Utilization 
Management , Credentialling , Members Rights and Responsibilities , Preventive Health 
Services , and Medical Record Documentation . 
Mission/Goals 
The principal purpose of the NCQA is to provide a survey process which will assist 
in ensuring the delivery of quality care by prepaid health care organizations . 
The survey will result in recommendations regarding the adequacy of the Plan ' s 
process for monitoring care and appropriate response to all aspects of care , 
including but not limited to the quality of medical care and service , appropriate 
utilization , accessibility , availability , and acceptability. 
The NCQA Board of Directors recognizes that the growth of HMOs and managed care 
systems has intensified the interest of employers , unions , and other purchasers 
and consumers of heal th services in evaluating the quality of care provided by managed 
care systems . In response , the NCQA review process provides the additional measure 
of assurance to purchasers of health care services that HMOs not only have internal 
quality improvement mechanisms , but a l so that these mechanisms function in an 
effective manner . 
Specific goals include : 
- Foster development and strengthening of internal systems for quality improvement . 
- Assess quality of medical management . 
- Develop re liable and comparable measures of system performance relative to Quality 
of Care and Quality of Service . 
Structure/General Organization 
NCQA incorporates a unique partnership through the organization of their Board o f 
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Directors , Users Group , Review Oversight Committee , and Standards Committee . 
The Board of Directors is self-perpetuating and is comprised of 14 members . The 
membership includes: 
- 4 managed care organization industry physicians 
- 3 health services researchers 
- 3 employee representatives 
- 1 union representative 
- 1 consumer representative 
- 1 physician consultant 
The Users Group is comprised of 10 members who are purchasers of heal th care services . 
The group has active participation , meets twice a year , and provides input into 
standards and revisions . Membership includes AARP , Bank of America , Communications 
Workers of America, Ford , GE , GM , National Consumers League , Pacific Bell , United 
Auto Workers , and Xerox . 
The Review Oversight Committee (ROC) provides NCQA ' s internal quality assurance . 
The ROC reviews every survey assessment report , checking for consistency and makes 
the official accreditation decisions . The committee is comprised of 5 physician 
directors and chief executive officers . 
The Standards Committee is comprised of 8 members who are active in the managed 
care organization field . The members are appointed by the board and receive input 
from the Review Oversight Committee and the Users Group . The Committee ensures 
that NCQA standards are comprehensive , consistent with quality improvement theory , 
and responsive to the needs of NCQA customers . 
Financing and Cost 
The National Committee for Quality Assurance is a non- profit , independent, external 
quality assurance review organizat i on for managed care organizations . NCQA is 
currently self- supporting on Accreditation Review fees and grants . 
Relationship to the Industry 
NCQA provides external assessment of Managed Care Organizations , including HMOs , 
Preferred Provider Organizations ( PPOs) , Point of Service ( POS) , and Medical Groups . 
NCQA has performed research and development and consultation to the Managed Care 
industry . For example , NCQA worked in a coordinated effort with GHAA on the Heal th 
Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) project . 
In addition , NCQA has worked with the Michigan Project , which includes the State 
of Michigan , three automobile companies (Chrysler , Ford, and General Motors) , and 
the United Auto Workers collaborating in the development and implementation of a 
review process . The project has four components : 
- The Plan's quality improvement systems will be assessed using NCQA ' s established 
standards . 
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-Medical record reviews will be conducted , using explicit criteria , to assess the 
quality of care provided to patients in five diagnostic categories : hypertension , 
diabetes , prenatal care at initia l visit , prenatal care at 28 weeks , and otitis 
media follow- up . In addition , four preventive services have been identified 
for review : prostate cancer screening , breast cancer screening , cholesterol 
screening , and childhood immunizations for Hemophilus Influenza B . 
- Level of employee satisfaction with individual HMOs will be assessed using a survey 
instrument developed for GHAA . 
-Access to mental heal th and substance abuse services will be assessed; the measures 
employed address , for example , the organization , availability, and utilization 
rates of these services . 
NCQA has worked closely with the Ford Motor Company and the United Auto Workers 
to conduct reviews of HMOs out side of Michigan . The reviews focused on the structure 
and operation of the quality improvement system, the Plan's policies and 
implementation of these policies relating to preventive services , and access to 
mental health substance abuse services . 
Several national and local accounts specifically require accreditation by NCQA . 
GM goes so far as to ask , " if not pursuing accreditation with NCQA - why you have 
chosen not to ." These accounts include , AT&T , Ryder , Ameritech , GM , Xerox , Ford , 
SunTrust , Barnett Bank , Alachua County School Board , and Southeast Bank. Blue Cross 
Association National Accounts has found that NCQA is encouraging employers to request 
NCQA accreditation in their Requests for Proposals to assure that effective quality 
programs are in place . 
Regulatory Authority 
NCQA currently is contracted to perform accreditation surveys and/or external 
reviews in Florida , Oklahoma , Kansas , and Pennsylvania . Florida is the first state 
to require HMOs to receive accreditation every two years to maintain state licensure . 
NCQA is one of three organizations (NCQA , Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations , Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Health Care , 
Inc . ) approved to conduct accreditation reviews . Oklahoma chose NCQA to perform 
accreditation surveys . Their state HMOs can choose to have NCQA conduct the survey 
rather than having a state review . Kansas approved NCQA to conduct HMO reviews 
for licensure purposes . NCQA is one of three organizations that has been approved 
by the Commonweal th of Pennsylvania to review HMOs for purposes of state licensure . 
Relationship t o the Government 
NCQA is an independent , non- profit organization . The organization has no official 
relationship to the federal and state governments . It has provided consultation 
to the National Health Care Reform. In addition , NCQA has consulted the Health 
Care Financing Administration (HC FA ) relative to Medicaid and Medicare , NCQA 
currently is contracted to perform accreditation surveys and/or external reviews 
in Florida , Oklahoma , Kansas , and Pennsylvania . 
Mechanisms for Dissemination of Information 
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Mechanisms for the dissemi nation of information include , but are not limited to , 
conferences , press releases , trade associations , and employer groups . 
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OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 
Federal Reserve Board 
• Independent body of the executive branch 
• Seven members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate 
• Funded through Federal Reserve System, no federal funding is appropriated 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
• Independent body of executive branch 
• Five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate 
• Funding is half federal , half by fees 
Prospective Payment Assessment Commission 
•Advisory arm of Congress ; also makes recommendations to HHS 
• Funded separately by Congress 
•Twenty- five professional staff members 
• Sometimes works in subgroups 
Physician Payment Review Commission 
•Advisory arm of Congress ; also works with HHS 
• Thirteen members appointed by Office of Technology Assessment 
• Funded separately by Congress 
•Twenty- five professional staff members 
•Works only in commission as whole 
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STANDARDIZED CLAIM FORMS 
Issue 
The Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993 directed the AHCA to develop 
standardized claim forms t o be used by all Florida licensed insurers and health 
care providers in an effort to reduce administrative costs . 
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes 
• Requiring all insurers to accept certain HCFA forms . 
•Requiring all insurers either bill a patient ' s insurer directly o r provide the 
patient with a properly completed claim form . 
• Providing flexibility on the use of provider identifiers until a federal standard 
is defined . 
•Authorizing the AHCA to adopt EDI standards as they are adopted officially by the 
federal government . 
•Establishing a task force , coordinated by AHCA , to assist insurers and providers 
in simplifying explanations of benefits , standardization of claims 
attachments , and to promote other consumer protection and administrative 
simplification projects. 
Effects 
•Physicians who have manual claims filing systems , especially those in solo practices 
or in small offices (many of which exist in rural areas) could be financially 
at risk if the AHCA moves too quickly in requiring the automation of claims 
filing . 
•Floridians concerned with big government would disapprove of AHCA establishing 
a government - funded task force to assist insurers and providers in their 
business options , when there are other organizations already performing these 
tasks . 
•Considerations for changing the filing procedures for all health care players must 
include the necessary time and expense to educate patients, employers, and 
providers. 
• The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is developing and adopting 
national standards for the exchange of electronic data . National standards 
must be thoroughly tested to ensure that all players in the health care market 
have a workable system . A poorly designed and tested system will only increase 
costs for everyone in the end . The state should not adopt interim standards . 
Alternative Proposal 
IP5 7 - February 1 , 1994 
•Encourage and support the efforts of the health care industry to standardize and 
automate data and claims processing . The market has a vested interest in 
ensuring as fast a change as possible , yet the market also understands the 
cost - effectiveness of doing it right the first time . 
•Encourage the AHCA to adopt ANSI standards for providers and insurers as these 
standards are officially adopted in both the public and private arenas . 
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STATE EMPLOYEE PLAN 
Issue 
The Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993 (SB 1914) allows the AHCA to move 
the State Employee Program into CHPAs if certain criteria are met . The state needs 
to determine whether and how to proceed with placing state employees in CHPAs . 
If CHPAs are not used for state employees , the Legislature may consider other changes 
in the structure of the state health benefits program . 
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes 
• Instituting a financial incentive which will allow state employees to consider 
their own costs in selecting plans (i . e ., varying the employee ' s contribution 
for health insurance depending on the cost of the plan selected) . 
• Designating the AHCA , in consultation with the Department of Management Services , 
as the state agency responsible for determining the health benefits for state 
employees . 
•Granting AHCA maximum flexibility in choosing health plans available to state 
employees (i . e ., authorizing the AHCA to consider only cost and additional 
benefits when selecting insurance carriers , reducing the requirement of S 
HMOs and S PPOs to 2 and 2) . 
Effects 
• Some state employees might be asked to contribute more to the cost of their coverage ; 
the increase could be quite large depending on how the state ' s contribution 
is determined . 
•State employees might lose substantial control over their health care insurance 
choices if the AHCA is granted maximum flexibility in choosing heal th benefits 
for state employees . One form this could take is limiting state employees ' 
choices of health plans from S to 2 . 
Alternative Proposal 
The state should not substitute decision- making by the AHCA for the decision- making 
of state emp l oyees . State employees should choose from among S PPOs and S HMOs , 
and the state should assure that the AHCA uses multiple criteria (e . g ., access to 
quality care , member satisfaction) in selecting the 5 , not just price . 
If the state employees are moved into CHPAs : 
• The state/AHCA should ensure that the SB 1914 criteria are met : 
- no reduction in state employee health benefits , 
- no increase in costs for the state of its employees , and 
- quality of care for state employees increases . 
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• The state should structure the state employee program like the Federal Employee 
Program , allowing choice among a wide variety of AHPs , recognizing geographic 
differences in the cost of medical care and health care coverage , and basing 
the employer ' s contribution on an average of the largest plans . 
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TARGETS 
Introduction 
The Florida Health Care Reform Act of 1992 calls for the establishment of targets 
for health care spending and coverage . We support the attempt to develop targets 
and believe they are consistent with a results - oriented approach to government . 
The current approach calling for cost and access targets must be broadened to include 
efficiency and quality of health care . 
Cr i tical Issues 
• Need t o be concerned about efficiency - the value per cost not just cost 
- Need to make the system more efficient so that for a given level of benefit , costs 
will be lower 
- Need to understand that people will want more and more benefit , so overall costs 
are not likely to decrease 
• Defining the problem in efficiency terms leads to a concern that we have quality 
targets , not just cost and access targets 
• Need to appreciate the inf l uence on targets of factors external to the health care 
system 
- violence , illegal drugs , and AIDS are having a great effect on costs 
- Florida ' s economy greatly affects access ; fluctuations in the economy will affect , 
positively or negatively , the progress toward meeting targets 
•Concern that : 
- targets are developed and used in a way that takes into account the enormous 
conceptual and measurement challenges ; and 
- targets are real i stic , given the problems and feasible solutions 
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THE UNINSURED 
Background 
We have developed a comprehensive problem statement to guide our approach to 
reforming the health care system . Our problem statement emphasizes the issues of 
access and cost . A major component of the access issue is the number of Americans 
who have no health insurance coverage . These people are dependent on their own 
financial resources to pay for both ordinary medical services and those related 
to chronic and catastrophic illnesses . 
Policy makers and others have tended to oversimplify the problem of the uninsured 
by defining it as a small employer problem . Tow of the most frequently cited 
statistics affecting recent or proposed policy reforms related to the uninsured 
are that 1) the majority of the uninsured are workers or the dependents of workers ; 
and 2) the majority of these workers are employed by small companies. while these 
statistics could lead to the conclusion that sma l l companies and their workers are 
the uninsured problem , in fact , the uninsured are not a homogeneous group . 
Furthermore , health care system reforms aimed at the uninsured which focus only 
on the small group market will not have a substantial impact on the uninsured problem . 
In order to address the problems of the uninsured adequately , we must understand 
the facts related to this population . 
The Uninsured 
At any given time , approximately 1 in 5 Floridians are uninsured . In Florida , 
BCBSF ' s 1992 Under 65 Market Segment Study indicates that 24 % of the population 
is uninsured (2 , 710 , 287 people) . 
•Half of the uninsured Floridians will be without coverage for less than 6 months 
(based on 1992 Urban Institute findings) . 
- Some Floridians are temporarily uninsured because they are between jobs . 
- This category also includes the majority of working Floridians who are without 
coverage for some period of time , for example , because of eligibility 
waiting periods . 
• Some Floridi ans are chronically uninsured even though they are working ( " chronic " 
means their spells without insurance last longer than 6 months) 
•Other Floridians are chronically uninsured while they are chronically unemployed 
(that is , they are unemployed for longer than six months) . 
Discussion 
These facts about the uninsured make several things very clear . The bas i c issues 
remain access and cost . However , assuming that the uninsured represent a relatively 
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homogeneous group of peopl e , for whom relatively simple (uni - dimensional) solutions 
will suffice , will lead us to the wrong solutions . In fact , uninsured Americans 
are a very heterogeneous population . Because of the differences among the 
uninsured , grounded primarily in the reasons for their lack of health insurance 
coverage , solutions which provi de access to health care coverage for the uninsured 
must be heterogeneous as well . 
We have defined f i ve categori es within the uninsured population (the estimates 1of 
size are rough approx i mations at this time , de rived from available data , and have 
been rounded to simpl ify comparison) : 
l . Those who are working but temporarily uninsured , and their dependents (estimate : 
1 , 000 , 000) 
This category includes people in new jobs who are subject to waiting periods and/ or 
pre- existing condition exclusions . I t also includes those who wo r k for 
employers who temporarily drop (lapse) their heal th care plans . These people 
have an income during their uninsured period . Nevertheless , they have probably 
chosen to go wi thout coverage until el i gible for the i r new employer ' s plan . 
2 . Temporarily unemployed ( that is , for up to six months) people and their dependents 
(estimate : 300 , 000) 
People who are temporarily out of work may be be t ween jobs or laid off , or they 
may be recent graduates looking for the i r first job . 
The people in this category of 
they are unemployed . 
unemployed Floridians . 
the uninsured have chosen to forego coverage while 
They are not representative of most temporarily 
The majority of those who are between jobs have some 
kind of interim health care coverage . 
3 . Those who are working but chronically uninsured worke r s , and their dependents 
(estimate : 600 , 000 - 700 , 000) 
The majority of these people work for small companies , but some work for lar ge f i rms . 
Most of these people are in low wage jobs , and the cost of individual coverage 
represents a s i gnificant part of their income . 
(Note : We hope to break this group down by company characteristics , includi ng size) 
4 . Chronical l y unemployed peopl e and their dependents (estimate : 500 , 000 - 600 , 000) 
Those who have not been working for 7 or more months include the long- term unemployed , 
early retirees , and the very wealthy . 
For the long- term unemployed , paying for insurance coverage becomes impossible or 
1 These numbers are very preliminary . Fo cus sho uld be o n the 
catego ries, n o t their estimated size, while we dev elop mo re 
a ccurate figures. 
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is a much lower priority than purchasing other necessities , such as rent 
or mortgage payments , food , and clothing . As the economy has slowed , this 
group has grown . Reforming the health care system will have little impact 
if lack of coverage is due to the overall economic conditions of the nation 
and Florida : inadequate funding of programs for the poor ; a growing 
lower-income population , and few government programs to help the near - poor ; 
and unemployment due to poor economic conditions . 
For ear l y retirees , the expense of insurance coverage may be weighed against health 
status , and these uninsureds may decide to risk go i ng without coverage until 
Medicare coverage begins. That is , these early retirees might be able to 
afford some type of coverage , but have chosen to spend disposable income 
on other goods and services . 
5 . Insured workers with non- insured dependents (estimate : 150 , 000 dependents) 
A certain percentage of these workers are in large companies , but most probably 
work for small companies . Some of these workers are employed by firms which 
choose not to offer dependent coverage ; in other cases , employers may offer 
dependent coverage , but contribute little or nothing to its cost . In either 
situation , workers have chosen (probably for reasons of cost) not to cover 
dependents . 
Many workers have grown children who do not yet earn enough to afford health care 
coverage , or who may be working for a company which does not offer coverage . 
These children add to the rolls of the uninsured . 
Sprinkled across all of these categories are the approximately 5 % of Floridians 
who are chronically ill . They have lost their coverage , given it up due to cost , 
or never had it . 
Solutions 
Focusing on small employers to solve the problem of the uninsured in Florida will 
be ineffective : if all chronically uninsured , working Floridians somehow got 
coverage tomorrow (and some of these people work for large companies) , the number 
of uninsured Floridians would be reduced from 2 . 7 million to roughly 2 . 1 million . 
A variety of solutions must be developed , tailored to the needs of each sub- group 
of the uninsured population . There are ranges of solutions for each sub- group . 
In this section we recommend sets of solutions and point out other alternatives 
available . (Fora summary of these solutions , and a comparison to Florida government 
measures targeting the various types of uninsured , see Table 1.) 
As these solutions are reviewed , it is important to keep in mind that , by law , Florida 
already offers protection to Floridians when they lose coverage (see Appendix A) . 
The solutions proposed below are designed to coordinate with these existing laws . 
l.Temporarily uninsured workers and their dependents 
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We recommend : 
- Temporary policies 
- Limited benefit policies 
·catastrophic coverage policies (either with high deductibles , or price- driven 
[e . g . , approximately $30]) 
·policies with strictly limited number of benefits 
- Make the cost of health insurance tax deductible for self-employed individuals 
- Make continued coverage under COBRA available for all size groups and individuals 
- Encourage employers to make coverage available on the first day of employment 
- Require employers to communicate health insurance choices to departing employees 
Other alternatives : 
- Prohibit waiting periods 
- Mandate that individuals purchase continued coverage (COBRA) when they leave a 
job 
- People in this category are temporarily without coverage , have an income, and have 
chosen not to purchase interim coverage ; do nothing 
- Mandate that employers make coverage available on first day and that employees 
buy it 
2 . Temporarily unemployed people and their dependents 
We recommend : 
- Increase the unemployment insurance premium by a small amount to pay for continuing 
heal th insurance coverage during a spell of unemployment (e . g ., include 
a voucher with the unemployment insurance check which recipients could 
use toward continuing their previous employer ' s coverage (COBRA) , or 
toward a temporary coverage policy) 
- Temporary policies 
- Limited benefit policies 
·catast rophic coverage policies (either with high deductibles , or price - driven 
[e . g. , approximately $30]) 
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·policies with strictly limited number of benefits 
- Make the cost of health insurance tax deductible for self- employed individuals 
- Make continued coverage under COBRA available for all size groups and individuals 
- Encourage employers to make coverage available on the first day of employment 
- Require employers to communicate health insurance choices to departing employees 
Other a l ternatives : 
Sarne as #1 
3 . Chronically uninsured workers and their dependents 
We recommend : 
- Require employers to allow insurers to do sales presentations to employees on 
company time 
- Allow employers to handle administration of insurance for employees who choose 
to purchase coverage as individuals 
- Offer limited benefit products 
·catastrophic coverage policies 
·policies with a limited number of benefits 
- Require employers to provide information (e . g ., payroll stuffers) on available 
plans 
- Employees who pass on income test are eligible for government subsidies 
- Make coverage tax deductible for individuals 
We realize these measures will not solve all the problems of this group . 
Nevertheless , if the measures we recommend only increase the number of employers 
offering cove r age by 15 %; increase the number o f employers facilitating the purchase 
of individual coverage by 15 %; and increase the number of employees purchasing 
coverage even without employer help by 15 %; the number of chronically uninsured 
workers will be reduced from 600 , 000 to 330 , 000 -- nearly cut in half . 
4.Chronically unemployed people and their dependents 
We recommend : 
- Define an income break ; make government subsidies ava i lable for the poor and 
near- poor to purchase private coverage 
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- Extend the COBRA time period 
- For the group who pass the income test : FCHA- type program for the sick ; low- cost 
coverage for the healthy : 
-catastrophic coverage (either with high deductibles , or price- driven [ approximately 
$30]) 
·other limited benefits coverage 
5.Covered workers with non-covered dependents 
We recommend : 
- Require that all group policies include a "children only " dependent rate (thus , 
four group policy options would be available : employee only ; employee 
plus spouse ; employee plus spouse and chi l dren ; and employee plus 
children) 
- Extend the current group coverage for children to all unmarried children up to 
the age of 30 , unless the child is eligible for some other group policy 
Summary of Solutions for the Uninsured 
- Temporary policies 
- Limited benefit policies 
·catastrophic coverage policies (either with high deductibles , or price- driven 
[e . g. , approximately $30]) 
·pol i c ies with strict l y limited number of benefits 
- Make the cost of health insurance tax deductible for individuals 
- Make continued coverage under COBRA available for all size groups and individuals ; 
extend COBRA time period 
- Encourage employers to make coverage available on the first day of employment 
- Require employers to communicate health insurance alternatives to current (e . g ., 
payroll stuffers) and departing employees 
- Increase the unemployment insurance prerni urn by a small amount to pay for continuing 
health insurance coverage during a spell of unemployment 
- Require employers to allow insurers to do sales presentations to employees on 
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company time 
- Allow employers to handl e a dministration of insurance for employees who choose 
to purchase coverage as individuals 
- Define an income break ; make government subsidies available for the poor and 
near- poor to purchase private coverage 
- For the group who exceeds the income test : FCHA- type program for the sick ; low- cost 
coverage for the healthy : 
·catastrophic coverage (either with high deductibles , or price - driven [approximately 
$30]) 
·other limited benefits coverage 
- Require that all group policies include a "children only" dependent rate 
- Extend the current group coverage for chi l dren to all unmarried children up to 
the age of 30 , unless the child is eligible for some other group policy 
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APPENDIX A: COVERAGE PROTECTION 
Current federal law required insurance carriers and employers with more than 20 
employees to offer COBRA coverage to peop l e who leave their jobs . 
In addi tion , Florida statutes require that : 
• If a person who is disabled , pregnant , or undergoing treatment for dental problems , 
works for a company which terminates health care coverage , the carrier must 
extend coverage for these conditions for up to 12 months following termination . 
• If a person is eligible for coverage under a prior employer ' s plan , the succeeding 
carrier ' s plan must meet the minimum level of benefits offered by the prior 
carr i er . 
•I f an employee becomes disabled prior to the date a succeeding carrier ' s policy 
takes effect , the succeeding carrier is limited in setting pre - existing 
condition restrict i ons . 
•All licensed insurance carriers selling group policies to Florida residents must 
offer conversion po l icies to individuals who terminate their group coverage . 
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APPENDIX B: STATISTICS ON THE UNINSURED IN FLORIDA 
(Source : BCBSF Market Research staff , 08/93) 
This population breaks down as follows : 
Employee uninsured 
group market 
self- employed 1 , 022 , 935 
195 , 238 
Sub- total 1 , 218 , 173 
Unemployed uninsured 
not in active job market 383 , 131 
early retirees 27 , 931 
Sub- total 411 , 062 
Temporarily unemployed (unemployed 204 , 729 
for 6 months or less) 
Dependents 863 , 747 
TOTAL UNINSURED (99. 5% OF 2,710,287) 2,697,711 
The total number of temporarily unemployed people in Florida is 460 , 465 . From the 
above figures , 4 4 % of these people have no coverage . However , the majority of these 
people , approximately 56 %, have interim coverage of some kind : 
Government (CHAMPUS , Medicaid , Medicare) 61 , 815 
Private group coverage (COBRA) 163 , 539 
Individual policies 30 , 382 
Total 255,736 
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UNIVERSAL ACCESS 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida supports the nation setting a goal of "access 
to health care " for all Americans , with 95 % of the population having " insurance 
coverage " (either private or public) , by the year 1999 . Achieving this goal requires 
implementing changes designed to improve the functioning of the market -- making 
sure that purchase information and appropriate incentives are in place to make the 
market operate more efficiently , and that rules and regulations which restrict 
suppliers (insurers) ability to offer a variety of lower - cost , innovative products 
are revised . Rapid expansion of access without these accompanying structural 
changes would just make an already serious cost problem even worse . 
We do not support achieving universal access through an employer mandate to purchase 
coverage for their workers . While an employer mandate is intended to help achieve 
universal access , it would actually end up making universal access more difficult 
to achieve and hurting workers in small companies . Employers with thin profit 
margins would be forced to reduce other forms of compensation , cut their work forces , 
or in the worst cases , go out of business -- placing more people out of reach of 
coverage . The impact on the Florida economy would be especially devastating because 
we have so many small businesses and low wage jobs . 
We also believe that an employer mandate to provide health insurance would set a 
bad public policy precedent and expand the role of the government beyond what we 
believe it should be . The government mandating that employers are responsible for 
their employees ' health care would extend the authority of government to place the 
responsibility for a social service , like insurance coverage , on an employer. 
If businesses can be mandated to include health insurance in their compensation 
to their workers , why not auto , property , and life? 
We acknowledge that even with the changes in the system to make coverage more 
affordable , there may be some people who choose not to purchase heal th care coverage 
(sometimes called " free riders " ) . The appropriate action for dealing with the 
" free rider " problem depends on the size of this group . After all of the other 
reforms have had a chance to demonstrate their effectiveness , if the number of free 
riders is small , the health care system can still function well and ignore their 
behavior . However , if the number of free riders is large enough to cause problems 
for the system, there may be a need to mandate purchase of basic health care coverage 
for everyone. As a last resort , we would support an individual mandate to purchase 
insurance coverage . 
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